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Preface
Given a renewed interest in pragmatism among both philoso-phers and sociologists, I would expect this study to arouse a certain amount of interest among academic readers in these 
and related fields. The motivation for this book, however, and my en-
thusiasm for the ideas of John Dewey and C. Wright Mills have ori-
gins other than the attention devoted in recent years to pragmatism. 
This study arises from a lingering dissatisfaction with the positivist 
tendencies and narrow scientific preoccupations of my chosen field of 
study, sociology. In my view, these trends have prevailed within the 
disciplinary mainstream at the expense of engagement with the social 
and human problems engendered by modern capitalist society, prob-
lems of major concern to both Dewey and Mills, among many others.
Amid the competing influences of structural functionalism, sym-
bolic interactionism, Marxism, and the Frankfurt School of Critical 
Theory, all of which shaped my intellectual development as a doc-
toral student at the University of California at Berkeley in the 1960s, 
my reading of Dewey imparted an arresting sense of his pertinence to 
social science. Dewey has, ever since, remained a critical voice in my 
thinking. Better known to sociologists, and someone many consider 
the “conscience” of the field, Mills put his own stamp on many of 
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Dewey’s views and concerns, translating them into an intellectually 
vital and politically relevant approach to sociological inquiry. The 
interrelated work of Dewey and Mills, to my mind, brings to light 
the limitations of the discipline by projecting the outlines of a sociol-
ogy devoted to “the big picture,” as Mills would say. While Dewey is 
perhaps the most prominent and influential American thinker of the 
twentieth century, a man of immense intellectual range, the “radi-
cal” sociology of Mills remains a beacon of inspiration for those who 
believe that sociology can make a difference in the real world of social 
and political actors. The combined insight and vision of these think-
ers offer, I believe, a renewed sense of the purpose and possibilities of a 
genuinely critical sociology based on the spirit and principles of prag- 
matism.
It is my hope that this book will contribute something of value to a 
continuing conversation about pragmatism and its place in American 
social thought and academic life. My critique of sociology and treat-
ment of pragmatism are specifically intended, however, to show how, 
taken together, the work of Dewey and Mills provides an intellectual 
and conceptual framework for the transformation of sociology into a 
more substantive, comprehensive, and socially useful discipline. The 
result would be a sociology capable of restoring a sense of moral and 
political purpose to a discipline still largely beholden to positivist sci-
ence and the encumbrances of professionalism. If my arguments for a 
pragmatist-based sociology encourage present and future generations 
of aspiring sociologists to think seriously and self-reflexively about 
this philosophy’s critical potential, I shall regard this work a success. 
More generally, in the spirit of both Dewey and Mills, I hope this 
book will encourage future sociologists to regard the discipline as not 
only a science but also an intellectual, moral, and political enterprise.
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Toward a Pragmatist Sociology

Introduction
The current revival of interest in the philosophy of pragmatism and particularly the writings of John Dewey is a development both significant and intriguing. Since its inception pragmatism 
has had a strong if not always recognizable presence in American in-
tellectual life, and Dewey, his controversial reputation notwithstand-
ing, has been widely regarded as the leading American philosopher 
of the past century. Why, after years of relative dormancy, we have in 
recent times been witnessing renewed interest in Dewey and pragma-
tism is a question with any number of answers. Whichever ones we 
choose, it is in any case clear that given its historical, intellectual, and 
theoretical connections to sociology, the rebirth of pragmatism has 
special significance for the field.
It can plausibly be argued that the rejuvenation of pragmatism is 
one manifestation of the exhaustion in the late twentieth century of 
prevailing strains of modernist thought, in particular the foundation-
alism and monistic structure of Enlightenment philosophy and its 
conceptions of reason and democracy. On this view, it is no accident 
that pragmatism has reemerged from the intellectual subconscious in 
the context of the movement called “postmodernism,” with which it 
shares strong antifoundationalist and antiessentialist impulses. While 
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the classic pragmatists would take umbrage at the simplistic relativiz-
ing and antihumanist elements injected into this movement by post-
structuralism, the two philosophies agree on certain basic principles. 
Most fundamental is a firm belief in the conditioned, variable, and 
provisional character of knowledge and, correspondingly, skepticism 
toward the notion of “Truth.”
The turn to pragmatism, however, can hardly be accounted for 
by the popularity of postmodernism. Rather, the pragmatic turn is a 
response to some of the same underlying conditions that precipitated 
the postmodern movement. Most important among these has been 
a crisis in many of the established intellectual outlooks, narratives, 
and habits of thought in the American university accompanying the 
rise of multiculturalism, consumerism, and other cultural develop-
ments. These trends have manifested themselves in an identifiable 
democratization of social, cultural, and political attitudes that reso-
nate with pragmatism’s antielitist tendencies.
Debates surrounding the meaning of pragmatism and its signifi-
cance are nothing new in the field of philosophy. In sociology, how- 
ever, where Dewey and George Herbert Mead are considered philo-
sophical “fathers” of the Chicago tradition of symbolic interaction-
ism, there have been novel signs of enthusiasm for exploring American 
sociology’s philosophical roots. Regrettably, this nascent movement 
has tended to focus on narrow technical readings of Dewey from 
within the discipline’s existing theoretical and methodological per-
spectives and attitudes. While this kind of perspective on Dewey can 
be useful for the further development of theory and research, it ig-
nores a larger and more compelling set of issues. Dewey’s philosophy 
puts forth a view of the entire scientific enterprise that is fundamen-
tally at odds with mainstream conceptions and practices in today’s 
social sciences. What is most important about this philosopher is his 
distinctive way of thinking about and viewing the world, including, 
most importantly, his integrated views of the nature and role of sci-
ence and his holistic conceptions of human thought and society. In 
short, Dewey’s outlook and his understanding of science and its role 
in society have provocative consequences for the very meaning and 
purpose of sociology as a scientific discipline.
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Viewed from this angle, a more promising approach to a reconsid-
eration of pragmatism would involve a broad and critical look at the 
present state of sociology, with its problems and promises, and a strat-
egy for transforming it into a different kind of discipline, one that is 
more socially, morally, and politically concerned and relevant. This 
requires that we look, preferably from a fresh perspective, at what 
many consider problematic trends in the discipline stemming from 
longstanding pressures both internal and external to the profession. 
The purpose of such an assessment would be to consider the ways 
in which aspects of pragmatism, and Dewey’s thought in particular, 
could redress the failure of sociology to reach its full potential as a 
science of social and human import. Of considerable importance, this 
would involve positioning sociology as a discipline capable of playing 
an active and meaningful role in public life.
In an attempt to exemplify this kind of sociology, the present 
study is organized largely around the key sociological writings of 
C. Wright Mills. Although a whole chapter is devoted to the thought 
of Dewey, the book is woven with ideas that were salient in Mills’s 
work, including his critiques of the profession and American society. 
Mills inherited from Dewey an abiding concern for the public role the 
social sciences should play as a normative science focused on societal 
problems, the well-being of the individual, and the moral, ethical, 
and political concerns of society and its members. Mills attempted to 
implement Dewey’s goal of making the problems of human beings liv-
ing in a modern, complexly organized, and rapidly changing society 
the focal point of the social sciences and of intellectual life generally.
The history of American sociology is a story that could be told in 
many different ways. These ways reflect not only the authors’ particu-
lar goals and intents but refract their biographies, social backgrounds, 
ideological orientations, and intellectual and practical dispositions. 
Such factors have obviously shaped my view of the discipline and 
my skepticism toward its contributions to a truly meaningful science 
of human society. While the history of sociology is not my primary 
concern, what I attempt in this book proceeds from a critical attitude 
toward the discipline’s overall development and present state. The 
condensed historical overview with which I begin focuses primarily 
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on a set of issues related to how the discipline came to define itself 
over time and for what reasons. I’ve chosen to emphasize the unhappy 
consequences of sociology’s search for a legitimate scientific identity. 
While conceding the importance of its scientific efforts, I criticize the 
failure of the discipline to achieve a coherent sense of purpose and 
relevance as a result of its single-minded search for scientific prestige.
The thesis of this book comprises two interrelated parts. The first 
part is largely diagnostic, briefly exploring the past and present state 
of the discipline, critiquing its dominant tendencies, and offering his-
torical examples of alternatives to conventional sociological approach-
es. The second, “remedial,” and larger part examines the possibility of 
a different kind of sociology predicated on the views of John Dewey 
and the work of C. Wright Mills. By stressing the similar intellectual 
and moral visions of both men, this aspect of the discussion empha-
sizes the contrast between an “ivory tower” conception of the disci-
pline and a definition of sociology as a critical social science engaged, 
in emulation of Mills, in the practice of turning “personal problems” 
into “public issues.”
To begin, regarding the discipline’s failings, divergent and com-
peting theoretical and methodological approaches have divided soci-
ology into rival factions or “schools” throughout much of its history. 
While these divisions have in certain respects created a healthy dy-
namic, they have also led to overly narrow thinking, fragmentation, 
and false issues. As a result, the discipline has lacked coherence and 
a sense of common purpose.
This state of affairs is largely an outcome of persistent attempts 
to convert the field into a positivist science in emulation of the natu-
ral sciences. Championed by those with a highly circumscribed view 
of science, the push toward positivism, in which science is seen as a 
search for immutable laws employing the methods of natural science, 
has slowed the progress of the field by diverting attention from the 
inherently human meanings and significance of sociological concepts 
and analysis. It is now common knowledge that causal explanations 
modeled exclusively on the “hard” sciences and simple fact-gathering 
techniques are in and of themselves inadequate and often mislead-
ing practices for an aspiring science truly representative and worthy 
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of its subject matter. Given the historical character and complexities 
of society and the intricacies of human consciousness and agency, it 
is doubtful that sociology will ever achieve the kind of generalizable 
knowledge and powers of prediction displayed by the natural sciences. 
Despite this reality, the assumptions and methods of positivism are 
still granted credibility grossly disproportionate to their usefulness for 
genuine sociological knowledge.
The quest for a positivist sociology has manifested itself in what 
is usually called “formalism.” A familiar feature of philosophical and 
 scientific thought, in the context of sociology this term bears un-
avoidable negative connotations, referring to the restrictions imposed 
on theory and research by pressures to achieve scientific rigor. Formal-
ism is that aspect of sociology burdened by an excess of abstraction, 
analytical constructs, formulaic methods, and mechanistic explana-
tions, the perfection of which is presumed to be a prerequisite of sci-
entific respectability. While conceding the importance of abstraction, 
I argue that unnecessary abstraction and its various forms of baggage 
can only hurt a discipline that thrives on substance.
Formalist sociology, in short, is woefully disconnected from the 
realities of social life. At worst, formalism is both cause and effect of 
the myopic vision of a discipline that in its pursuit of scientific status 
is often more preoccupied with itself than its purported object of 
study. While analytical clarity and technical procedure are essential 
to any scientific endeavor, a glance at the mainstream of sociology 
over the past seventy-five years shows that, despite opposition and 
more promising trends, such preoccupations have exercised undue 
influence on the discipline.
Many share in the contention that formalism can never play more 
than a limited and subsidiary role in sociology, whose major purpose 
is to describe, explain, and understand the structure, functioning, and 
human significance of real societies. The generalizing and purifying 
functions of formalist procedures are hardly suitable for the study of 
a social world that is full of particulars and complexity and that is 
historical and evolutionary in character; in other words, an object of 
study that is complicated and always changing. If anything, such pro-
cedures interfere with the theoretical depth and empirical concrete-
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ness demanded of a science of social life that is true to its object, in 
the sense of grasping the realities of its subject matter in a way that is 
meaningful and of practical consequence.
One strategy for overcoming the constraints of formalist soci-
ology would be to adopt a broadened conception of science. Cer-
tainly, the mere fact that society and its inhabitants occupy time 
and space binds them to the laws of the physical universe. Also, that 
we are biological creatures and still to some degree live in a natu-
ral environment means that we are to some extent bound by the 
forces of nature. These are perhaps among a few of the reasons why 
sociology has been unable to dispense entirely with lawlike proposi-
tions and positivist methods. At the same time, such methods are 
by themselves incapable of providing adequate explanations and 
understandings of social reality in its full human significance. Our 
conception of social science accordingly needs to include a variety 
of methods that capture both the human and “natural” dimensions 
of social life.
A related strategy of creating greater coherence of purpose and a 
common disciplinary vision entails a larger problem: overspecializa-
tion. The extreme division of labor in sociology stems largely from 
the sheer size and complexity of the field. Layered over this division 
of labor, however, and intensifying its negative effects, are conflicts 
resulting from epistemological and ideological differences over what 
constitutes, or should constitute, knowledge in the social sciences. 
In place of productive differences we often find competing theoreti-
cal factions and a consequent lack of analytical coherence across the 
field. This appears in endless disputes over how to bring different 
levels of social analysis together, which often requires a reconciliation 
of seemingly incompatible theoretical perspectives and frameworks. 
While such difficulties are to some extent reflective of the multiple 
levels and dimensions of social life, these disputes are often artificially 
created and wasteful controversies resulting from a formalist frame of 
mind. For seriously reflective sociologists, such a situation calls for a 
new mode of thinking, more deliberate and honest consideration of 
the nature of the subject matter and how to represent it, and a recon-
sideration of the goals and practices of the discipline.
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The second part of the thesis of this book is a multilayered re-
sponse to these problems. At the most general level, the ultimate 
challenge to sociological formalism is a serious rethinking of the very 
purpose of the discipline. Formalism is the cause of a disembodied 
and fragmented sociology but also a symptom of a failure to defini-
tively answer a fundamental question: Is sociology merely a science, 
an endeavor aimed at “knowledge for its own sake” and the needs of 
special interests, or is it an enterprise destined to play a critical intel-
lectual, social, and political role in the larger society?
The primary goal of this book is to explore a groundwork and 
rationale for the latter conception. I begin by examining past tradi-
tions of social criticism rooted in the intellectual and moral concerns 
that shaped the work of some twentieth-century social thinkers. 
Looking backward historically, we find two interrelated lines of 
scholarly descent. The first, now largely forgotten, is a critical tradi-
tion in American social thought dating from the writings of the in-
stitutional economist Thorstein Veblen. This tradition includes the 
popular writings of a generation of post–World War II social critics, 
the primary thrust of whose work found explicit and more expansive 
expression in the sociology of C. Wright Mills. The second, allied, 
tradition is the philosophy of pragmatism as brought to fruition in 
the work of John Dewey. Mills is the pivotal figure joining these two 
bodies of work.
Next, I turn to a number of continuities between Mills and Dewey 
that express the affinities between these traditions and that I believe 
are crucial for an informed critique of mainstream sociology and the 
development of an alternative to formalism. While the importance of 
pragmatism to Mills’s early social-psychological writings was eventu-
ally overshadowed by his turn to classical European theory, pragma-
tism remained a frame for much of his thinking and informed the 
theoretical structure, style, and method of his work. This is evident 
not only in Mills’s enduring focus on the Deweyan theme of prob-
lem solving, most apparent in The Sociological Imagination, but also 
in his frequent reliance on the pragmatist nomenclature of rationality, 
knowledge, symbols, communication, democracy, and so forth, cen-
tral motifs in Dewey’s philosophy. I argue that a fuller understand-
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ing and appreciation of the critical vision of Mills, a vision with a 
potential for transforming sociology into a more relevant field, can be 
attained by placing him in a comparative and contrasting relationship 
to Dewey’s pragmatism. At the same time, I see Mills’s contributions 
as inadequate to the task of bringing about fundamental change in the 
field. Rather, this task depends on a reappropriation of Dewey’s own 
intellectual vision and philosophical and theoretical ideas.
A comparison and contrast of Dewey and Mills reveals four major 
convergences. First, and perhaps most obvious, is their common con-
viction in the importance of social scientific inquiry to resolving the 
human problems of society. Pragmatism for Dewey was at bottom a 
philosophy of problem solving, and sociology for Mills was a crafts-
person’s effort to grasp the relationship among personal troubles, so-
cial structures, and history. Implicit in both conceptions is a belief 
in the unity of theory and practice, of the interconnections between 
thought and human action. For Dewey, philosophy itself was a form 
of action, and for Mills the meaning of sociology consisted ultimately 
in its relevance to the rule of reason and freedom in the active shaping 
of social institutions and people’s lives.
Second, in my treatment of 1950s social criticism and the intel-
lectual commonalities between Dewey and Mills, I hope to show 
that the notion of critique inherent in both lines of descent deserves 
a wider hearing among sociologists. For Dewey and Mills, social sci-
ence had a responsibility to inquire into societal problems for the 
purpose of furthering public understanding and promoting social 
progress. Except for small pockets of the discipline, this view of social 
science has been largely lost. Its retrieval presupposes that ongoing 
critiques of society, no matter how threatening to established inter-
ests, are an essential aspect of responsible social inquiry. What such a 
sociology might look like is suggested by the writings of the postwar 
critics and given strong foundation in the work of both Dewey and 
Mills.
A third and closely related convergence is the role of values in 
the scientific enterprise. Both Dewey and Mills saw values as inte-
gral to the conduct of science, as providing a sense of meaning and 
moral significance to social facts and the knowledge that comes from 
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empirical discovery. For Dewey, intelligence and values mutually in-
formed one another, and for Mills the meaning of sociological work 
was inseparable from value commitments. Both men took strong ex-
ception to the fact-value distinction, seeing it as a false dichotomy 
akin to the wrongful separation of theory and practice. Dewey be-
lieved it was the responsibility of science to conduct itself with the 
aim of preserving and promoting human values. On the one hand, 
Mills saw sociology as a tool for identifying and protecting cherished 
values, while on the other hand he thought that conscious, open re-
flection on one’s own values were a necessary precondition of objec-
tivity in sociological investigation. Both thinkers, in short, believed 
that human values were just as entrenched in scientific practice as in 
any other social institution.
Finally, there always remain questions of what/whose values are 
at stake and how we are to overcome value differences and conflicts. 
This is a challenging problem in diverse and complex societies. In this 
respect, the case of Dewey and Mills is both remarkable and encour-
aging. Their lives were in a real sense worlds apart, Dewey coming 
from a rural nineteenth-century New England background steeped 
in an ethos of tradition, gentility, and spirituality, and Mills, a native 
of Texas, coming of age much later in the atmosphere and culture 
of the open spaces of the American West, with its legacy of frontier 
independence. It is thus perhaps surprising that both men developed 
such similar intellectual and political values and inclinations. This 
was evident in their social criticism and progressive politics, which 
manifested itself in a strong commitment to social change based on 
the ideals of democracy, equality, expanded reason, and a vigorous 
public sphere.
I argue in this book that the ideas of Dewey and Mills provide 
a philosophical and theoretical foundation for the development of a 
critical public sociology. I attempt to show that these men, taken to-
gether, offer the crucial elements of a holistic and grounded approach 
to social inquiry shaped by progressive values and a strong concern 
for a morally dedicated social science. In line with the genre of twen-
tieth-century American social criticism but extending beyond it, the 
pragmatist thinking of Dewey and Mills was focused on problem 
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solving and social change. Accordingly, both men regarded the social 
sciences as a means of promoting progress toward a better society.
The plan of this book is as follows. Beginning with a brief his-
torical overview, Chapter 1 discusses the turn toward positivism and 
formalism and its dubious consequences for the field. Following a 
consideration of the problematic dualism of micro and macro analy-
sis, the discussion turns to strategies for overcoming formalism by 
means of theoretical and methodological thinking oriented to the 
investigation of concrete, substantive problems.
After a presentation of the reformist views of Mills and Robert S. 
Lynd, Chapter 2 examines the tradition of social criticism inaugu- 
rated by Thorstein Veblen and inherited by the popular critics of 
post–World War II American society. This body of work is treated as 
illustrative of a type of sociological inquiry that is relevant, substan-
tive, and public in nature. Aside from its contributions to the practice 
of social critique, the essential feature of this critical writing is the 
precedent it established for what I call “historical social psychology,” a 
frame most evident in Mills’s studies.
Chapter 3 turns to the philosophy of pragmatism, concentrating 
on the work of Dewey. Dewey’s work is interpreted as providing a 
means of reorienting social science, social theory, and methodology 
away from formalist procedures toward a grounded mode of inquiry 
and analysis. Emphasis is placed on pragmatism’s antiformalism and 
Dewey’s antidualism. These epistemological positions are credited 
with providing a starting point for a substantive sociology based on 
the concrete, dynamic character of social life, captured in Dewey’s 
concepts of experience and inquiry, as opposed to the abstract and 
static analytical categories of formalism.
Chapter 4 introduces a series of connections between Dewey and 
Mills, organized around the theme of the unity of theory and prac-
tice. This is discussed in terms of Dewey’s conceptions of the rela-
tionship between thought and action, human life as problem solving, 
and the ubiquity and permanence of change. This framework is a 
basis for establishing continuities between Dewey and Mills and as-
sessing the similarities and differences between them, especially re-
garding their views of social change and politics.
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Finally, Chapter 5 begins with a critical discussion of the fact-value 
distinction and proceeds to an exploration of the normative charac-
ter of social science employing the views of Hilary Putnam, Gunnar 
Myrdal, Max Weber, Mills, and Dewey. As a culmination of issues 
posed throughout the book, this chapter draws attention to the evalu-
ative and critical features of Dewey’s thought and pragmatism more 
generally, highlighting Dewey’s advocacy of the moral and ethical 
character of science. All of these thinkers established ground for an 
objective conception of values that links sociological analysis to the 
tradition of critique. The notion of social critique is explored in rela-
tion to the neo-Marxist tradition of critical theory and to Dewey’s 
pragmatism. The symbolic interactionist elements in Dewey’s thought 
are put forth as offering the constituents of an expanded and more 
effective form of critique that improves on Frankfurt School theory 
while offering a concrete scientific and pluralistic approach to critique 
that is sociologically grounded. 

1
Against Sociological  
Formalism
American sociology came into its own during the prosperous post–World War II period of expansion in higher education and social science research. This was a period marked by pro- 
fessionalization of the field and a preoccupation with scientific pro-
cedure involving the adoption of a positivist scientific outlook that 
took the natural sciences as a model for the practice of sociology. This 
period of rapid evolution in the discipline toward a new scientific 
agenda resulted in dramatic changes in the practice of sociology that 
featured a new formalism that put a premium on abstract theory and 
data analyses. These changes constituted a major shift in disciplinary 
priorities in which theory construction and methodological proce-
dure took precedence over subject matter.
The new scientific orthodoxy eventually led to a reaction, precipi-
tated by the social unrest and organized political movements of the 
1960s and 1970s. Competing ideas, ideologies, theories, and research 
agendas came to challenge the positivist turn on grounds that it dis-
connected sociology from the realities of American life and emptied 
sociological ideas and concepts of their human content. Now a con-
tested field, sociology entered a period of growing heterodoxy. While 
fragmenting the field, the array of new sociologies had one thing in 
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common: opposition to the positivism and formalism accompanying 
the professionalization of the discipline during the 1940s and 1950s. 
This opposition was partially successful in bringing sociology down 
to earth, but the field has remained in relative disarray and largely di-
vided between positivists and their antagonists ever since. As a conse-
quence, despite encouraging trends toward renewal over the last fifty 
years, it can safely be said that sociology continues to seek a coherent 
identity and sense of relevance.
Sociology in the West was largely founded on nineteenth-century 
European social theory, a voluminous intellectual response to the 
social crises accompanying the rise of modernity. Classical social 
theory defined itself primarily through a body of ideas and observa-
tions about the nature of modernity and its impact on traditional 
social structures and patterns of thought. Emerging during a time 
of philosophical ferment and social and political upheavals, classical 
theory was fueled by a variety of intellectual currents and sociocul-
tural outlooks. In seeking to identify the main contours of moder-
nity, the early theorists focused their attention on processes of social 
change, specifically what they perceived as the dynamics and effects 
of industrialism, urbanization, expanding markets, bureaucracy, and 
democracy, along with new patterns of culture and ideology accom-
panying and driving these forces.1
With some exceptions, American sociologists today often fail to 
appreciate the contribution classical social theory made to the cre-
ation of the subject matter and major themes of the field. This body 
of theory was born of the massive sociocultural changes preceding 
and wrought by the rising market economy of industrial capitalism. 
The subject matter of sociology was thus initially forged from a clus-
ter of historical, intellectual, and political concerns connected to this 
great transformation.
In the United States, sociology emerged in a substantially different 
set of conditions from those prevailing in Europe. Though the theo-
retical ideas of the Europeans offered some guidance, early Ameri-
can sociology was shaped by a philosophical and cultural orientation 
focused on the problems of a young, heterogeneous, and developing 
country. Early sociology in the United States was composed of a mix 
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of classical European themes and a distinctively American engagement 
in empirical research. Unlike the European tradition, early American 
sociology was shaped by a set of moral concerns surrounding the social 
problems characterizing an ethnically diverse urban life and a nation 
in the process of painfully inventing itself. Given the differences be-
tween the New and Old Worlds, modernity in the United States was 
thus destined to acquire a more practical set of meanings than within 
European social theory.2 At the same time, in the American context 
the pursuit of sociology was shaped less by intellectual concerns than 
by a moral ethos of social improvement.
This brief background can serve as a frame for examining the 
transition of the discipline of sociology at mid-twentieth century and 
its mixed consequences. Since that time, given the contrasts between 
the European tradition and the contested trajectory of American 
sociology, there has been a continuing conflict of opinions over the 
very meaning, purpose, and direction of the field. In what follows, a 
version of the issues at stake in the debate is briefly outlined in order 
to set the stage for a critique of the discipline.
The Rise of Positivism and Formalism
The University of Chicago is usually considered the birthplace of 
American sociology,3 and the type of sociology incubated at this in-
stitution shaped the field for several decades.4 While the European 
founders were a source of theoretical insights, the dominant influenc-
es at this institution were the homegrown pragmatist philosophies of 
John Dewey and George Herbert Mead.5 These men were major fig-
ures at Chicago, and their ideas lent themselves to a socially engaged 
sociology in an era of business tycoons and rival progressive reform-
ers. Tending to side with the latter, the social philosophy of pragma-
tism placed primary emphasis on democratic values, experimentation, 
and societal improvement through collective problem solving. These 
themes inspired many sociologists to engage in morally and politi-
cally concerned research into the problems of uprooted and marginal 
groups and immigrant ethnic communities struggling to survive amid 
the ills and predations of urban life. While not definitive of the entire 
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field, this version of Chicago sociology established a strong precedent 
for the study of social problems while mirroring the politics of the 
Progressive Era.6
This variant of Chicago sociology had a strong presence in the 
discipline until the 1930s, when the social sciences began to enter 
a period of professionalization in their search for scientific identity 
and legitimacy (Haney 2008). During and following the crises of 
the Depression and European fascism, the field came under increas-
ing pressure to prove its worth as a scientific discipline capable of 
addressing major societal problems, particularly the growing threats 
to democracy and social order posed by economic crisis, extremist 
ideologies, and widespread political conflict. These pressures under-
mined the earlier moral and practical concerns of sociologists, caus-
ing a major shift of orientation toward the cultivation of scientific 
technique. This soon led to a positivistic trend toward emulation of 
the natural sciences and the emergence of theory and research as the 
central concerns of the discipline.7 While signaling a promising new 
phase of disciplinary progress, this transition meant a relative decline 
in substantive work and a new emphasis on scientific method. Per-
haps most significant, this change of priorities entailed a distancing 
of sociology from its previous concern with social problems and its 
engagement in public life (Haney 2008, 9).
With this change of direction there appeared a new formalism, a 
mode of theoretical and methodological practice in which conceptual 
abstraction and scientific rigor take precedence over subject matter. For 
all practical purposes, formalism means that “form” trumps “content.” 
But it also means that what goes on within the organized discipline, 
based on the specialized concepts and methods of trained sociologists, 
tends to overshadow events and developments in the world outside the 
university. With this shift, the natural science model of “detached” 
observation replaced the earlier, largely qualitative methods of the 
Chicago School, becoming the dominant investigative paradigm that 
shaped the field from the late 1940s through the early 1960s (Haney 
2008, 9).8
These changes coincided with a transfer of the center of disci-
plinary gravity from Chicago to other universities, especially those 
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on the East Coast. Under the sway of Talcott Parson’s functionalist 
theory, Harvard became a center of abstract theorizing and system 
building. Simultaneously, through the work of Paul Lazarsfeld and 
his colleagues at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia 
University became known for its highly technical advances in data 
collection and quantitative analysis. Accompanying these develop-
ments was a growing sense that the pursuit of science and engage-
ment with the public and its problems were incompatible goals. As 
sociology began to cloister itself in the academy and various research 
institutes, the dominant trend of the discipline was a turn away from 
social problems and the reformist orientation of the earlier generation 
(Haney 2008, 17). Reformism was now mostly displaced by a new 
professionalism dedicated to the pursuit of science on terms dictated 
primarily by well-resourced institutions connected to government 
and the new corporate economy.
A watershed moment, the rise of formalism manifested itself in 
two divides within the field. First, it created a tendency to separate 
conceptual issues from methodological technique and, correspond-
ingly, theory from research. This split resulted in a growing gap be-
tween theoretical development and the accumulation of raw data. 
These changes were reflections of a profession now comprising spe-
cialists with increasingly narrow disciplinary interests, divided rough-
ly between theorists and researchers. While leading scholars such as 
Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton urged a close connection be-
tween theory and empirical research,9 in practice specialists in each 
area typically failed to link the two. Second, the turn to formalism 
resulted in a disjunction between two intellectual tendencies, styles, 
and disciplinary attitudes, namely, the “down-to-earth” orientation 
of those working in the tradition of Chicago and the abstract mode 
of functionalist theorizing and data analyses being pursued on the 
East Coast.
These changes were due less to the internal dynamics of the disci-
pline, though these played an important part, than to external forces. 
The formalistic mode of inquiry that came with professionalization 
and “scientization,”10 and the corresponding impoverishment of sub-
stantive work, was largely a response to national administrative and 
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policy needs that arose during World War II, its aftermath, and the 
beginning of the Cold War. This was a period during which the dis-
ciplinary mainstream, seeking scientific legitimacy as a means of at-
tracting resources, began to respond more directly to the specialized 
interests of government, big business, foundations, and other funding 
agencies, to the relative detriment of attention to problems of concern 
to the lay public.11 The rush to align sociological practice with the 
methods and standards of the natural sciences was thus driven pri-
marily by the growing demands of government and business and the 
need for greater material and institutional support for the discipline.12 
Eventually, as sociologists were called on to prove their worth as sci-
entists, professionals, and academics, career and personal ambition 
emerged as prime motivations.
During this transition, the moral and political issues surrounding 
the earlier work on social problems were marginalized as enthusiasm 
grew for the ideals of “objectivity” and “scientific autonomy.” Many 
of those identified with the Chicago tradition resisted this change 
of priorities, disavowing efforts to model sociology on the natural 
sciences and the withdrawal of the discipline into an ivory tower. 
This eventually created a rivalry between competing views of the 
role of sociology and its appropriate methodologies. The ensuing 
debates were initially focused less on the relationship of sociology 
to the moral and political concerns of sociologists who had worked 
in the Chicago tradition than on the theoretical and methodologi-
cal issues posed by the positivist paradigm. These were not entirely 
separate concerns, and as these debates reached their zenith in the 
mid-to-late 1960s the larger societal and political context of sociol-
ogy eventually emerged as a focal point of dissent for those seeking 
to develop a discipline of greater substance and relevance to the reali-
ties of American life.
The achievements of both the Chicago and the Harvard/Colum-
bia traditions are worthy of our attention but are now largely a mat-
ter of history. The sociological landscape has changed dramatically 
since the 1960s, when social change forced a diversification of the 
discipline and growth in alternative perspectives and research agen-
das. But while functionalist forms of theorizing and the Parsonian 
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mythology of consensus have largely vanished, a glance at the socio-
logical literature suggests that a positivist model of inquiry persists 
in many areas of the discipline.13 The split between theory and re-
search and their subordination to the deterministic and mechanistic 
models and techniques of natural science have continued, however 
diminished their influence. This has meant a loss of balanced and 
comprehensive approaches to social life and social change in all their 
human and structural complexities.
The Dualism Problem
The relative isolation of sociology from the public and its problems 
is only one of the negative ramifications of formalism. Formalism 
has also contributed to the creation of artificial and misleading con-
ceptual divisions that fragment our understanding of social struc-
ture and process. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the division 
between micro and macro perspectives and theories. The source of 
this division can be found in a subtle but highly consequential mis-
step. Formal theory has converted the real duality of social life—the 
difference between the actions of persons and the emergence of in-
stitutional and cultural structures—into an abstract dualism. Once 
this happens, a series of dichotomies are substituted for a complex 
relationship of dynamic and evolving tensions between the two levels 
of associational life. Theoretical constructions that turn each level 
into a fixed category tend to empty the interrelationship between 
actor and society of any substantive content. The dualities in which 
these tensions inhere are thus treated as distinct entities rather than 
socially and historically situated dialectical relations between actors 
and structures.14
The intrusion of dualistic thinking into a field that formerly held 
to a more integrated and concrete view of society has had numer-
ous adverse effects. “Actions” and “structures,” “change” and “order,” 
“meanings” and “facts” are terms that have been dichotomized and 
converted into abstractions that fail to represent empirical social re-
ality. The staying power of these dualisms is an indication of the 
self-perpetuating nature of the formalist mode of analysis. Formal-
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ism feeds on abstraction, which invariably leads to the construction 
of dichotomous categories, which in turn perpetuate abstract modes 
of thought divorced from the interrelatedness and continuities of the 
real world.
The problem of dualism is certainly not exclusively the creation 
of formalistically minded sociologists. Dualistic thinking is not 
only embedded in our linguistic structure; it is also deeply rooted in 
Western thought. The individual-society distinction inheres in the 
subject-object opposition originating with the Greeks, developed in 
Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, and given rigid formulation as a 
fixed dichotomy by René Descartes. The rise of modern individual-
ism reinforced this dualism by creating a cultural dichotomy of “in-
dividual versus society,” suggesting a discordant relationship between 
thinking, willing, acting subjects and a world of external, impersonal 
forces seen as resistant or opposed to these subjects. Beginning in the 
nineteenth century, major strands of social theory have portrayed 
the social forces of modernity as beyond the control of individuals, 
as contravening human desire and intention (and the Enlightenment 
vision of rationality) by imposing limits on individuals’ capacity to 
think and act freely and rationally. Generally speaking, modernist 
discourses have constructed the individual and society as opposing 
entities.15 Both the epistemological dualism inherent in the struc-
ture of Western thought and the intellectual and cultural discourse 
of antagonism—which portrays a modernity divided against itself, 
celebrating the creative powers of the individual while simultane-
ously unleashing forces that thwart the individual—underwrite the 
gap sociological formalism has established between micro and macro 
phenomena.
Given this background, with the introduction of formalism the 
emergence of contending schools of thought partitioned by the mi-
cro-macro distinction would appear to have been inevitable. In keep-
ing with its presumptive intellectual and scientific purposes, within 
this dualistic framework sociology has tended to subordinate the 
individual to society. This has taken two theoretical forms. On the 
one hand, society and culture have been simplistically theorized as 
constraining the individual.16 On the other hand, these powerful 
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entities have been theorized as both constraining and enabling the 
individual, a more nuanced conception developed in different ways 
by some of the classic European theorists and those in the American 
tradition, most notably George Herbert Mead.
Theoretical and philosophical issues notwithstanding, the rise of 
formalism is essentially a methodological problem. With formalism, 
variable, concrete connections between individuals and society acquire 
the status of static categories, creating a series of conceptual reifica-
tions.17 “Actor” and “system,” for example, become abstractions de- 
tached from social reality and substituted for real people and institu-
tional structures. Arguably, the tendency toward conceptual reification 
is more likely to occur in more deterministically oriented theories and 
mechanical forms of causal explanations than in interpretively oriented 
approaches such as symbolic interactionism. The former, formalistic 
approaches are prone to the danger of “false realism,” in which con-
cepts tend to be treated as literal descriptions of reality. Formalistic 
theorizing thus contravenes the position of “nominalism,” which treats 
concepts as mere representations of reality. It is no surprise that inter-
pretive sociologists are more likely to be cautious of the error of treat-
ing ideas and concepts as real things rather than their representations. 
To repeat a well-worn but often forgotten axiom, the proper function 
of sociological concepts is heuristic and analytical, and they are not 
to be confused with actual phenomena.18 Unlike interpretive theories, 
which are focused on “meaningful action/interaction,” highly abstract, 
formal theoretical systems (for example, functionalism, systems theory, 
exchange theory) are most prone to the error of false realism. In gen-
eral, the more positivistic variants of sociological theory tend to mis-
takenly treat concepts as actual objects.19
In sum, formalist dualisms create unnecessary problems. First, a 
formal separation of micro and macro forces us into a misleading 
epistemological choice: we can either (1) accept each level of analysis 
as a different way of looking at the same thing or (2) on the assump-
tion that each provides only a partial perspective, we can attempt to 
connect or integrate them. While in certain situations both views 
could be defended, only the second option is acceptable as general 
methodological practice. Since emergent social phenomena are trace-
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able to but not reducible to the actions of individuals, grounds exist 
for maintaining the macro-micro distinction as a heuristic device. 
The task of theorists and researchers, however, is to understand the 
interrelatedness of the different levels and to formulate empirically 
grounded propositions that connect them.20
For all practical purposes, formalism artificially divides the disci-
pline into two sociologies (Dawe 1970). On the one hand, we have a 
sociology founded on positivist methods associated with the natural 
science model and largely macro in nature. On the other hand, there 
is a sociology of interpretation and meaning focused on the micro 
level of interaction, having strong affinities with what is often called 
the “human sciences.”21 And this has tended to be a lopsided divi-
sion. Despite the significance of structural explanations, sociologi-
cal positivism has often been guilty of a certain exaggeration of the 
effects of structure at the expense of action and agency. Thus, the 
interpretive school, mainly the symbolic interactionists, has rightly 
asserted that there has been a lack of attention in structural sociology 
to (1) notions of meaning, creativity, and innovation; (2) the connec-
tions of large-scale social phenomena to micro action and interaction 
processes; and (3) the cultural and social psychological sources of 
order and change, specifically how and to what extent variations in 
“system” states are a function of the definitional work and motiva-
tions of individuals.22 The lesson to be drawn is that formulations 
that strike a balance between “determinist” and “nondeterminist” 
conceptions, social structure/culture and the individual, ought to be 
the practiced form of sociological description and explanation.
Toward a Substantive and Relevant Sociology
The theoretical and methodological perils of formalism are sufficient 
reason to reject this form of sociological practice. But formalism has 
larger ramifications. Under its influence, mainstream sociology by 
and large continues to labor under a disciplinary regime too ingrown 
and overspecialized to provide a truly substantive, comprehensive, 
and integrated picture of society, one that captures the lived realities 
of society and group life. The discipline’s preoccupation with sci-
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entific procedure and its corresponding remoteness from public life 
has its counterpart in the relative absence of an intellectual/scientific 
agenda that would engage serious moral, ethical, and political ques-
tions about the state of society and the problems of its members.23
All sciences depend on a logically organized body of concepts, 
principles, and procedures that can serve as a framework for gen-
erating and testing hypotheses. Sociological formalism, however, is 
formal sociology that has acquired a life of its own. To work in a 
formalistic mode is to evade the task of constructing sociological ex-
planations and understandings that are faithful to reality and that 
offer concrete and accessible knowledge to nonsociologists.24
Once theory and research succumb to a preoccupation with tech-
nique, these become ends in themselves, and sociology is reduced to 
a barren exercise in scientific procedure, such as modeling statistical 
relationships. Excessive abstraction contributes to a bifurcation of the 
field into theoretical analysis and data collection, to the detriment of 
both. This double tendency was the target of the well-known state-
ment of C. Wright Mills in The Sociological Imagination, in which he 
attacked postwar American sociology for its turn to “grand theory” 
and “abstracted empiricism” (Mills 1961, chaps. 2 and 3). In both 
cases, as Mills rightly saw, sociologists were indulging in abstract con-
structions at the expense of real empirical content.
As suggested by Mills’s critique, excessive abstraction, characteris-
tic of systems theory but not uncommon in garden-variety sociology, 
has been perhaps the most intractable problem. Appealing to “classic 
social analysis,” implying mainly the European theorists, Mills advo-
cated instead a sociology concerned with “historical social structures” 
(Mills 1961, 21). Here, he is suggesting that to avoid unnecessary 
abstraction that fails to reflect the reality of social phenomena, socio-
logical analysis, while concerned with the individual, needs always 
to remain focused on the structural, historical, and cultural dimen-
sions of society, or what he thought of as “the big picture” (Aronowitz 
2012, chap. 8; Mills 1961, 17).
To the extent that sociology began to show some aversion to posi-
tivism and change direction in the 1960s, much of this change can 
indeed be credited to the work of Mills, for many the icon of critical 
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sociology. For Mills, truly meaningful social analysis is contextual-
ized in the situated problems of human actors, problems that in turn 
were to be connected to the large-scale forces shaping them. With 
insight into what went wrong with the discipline, he gave us a vision 
and model of a nonformalist sociology of substance, human signifi-
cance, and social, moral, and political relevance (Mills 1961). He saw 
this as a matter of turning “personal problems” into “public issues” 
(ibid., chap. 1). For Mills, sociology’s mission was to examine how 
societies affect the people who live in them and by implication to 
suggest how people, whether in possession of power or subject to it, 
might think and act in ways that would alter the condition of their 
lives. In parallel fashion, Mills called on sociology to examine the 
relationship between biography and history. He understood that for-
getting the historically specific nature of social facts is to premise so-
ciology on the mistaken belief that its object of study is a static entity 
exhibiting characteristics of a universal, unchanging nature. In real-
ity, society is a historical entity, a changeful system of dynamic forces 
and relations composed of social structures and an ensemble of ac- 
tive agents. What Mills in effect proposed in his statements about bi-
ography and history was that the formal division of micro and macro 
be translated back into concrete human terms, thereby connecting 
the two levels in formulations reflecting actual social and historical 
relationships.25
Many in the field have averted the formalistic straitjacket by pur- 
suing a variety of original and socially grounded work that reflects 
Mills’s call for sociological substance. While acknowledging these 
trends, following Mills I would propose two key principles on which 
to develop a more relevant and substantive sociology. First, to avoid 
unnecessary abstraction, it is imperative that sociologists devote them- 
selves to the study of particular substantive areas as opposed to the 
development of theoretical structures and methodological technique. 
Second, a steadfast concern for the source of the chronic problems plagu- 
ing society and its individual members would keep sociological in-
quiry focused on the concrete realities of actors and social structures 
and the interrelated institutional workings of the system as a whole.26 
A major goal of this type of inquiry would be to develop workable, 
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scientifically based remedies for lessening or abolishing the harmful 
social and human effects of poorly functioning institutions. In this 
respect, sociological inquiry needs to move beyond conventional defi-
nitions of social problems to include the entire panoply of ailments 
afflicting highly bureaucratized, market-based societies, of which the 
United States is the prime example. This would require sociologists 
to more openly and honestly acknowledge the nature of the society in 
which Americans live and to focus attention on its problematic char-
acteristics.
Such a sociology, to my mind, would attempt to represent and 
analyze the following features of contemporary American life. Fu-
eled by the profit motive, economic modernity has created an essen-
tially acquisitive society,27 whose dominant behavior patterns are at 
best uncaring of others and at worst predatory. As the textbook case 
of this societal type, American society is driven by an ethos of self-
reliance that celebrates competitive individualism and private gain. 
These are cultural and psychological traits indispensable to the profit-
oriented agenda of consumer capitalism and an economy dependent 
on a “free” market in exploited labor. Chronic problems of alienation, 
feelings of powerlessness, social inequality, violence, the corrupting 
power of money, ego and celebrity worship, and the consequent ero-
sion of democracy—all are familiar features of life under a system 
that routinely favors private advantage over public good. Situating 
social problems in the context of these features of capitalism, a his-
torically specific type of society, would be a necessary step toward the 
creation of a more relevant and socially or humanly useful sociology.
A considerable amount of contemporary sociological work already 
approximates a socially concerned and critical social science engaged 
in exposing and accounting for these problems. The piecemeal ap-
proach of much of this work, however, falls short of providing a com-
prehensive picture of these problems’ systemic origins. The discipline 
sorely lacks analyses of large-scale historical, cultural, and social pro-
cesses, analyses without which social problems cannot be adequately 
explained, understood, and mitigated. This would entail abandoning 
an abstract, generalizing sociology in favor of one that studies society 
in terms of its particular historical and cultural formations and con-
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figurations. This sociology would be less universalistic and more pro-
vincial and at the same time less piecemeal and more comprehensive.28
Without underestimating the value of much contemporary work 
or harboring illusions about the likelihood of dramatic disciplinary 
change in the near future, I explore in Chapter 2 an earlier tradition 
of sociological inquiry that exemplifies what might be thought of as 
“sociology-on-the-ground” or “sociology-with-human-significance.” 
This is a sociology that addresses real problems with breadth and in-
sight, without unnecessary abstraction and jargon, one that provides 
an understanding of our lives through thoughtful and unsentimen-
tal criticism of existing sociocultural arrangements and priorities. 
Perhaps most important, this is a sociology that encourages self-re-
flection and self-understanding. It does so by means of a sociologi-
cal critique that assertively questions how we currently organize our 
lives, individually and collectively, and in terms that nonspecialists 
can grasp and, I hope, act on.
2
C. Wright Mills and the  
Tradition of Social Criticism
The “promise” of sociology that C. Wright Mills describes in the opening of The Sociological Imagination (1961, chap. 1) can be thought of in a variety of ways. What most immediately comes 
to mind, however, is the scope and diversity of the field and the power 
of sociological explanation. While its breadth of subject matter might 
seem a liability, the reach and versatility of sociology offers, as Mills 
rightly saw, the possibility of a comprehensive picture of society and 
the lives of its members.
Mills’s own work exemplifies the creative potentials of the socio-
logical perspective, demonstrating how it can illuminate the relation-
ship between individual and society, actor and structure, social life 
and history. Mills believed that sociology ought to be used to further 
our understanding of social life and human beings as products of 
“historical social structures” (1961, 21). Focusing on “character” and 
“social structure” (Gerth and Mills 1964), Mills throughout much 
of his writing sought to portray individuals in terms of the histori-
cally specific social and cultural patterns within which they lived and 
acted. For Mills, sociology’s “promise” resided in what he called “the 
sociological imagination . . . which enables us to grasp history and bi-
ography and the relations between the two within society” (1961, 6).
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Mills made good use of sociology’s porous boundaries and the 
field’s capacity for empirical discovery. He astutely navigated the so-
cial sciences’ common borders, believing that disciplinary specializa-
tion was largely an artifice of professionalization that fragmented our 
knowledge and understanding. Indeed, Mills was in a sense ahead 
of his time in cultivating the practice of “interdisciplinary” work, al-
though this term certainly does not describe his approach. As he saw 
the matter, the excesses of formalization, generalization, and abstrac-
tion—and the tendency to separate theory from method, specializ-
ing in one or the other—could be counteracted only by engaging in 
“empirical studies of contemporary social facts and problems” (1961, 
23). If there is to be specialization, it should proceed not along disci-
plinary lines but in terms of “problem-areas.” Attempts to “integrate 
the social sciences” should be done not in terms of “conceptions and 
methods” but in terms of “problems and subject matters” (41). By 
Mills’s own example, this meant stepping outside of conventional dis-
ciplinary boundaries to draw on any material relevant to a particular 
problem. Indeed, as Mills argues, this is hardly different from the 
practices of the classic theorists themselves, including Émile Durk-
heim, who is often credited with establishing sociology as a scientific 
discipline.1 Finally, if there is any confusion regarding what happens 
to the role of the sociologist when all the social sciences are in play, 
Mills says, “What is specifically ‘sociological’ in the study of any par-
ticular feature of a total society is the continual effort to relate that 
feature to others, in order to gain a conception of the whole” (137). 
The province of sociology is thus the whole social structure or system.
Given its broad perspective, and its relevance to the public, sociol-
ogy’s relationship to journalism is no less important, as Mills dem-
onstrated by the style and tone of his writing. Strictly speaking not 
a social science, journalism has always shared a close but uneasy re-
lationship with sociology, with skeptics in the latter field often look-
ing down on journalism for its alleged lack of theory and scientific 
rigor. Nonetheless, despite its reputation as a “soft” or “quasi” social 
science, in subject matter and even method journalism and sociol- 
ogy frequently overlap. As a form of reporting on matters of public 
interest, journalism has obvious ramifications for the kind of sociol-
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ogy advocated by Mills. Sociologically informed studies employing 
journalistic methods and reporting styles can provide rich portray-
als of human behavior and ways of life along with information pre-
sented in a form accessible to nonacademic readers. As for impact on 
the public, many of the most influential books on politics and pub- 
lic policy have been written by journalists, some of whom possess 
research skills of the highest quality.
Both questions—sociology’s relationship to the other social sci-
ences and to journalism—were an essential aspect of Mills’s critique 
of professional sociology. As questions having a direct bearing on the 
central theme of Chapter 1—formalism, positivism, and professional-
ism as barriers to a publicly relevant sociology grounded in everyday 
life—these were questions of direct pertinence to Mills. Gatekeepers 
still frequently regard appropriation of material from nonsociologists 
a dubious practice, despite lack of compelling evidence that either an 
interdisciplinary or journalistic approach involves a compromise in 
scientific standards. In any event, before a fuller discussion of Mills 
and the genre of publicly oriented social criticism to which he con-
tributed, we need to consider further means of combatting formalis-
tic sociology.
Overcoming Formalism: Grounding Strategies
In addition to interdisciplinary and journalistic connections, there are 
approaches internal to the discipline offering useful ideas for situat-
ing sociological analysis in lived realities. The well-known Grounded 
Theory of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (2010), for instance, of-
fers a methodological protocol for generating theory inductively from 
data rather than deductively from formal concepts and axioms. While 
it is intended for use by qualitative researchers, the authors claim that 
Grounded Theory is applicable in any sociological study. Indeed, the 
authors’ position is that “there is no fundamental clash between the 
purposes and capacities of qualitative and quantitative methods or 
data” (ibid., 17).
What Glaser and Strauss propose is a program for practicing soci-
ology with a methodology aimed at the collection of raw data. While 
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Grounded Theory is a remedy for many of the deficiencies of formal-
ism, however, it is lacking in theoretical content. What Glaser and 
Strauss underplay is the role that theory plays in organizing social 
phenomena into conceptually distinct and significant objects of in-
vestigation. In short, theory assigns meaning to data. While the au- 
thors claim their research approach strengthens theory, it actually 
segregates the research process. Despite its virtues, by leaning on 
method Grounded Theory tends to preoccupy itself with procedure 
at the expense of substantive theorizing.
Grounding sociological inquiry is often less a matter of research 
methodology than of subject matter and theoretical structure. Mills 
understood that theory is the means by which social phenomena are 
defined, framed, treated, and presented, but he goes a step further, 
asserting that social research and its findings require a theoretical 
apparatus that draws on social structure and history (1961, chaps. 
1 and 4). In his view, the “facts” of milieux—the small-scale (ibid., 
78) social and institutional settings in which people live, work, and 
act—are to be grasped in terms of larger social and historical entities.
Mills’s injunction to focus sociological attention on “problems” 
rather than theory and method raises the question of what con-
stitutes a “problem.” For Mills, problems were essentially “human 
problems.” In turn, he believed that genuine insight into the nature 
and source of human problems would require sociologists to con-
ceptualize society in terms of historically specific social structures. 
Problems, Mills thought, were to be explained with reference to the 
connections between the troubles of individuals and the institution-
al and systemic forces shaping their lives. And Mills always made 
clear that such explanations would involve analyzing structures of 
inequality and power, a central theme in his work. This implies con-
ducting social inquiry with a strong eye for the economic and politi-
cal factors conditioning social life.
In recent decades there has been an encouraging trend toward 
these kinds of inquiry. At the same time, the unfortunate practice of 
assigning the study of inequality and power to subfields of the disci-
pline (e.g., stratification, political sociology) ignores the fact that in-
equality and power are features of all social relations. Demoting these 
C. Wright Mills and the Tradition of Social Criticism  / 31
topics to the status of subfields minimizes their analytical importance 
and their connection to personal and social problems. Though inter-
ested in the subjective dimensions of behavior, Mills believed material 
interests and power relations were often just as important as culture 
and ideology in explaining social process and the psychology of in-
dividuals.
The social problems studies of the early American sociologists 
offer some precedent for this type of work. The Chicago School re-
search into the urban landscape of crime, poverty, and race/ethnic 
relations displayed a strong empirical orientation to the concrete prob- 
lems of people’s lives. Nonetheless, these studies were for the most 
part weak on issues of inequality and power, and by focusing on com-
munity problems, examples of Mills’s “milieux,” this work lacked 
adequate theoretical scope for linking social problems to large-scale 
historical and structural change. This established within the disci-
pline a piecemeal pattern of social inquiry marked by a tendency to 
separate the parts from the whole, the main object of Mills’s critique 
of the discipline.
As against Grounded Theory and the Chicago School, Mills felt 
that classical European theory continued to provide the backbone 
of sociological inquiry.2 In their analyses of the sweeping historical 
changes shaping modern society, thinkers like Durkheim and Sim-
mel and particularly Marx and Weber remain models of theoretical 
grounding. These thinkers closely examined the characteristic fea-
tures and impact of modern capitalism. In an era prior to the rise of 
the specialized social sciences, Marx and Weber drew on a variety of 
scholarly resources—especially history—in theorizing connections 
between social actors and the structural and ideational elements of 
society. Despite Weber’s greater appreciation of the complexity of cul- 
tural factors in the formation of belief systems and patterns of ac-
tion, both thinkers enriched their ideas by contextualizing sociologi-
cal phenomena in history and social change.3
While many sociologists have continued to draw on the work of 
the classics, if alive today Mills would probably regard the bulk of 
American sociology as only peripherally related to the classic tradition 
because of its frequent failure to connect milieux to social structure 
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and history. Mills’s oeuvre, and specifically his arguments for link-
ing biography and history, personal troubles and public issues, while 
displaying a characteristically American concern for the individual, 
aimed to reverse this tendency by developing an expansive “macro” 
perspective. With themes and insights drawn from the classics, par-
ticularly Weber, Mills attempted to synthesize a range of ideas he saw 
as relevant for explaining contemporary problems of milieux in terms 
of larger structural and cultural trends. Mills’s accomplishments in 
this respect remain a model for a sociology that concretely combines 
micro and macro perspectives.
Looking back to Mills, finally, puts us in touch with a tradition 
just as important as that of the early Chicago generation and the 
classic European theorists. Mills was a key figure in the social criti-
cism literature that flowered after World War II, involving numerous 
best-selling authors who popularized the social sciences with their 
provocative criticisms of postwar society. Before considering this 
work, however, I examine an allied body of criticism. Mills was an 
outspoken critic of American social science, building on the earlier 
critical reflections of Robert S. Lynd, who famously attacked social 
science for failing its responsibility to produce comprehensive and 
socially useful knowledge.
Reforming Social Science: Robert S. Lynd 
and C. Wright Mills
The emerging scientific priorities of the late 1930s, which pushed so-
cial science in a positivist and professionalizing direction, contributed 
to the formation of specialized disciplines with relatively distinct agen-
das and areas of inquiry. Responding to this trend, a few thoughtful 
scholars began to question the rationale of the social sciences and their 
place in society. Of special concern were questions about the social 
responsibility of these disciplines, specifically what purposes they were 
to serve and for whom.
The earliest and boldest statement came in 1939 from the Colum-
bia University sociologist Robert S. Lynd in his book Knowledge for 
What? (1939). Lynd’s critique, projecting a sense of urgency during 
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the Great Depression and the rise of fascism in Europe, continues 
to resonate a sense of pressing need in our own era of ongoing crises. 
The striking sense of familiarity evoked by his remarks on the influ-
ence of businessmen and university bureaucrats on the social sciences 
and the latter’s complicity with the status quo serves to illustrate the 
currency of Lynd’s worries. While the context of Lynd’s critique was 
the massive economic, social, and political failures of the 1930s, his 
view of the situation of the social sciences was prescient of postwar 
developments in academia.
Lynd begins by arguing that the social sciences are part of the 
wider culture and therefore bear an obligation to bring the knowl-
edge they produce into the public arena in a manner that benefits the 
interests of society. On the question of how the social sciences were 
to fulfill this obligation, he presents a twofold critique. First, their 
proper focus should be the “whole culture,” and this means pulling 
together findings from the various fields to create an overall picture 
of society as it actually exists in the lives of its members. Lynd places 
the burden of this task squarely on sociology. In Lynd’s judgment, 
this was the one social science claiming to study “the whole,” while in 
practice the sociological specialist had tended to “abstract his problem 
from its context” (1939, 21), leading to an “atomized” sociology lack-
ing a comprehensive picture. In his words:
The failure of the social sciences to think through and to inte-
grate their several responsibilities for the common problem 
of relating their analysis of the parts to the analysis of the 
whole constitutes one of the major lags crippling their utility 
as human tools of knowledge. (Ibid., 15)
To correct this failing, the social sciences needed to adopt an inclusive 
“frame of reference,” which would be the totality of culture in which 
all of the problems they studied could be situated. Lynd thus propos-
es the concept of culture as the unifying framework of a social science 
capable of an understanding based on the way people actually live.4
Second, Lynd argues at length for the analytical importance of 
“the individual,” in his view the main constituent of culture, and 
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for the need to retrieve the human element from behind the concep-
tual abstractions of the social sciences. He laments the “unfortunate 
dualism” between the individual and culture that emerges once the 
latter comes to be regarded as a “self-contained universe” existing 
apart from the person. Under these conditions, social science creates 
“another reified entity” that separates social analysis from how people 
actually think, feel, and behave. To counteract this tendency, he pro-
poses reinstating the person as an analytical equal to culture and 
institutions. He also takes social scientists to task for forgetting that 
“useful conceptual discriminations are true only to a certain extent, 
as methodological tools.” As to the problem of reified conceptual ab-
stractions, Lynd is quite direct.
The emphasis upon persons as the active carriers, perpetra-
tors, and movers of culture performs for us the indispensable 
service of resolving the dualism of “culture and person,” and 
of placing the primary emphasis where it basically belongs, 
upon people. (Italics in original)
For Lynd, the analyst must at some point move to the level of in-
dividual behavior; research that remains at the “institutional level” 
can give us only “crude and limited understandings” (1939, 21–25).
We can hardly miss the resemblances between Lynd’s prewar cri-
tique and the later appraisal by C. Wright Mills in The Sociological 
Imagination (1961). Appearing toward the end of a singular career 
in sociology, Mills’s book is in many respects an impassioned sum-
ming up of his scholarly endeavors and concerns. Written as both a 
critique of the discipline and a handbook for practicing sociologists, 
Mills’s text draws attention to how inquiry focused on the relation-
ship between biography and history infuses sociological work with 
human significance. Mills’s emphasis on biography is an elaboration 
of Lynd’s earlier plea to reinstate the individual person in social sci-
entific analysis. The two men seem in full agreement that the social 
sciences should assume responsibility for producing knowledge that is 
of benefit to both individuals and society-at-large, with an analytical 
understanding of the interrelationship between the two. Finally, both 
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scholars courageously address the question of values, arguing that 
social science acquires genuine cultural and human meaning only 
to the extent that the problem of values is made explicit in both its 
subject matter and the practices of social scientists themselves.
Yet, as the title suggests, The Sociological Imagination goes beyond 
Lynd’s critique of the narrow disciplinary restrictions of the social sci-
ences. Mills moves closer to a vision of a sociology of human relevance 
and substance that connects culture and social structure to persons. 
In the main body of the book Mills offers an overview of the charac-
ter and makeup of American society and its historical situation, set-
ting forth guidelines for how sociologists might realize his conception 
of the sociological enterprise. Exhibiting a range of knowledge and a 
full grasp of pertinent philosophical issues, Mills lucidly discusses the 
broad intellectual and social contexts of the field. He points especially 
to the pressing questions these larger contexts pose for sociologists who 
would seek understanding of the impact on the individual of a mod-
ernizing, depersonalized, bureaucratized world.
The heart of his critique is contained in the first chapter, “The 
Promise.” In lively and engaging prose, Mills makes an appeal for 
studying society from the standpoint of its human problems. First 
of all, to formulate the connection between “the personal troubles 
of milieu and the public issues of social structure” it is necessary to 
“ask what values are cherished yet threatened, and what values are 
cherished and supported, by the characterizing trends of our period” 
(Mills 1961, 6, 11). Against the grain of the discipline, Mills places 
the question of values squarely at the center of sociological inquiry. 
Underscoring the importance of values, he voices worry of widespread 
unawareness or unconcern among the public that cherished values are 
indeed at risk. Mills refers to a collective sense of “indifference,” lead-
ing to “apathy,” and “uneasiness” or “anxiety” over the importance of 
values in people’s lives.
Second, while perhaps wishfully projecting his own hopes onto 
others, there is a compelling quality to the claim Mills makes about 
individuals’ desire for knowledge of themselves and the everyday 
world they inhabit. Questioning the adequacy of contemporary mass 
fiction for a sufficient understanding of modern problems, Mills 
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states, “It is social and historical reality that men want to know. 
. . . They yearn for facts, they search for their meanings, they want 
a ‘big picture’ in which they can believe and within which they 
can come to understand themselves” (1961, 17). Here Mills claims 
to perceive a dire public need for a body of social knowledge that 
would help ordinary people comprehend the reality of their complex 
and confusing lives. In this respect, he is pointing to a supposed void 
that only a sociology linking personal life to larger social structures 
could fill.
Third, in a minor reversal of Lynd’s complaint about lack of at-
tention to the person, Mills demurs at the postwar turn to individual 
psychology that tends to reduce personal troubles to “human na-
ture” while ignoring the strong influence of social structure. Attack-
ing the claim of the prominent Freudian scholar Ernest Jones that 
the person’s “chief enemy and danger is his own unruly nature and 
the dark forces pent up within him,” Mills argues:
On the contrary: “Man’s chief danger” lies in the unruly forc-
es of contemporary society itself, with its alienating methods 
of production, its enveloping techniques of political domina-
tion, its international anarchy—its pervasive transformations 
in the very “nature” of man and the conditions and aims of 
his life. (1961, 3)
As a passionate expression of Mills’s conviction that the source of 
human troubles is an inhumane society that regards people as grist for 
its economic and political mill, this statement is vaguely laden with 
Marxist themes. Mills thus takes a strong stand against the privati-
zation of individuals’ problems and their relegation to the realm of 
private therapy, pointing a finger at a society that fails the individual 
and is thus in need of extensive sociological diagnosis.5
Finally, in his opening chapter Mills refers to his own biases as 
a sociologist and social thinker, calling on other social scientists to 
make their biases explicit. This is Mills at his best as a forthright and 
candid scholar of intellectual integrity, suggesting that it is incum-
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bent on all social scientists to be self-reflexive in their work. Mills’s 
call for reflexivity is yet another appeal to put values at the forefront 
of sociological inquiry and to treat them as not only intrinsic to 
social life but crucial to the thinking and practices of sociologists. 
In his words, disclosing one’s biases leads to “greater self-awareness 
all around—which is of course a precondition for objectivity in the 
enterprise of social science as a whole” (1961, 21).
Mills concludes this discussion by invoking what he calls “classic 
social analysis.” Though failing to explain exactly what he means by 
this term, he alludes to classic European social theory and its deriva-
tives when he says, “Its essential feature is the concern with histori-
cal social structures; and that its problems are of direct relevance to 
urgent public issues and insistent human troubles” (1961, 21; italics 
added). Mills sees “great obstacles” to the continuation of this tradi-
tion, but he also believes that “the qualities of mind that constitute 
it are becoming a common denominator of our general cultural life 
. . . and are coming to be felt as a need” (ibid.). This comment, too, 
begs crucial questions and perhaps sounds overly optimistic. But 
it reveals Mills’s belief that, in spite of historical trends that he la-
ments—bureaucratization, a concentration of power, the growth of 
mass culture—there is evidence of an enlarged intellectual awareness 
in the general population.6
Conscientious and articulate intellectuals of their times, Lynd 
and Mills remain unsurpassed as critics of modern social science. 
Each wrote within a different historical context, but their adverse 
reactions to the state of sociology converged in a set of common 
themes. Their prescriptions for change reflect different intellectual 
and ideological dispositions, with Lynd stressing the need for a uni-
fication of social science findings and Mills proposing a renewal of 
classical social theory’s historical perspective on the character and 
consequences of a rapidly emerging modern society. Finally, in the 
face of ascendant positivism, both men showed uncommon courage 
in the attention they gave to values and in their call to reorient so-
ciology away from scientific technique toward an engagement with 
human problems.
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The Postwar Social Critics:  
Historical/Structural Social Psychology
In the work of Mills, sociology faced a provocative challenge to its 
sense of mission and purpose. This challenge was the achievement of 
a bold and ecumenical thinker whose relatively short life and career 
were marked by several shifts in theoretical orientation and research 
interests. Indeed, despite the clarity and outspokenness of his work, 
the changing trajectory and intricate structure of Mills’s sociology be-
came sources of a disputed reputation. Working within the tensions 
of numerous intellectual and political tendencies, Mills conveyed an 
ambiguous public persona, giving rise to varied and sometimes mis-
taken interpretations of the man and his goals. Despite his popular 
image as a political renegade and academic outsider, Mills was very 
much an academic person throughout his entire career, striving to 
transform sociology from within while attempting to engage a non-
academic reading public from without.7
Schooled in philosophy and early on an initiate of pragmatism, 
Mills was dedicated to the idea of a rigorous but humanly mean-
ingful social science that grasped the larger structural and historical 
contexts of contemporary life. At the same time, Mills wanted a soci-
ology critically engaged with the lives of real people and committed 
to the amelioration of social problems and the troubles of individuals. 
Even as he turned to classic European social theory, not unlike Lynd 
there was in Mills an ingrained American concern for the individual. 
Mills accordingly devoted himself to the task of delineating the social 
forces affecting ordinary lives.
Although Mills had a unique presence in the postwar intellectual 
scene, he was in the company of a number of popular and influential 
critics of midcentury America who shared many of his ideals and 
worries and who also worked within a perspective of historical and 
social change. While an heir of Lynd’s critique of social science, Mills 
is thus equally important as a figure in a lineage of critical social 
theory and commentary that began with the founder of American 
social criticism, Thorstein Veblen (1934).8 While Veblen’s powerful 
insights and uniquely provocative and witty style of criticism remain 
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unmatched, his influence has been widespread, mainly in the form 
of a mode of inquiry that coalesced among a number of social critics 
following World War II.
There is both irony and poetic justice in the fact that this group 
of writers emerged during the professionalization of academic soci-
ology associated with the rise of positivist methods and formalistic 
approaches. Indeed, their writings were in large measure a response to 
these scientistic trends and served as their counterpoint.9 These critics 
wrote animated and sometimes biting criticisms of American society 
in the 1950s and 1960s, conducting a type of critical social inquiry 
implicitly endorsed by Lynd and Mills in their critiques of sociology 
and manifested in Mills’s own studies.
In retrospect, one is struck by the sense of history and the astute 
sociological insights of these writers. Consistent with Mills’s emphasis 
on historical perspective, these critics approached society as a socio-
cultural configuration comprehensible only in historical context. In 
doing so, these authors cultivated a distinctive nondenominational 
form of critical writing, ignoring the boundaries of professional aca-
demic disciplines.
Perhaps most important was these critics’ focus on the subjec-
tive and psychological dimensions of change. Given their framing of 
social problems, the ultimate concern of these writers was the fate of 
“Man” in modern capitalist society.10 While not always cast in this 
language, for all practical purposes these writings were about the so-
cial and human consequences of a bureaucratized and corporatizing 
form of consumer capitalism. Their focus was the effects of structural 
and cultural change on the person-on-the-street, whom these critics 
saw as bereft of a sense of place and meaning in a world increasingly 
impersonal and uncertain. If these thinkers were following Mills’s 
dictum of connecting history and biography, for them it meant il-
luminating the impact of a modernizing and affluent way of life on 
the consciousness and behavior of human actors.11
The defining feature of this writing was a sustained interest in the 
emerging personality and character structures of postwar America.12 
Mills was a leading figure in this movement. While engaged in a 
number of his own empirical research projects, he spent a number of 
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years coauthoring a book with his teacher and colleague Hans Gerth, 
titled Character and Social Structure (1964) and subtitled “The Psy-
chology of Social Institutions.” In this underappreciated work, the 
authors present a comprehensive theoretical overview of the rela-
tionship between social and character structure, employing histori-
cal and comparative methods. Intended as a formal statement of the 
social structural sources of human behavior, this study demonstrates 
Mills’s interest in a methodology for analyzing the institutional bases 
of character formation. In keeping with a fashion of the times,13 the 
book was a study in social psychology, but one that outlined Mills’s 
own methodological program for connecting biography to history 
and private troubles to public issues. In the preface, the authors offer 
a succinct statement of how they conceived of this area of study.
The structural and historical features of modern society must 
be connected with the most intimate features of man’s self. 
That is what social psychology is all about. (Gerth and Mills 
1964, xix)
This statement represents a decisive departure from common defini-
tions of social psychology, then and now, and serves as a summing 
up of the general approach of the social critics of the time, all of 
whom can be characterized as practicing a social psychology based 
on structural and historical analysis.
The best-known example of this approach is unquestionably David 
Riesman’s 1950 publication, The Lonely Crowd, written with Nathan 
Glazer and Reuel Denny (Riesman, Glazer, and Denny 1961). Ries-
man discusses the role of changing demographics, increased social mo-
bility, and economic change in the transition from a production to a 
consumption society, a process he sees as bringing about a transforma-
tion in personality types. The “traditional” personality of preindustrial 
culture gave way, during the rise of industrial production, to a transi-
tional, “inner-directed” type of personality based on the internaliza-
tion of parental authority. This type was followed in the contemporary 
period, with the rise of consumption relations, by the “other-directed” 
personality, a type of person dependent on the behavioral cues of 
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others. In Riesman’s view, the individual living under modern social 
structures develops a kind of “radar” that attunes behavior situation-
ally to the pressures of peer group, school, and the mass media, social-
izing agencies and reference groups largely replacing the influences of 
family, religion, and neighborhood. In short, for Riesman contempo-
rary social life called on individuals to adapt their attitudes and behav-
ior to the expectations of a wide circle of “others,” leading to a posture 
of conformity. A classic study, The Lonely Crowd exemplifies the kind 
of inquiry that tells us about the character type called forth by a given 
social structure and cultural/ideological pattern.
Another highly influential book on character type was The Or-
ganization Man by William H. Whyte (1956). Paralleling Riesman’s 
argument, Whyte maintained that the individualistically oriented 
Protestant Ethic had in the age of large corporations given way to a 
new Social Ethic, shifting the person’s orientation from one’s inner 
beliefs toward a sense of obligatory adjustment to the organization. 
In Whyte’s view, a sacrifice of inner convictions and individual ini-
tiative and creativity had become a social imperative. More impor-
tantly, it had become the basis of a new type of individual overly 
responsive to group pressures and adhering to an ideology of “be-
longingness.”
Representing a distinctive approach to social analysis, Mills, Ries-
man, Whyte, and other critics of the time were engaged in what might 
be called “historical/structural social psychology.” An admittedly 
unwieldy term, this label aptly describes the kind of inquiry begun 
by Veblen, continued by the postwar critics, formalized by Gerth 
and Mills, and practiced by Mills. Avoiding formal divisions between 
“micro” and “macro,” this mode of analysis attempted to weave to-
gether a picture of the person who typified the American population 
(white, middle class, male) during the postwar period. These writers 
variously portrayed a character structure linked to the ascendancy of 
a social system driven by monetary rewards, increasing affluence, the 
pursuit of technology, and rapid growth in bureaucratic organization. 
Attuned to the ways that social structures and institutions formed 
characterological and behavioral traits, these critics saw the social psy-
chology of everyday American life as an outgrowth of market-based 
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social relations and a pecuniary culture. They perceived the rise of a 
prosperous middle class, whose lifestyle was consumerism, suburbia, 
and white-collar work, in terms of new values and ideologies endors-
ing a drive for social success through status competition and social 
conformity.
For most of these writers the growing influence of corporations, 
government, and other large organizations meant a loss of individu-
ality and personal autonomy as well as a troubling concentration of 
organizational power. These critics examined how new structural 
and cultural forces were (mis)shaping who and what we were: our 
sense of self, our behavioral and dispositional traits, our inner ex-
perience, our emotional lives, and our ties or lack thereof to others. 
Avoiding formal analytical categories and the artificial gap these cre-
ated between person and institutional/structural influences, these 
critics employed a historically based, structurally and culturally 
oriented conception of the person that concretized connections be-
tween the two levels.
In the attention they gave to the sources of character type these 
thinkers set forth a number of important sociological themes. Read-
ing these authors with these themes in mind imparts a sense of unity 
to their work and draws attention to some enduring issues for prac-
ticing sociologists today.
The most obvious theme, beginning with Veblen and recurring 
throughout the criticism of the 1950s and 1960s, was the impact of 
material abundance. In The Theory of the Leisure Class (1934), first 
published in 1899, the commanding material prosperity of the upper 
classes in late-nineteenth-century America was seen by Veblen as 
turning the possession and display of material goods into invidious 
expressions of wealth and high status. In his account of the rise of 
“conspicuous consumption” in a society marked by pecuniary emu-
lation, Veblen highlighted the consequences of consumer goods for 
the social norms governing class structure. Rising abundance made 
possible the transformation of the material possessions of the rich into 
legitimate and highly prized symbols of pecuniary success and a life 
of leisure. More important than his mere description of leisure-class 
behavior, however, was Veblen’s argument that the power of these 
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success symbols gave rise to emulative character traits in the whole so-
ciety, generating a dynamic of status emulation extending throughout 
the entire class system.14
The theme of abundance becomes even more explicit in postwar 
assessments of the social and psychological effects of spreading pros-
perity. In his collection of wide-ranging essays of the late 1940s, titled 
Abundance for What? (1993), David Riesman thematizes material 
abundance in discussing a vast array of topics in the spheres of leisure, 
politics, and education. In The Waste Makers (1960), Vance Packard 
draws readers’ attention to the wastefulness (for Veblen the hallmark 
of conspicuous consumption) of endless spending on material goods 
and the behavioral traits resulting from this trend. In The Hidden 
Persuaders (1957), the rise of a vast advertising industry exploiting the 
visual powers of television and the design and fashion industries en-
abled Packard to go much further than Veblen by exposing the new le- 
vers of motivational control over consumer behavior. This book was 
a provocative exposé of the methods used in what Paul A. Baran and 
Paul M. Sweezy in Monopoly Capital (1968) called “the sales effort.” 
Picking up the main thread of Veblen’s argument, Packard in The Sta-
tus Seekers (1959) documents the many ways in which goods posses-
sion and social behavior mark a person’s class status. A final example 
is a work more historically and technically oriented than Packard’s 
trilogy: The Affluent Society (1958), by the prominent economist John 
Kenneth Galbraith, situates American prosperity economically rather 
than socially and culturally. Galbraith makes his most significant 
argument in one of his shortest chapters, “The Dependence Effect.” 
Against the orthodoxy of the time, Galbraith claims that a dynamic 
of consumer manipulation is inherent in the economic system of capi-
talism: goods production itself is the source of consumer need/want. 
Whereas in the “conventional wisdom” (ibid., chap. 2) production is 
a response to consumer demand, in Galbraith’s argument consumer 
demand is a function of productive output, since the latter sets the 
living standard at any given point in time. Along with the sales effort, 
production itself plays a crucial role in the status game, since the num-
ber and kind of goods in the marketplace effectively shape the field, 
thus determining the material contours and parameters of the game.15
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As the central framework for examining changing social character, 
material abundance (most of the time and for an increasing number 
of people) beginning in the late 1940s changed society and its middle-
class members in fundamental ways. Accordingly, the phenomenal 
growth of mass consumption and consumerism was the wellspring 
of numerous critical essays on American life. As the critics demon-
strated, these developments had major implications for sociological 
analysis. For instance, in a number of works there appeared a politi-
cally controversial suggestion that a relative decline in the importance 
of economic production meant that problems of material inequality 
and insecurity had been superseded by a set of psychological problems 
related to the dynamics of a mass-consumption society, in which sta-
tus concerns became paramount. Although more recent scholars have 
tended to frame consumption as a cultural phenomenon, the 1950s 
critics drew attention to how social organization and practices, in 
both work and leisure, had been fundamentally altered by the new 
consumer economy. While it is now commonplace to think of in-
stitutions such as the family, schools, hospitals, business enterprises, 
government agencies, the mass media, and more recently the Internet, 
as increasingly molded by the imperatives of a consumption economy, 
study of this basic aspect of contemporary social change has been 
mostly missing from the agendas of sociologists. In reality, processes 
of commodification and marketization have played a central role in 
shaping social relations and individual attitudes and dispositions. Im-
plicitly drawing on the Weberian perspective of bureaucracy and the 
theory of the commodity form advanced by Marxist theory, these 
critics addressed a corpus of problems using theoretical tools still rel-
evant today for understanding the essential features of American life.
The critical writings of this period paid relatively little attention to 
changes in the social class structure, with two important exceptions. 
Whyte’s The Organization Man and Mills’s White Collar addressed 
the rise of a new middle class that they saw as bearers of a new per-
sonality and character type. In the ideological throes of American 
triumphalism, postwar society was rapidly adopting a middle-class 
way of life that celebrated U.S. economic strength and a renewed 
sense of economic opportunity. For Whyte, however, an American 
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Dream identified with a middle-class lifestyle came at a cost. In ad-
dition to sacrificing their individuality to the organization, people in 
the new middle class encountered pressures to conform to an affluent 
lifestyle. “Fitting in” to one’s leisure world largely meant “keeping 
up” with neighbors in a vast new suburban landscape where signs 
of material and social success were on display in the form of mass-
produced goods.16
Mills, too, believed a huge price was being paid for the rewards of 
a middle-class way of life. Indeed, his landmark work, White Collar 
(1956), the classic sociological study of the makeup and character 
of the “new middle class,” casts a long shadow over the newfound 
affluence and celebratory economic expansion of the 1950s. Perhaps 
his most ambitious and substantial achievement, this book brought 
together in one place a description of what many saw as disturb-
ing trends in American life. Mills’s primary focus was on change in 
the nature of work as seen in a massive expansion of a white-collar 
labor force precipitated by bureaucratic growth and the changing 
character of American business enterprise. More than merely a study 
of occupational change, Mills’s book was also concerned with inter-
connections between the worlds of work and leisure as experienced 
by the armies of office workers, salespeople, salaried professionals, 
managers, supervisors, and others constituting the bulk of hired em-
ployees, people he called the “new little men.”17 More to the point, as 
his major study of social structure and character, White Collar was at 
bottom preoccupied with the problem of alienation. In Mills’s view, 
the bureaucratic structures of the white-collar world led to a deskill-
ing of jobs and a tedious, boring work experience to which the pas-
sive pleasures of mass culture were an impoverished compensatory 
response (what Theodor Adorno called “substitute gratification”).18 
More significant than its effects on the economic class system, mass 
culture created new forms of alienation. On the one hand, deprived 
of a sense of self and identity at work, the new middle class exhibited 
“a psychology of prestige striving” in which feelings of self-worth, 
no longer part of the rewards of labor, were sought in the superflu-
ous, consumerist-based signs of social status. On the other hand, 
the diversions of mass culture offered ultimately empty pleasure 
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through manipulative, consumerist-oriented forms of entertainment. 
In both cases, Mills saw members of the new middle class as being 
denied meaningful and fulfilling lives through the bureaucratization 
of work and an emerging national culture of intellectually shallow, 
commercially packaged leisure pursuits.
Attempting both to update Marx’s theory of alienation in work 
and market exchange and to draw on Weber’s concept of bureaucracy, 
White Collar offers a provocative critique of middle-class society and 
character structure. Detracting from the book’s strengths, however, 
is Mills’s tendency to caricature the white-collar worker, a result of 
his failure to present a truly systematic and balanced analysis.19 Mills 
stops short of looking at white-collar workers in the flesh, instead 
proffering speculative inferences from the structural and cultural 
features of the bureaucratic workplace and middle-class society. In 
spite of this methodological flaw, Mills’s study still stands as a model 
of informed sociological investigation into the human problems of a 
bureaucratized capitalist society and culture.20
The Legacy of Postwar Social Criticism
The postwar critics cultivated a type of social analysis that put Amer-
ican society under a microscope for an educated mass readership. In 
doing so, they demonstrated the possibility of a grounded sociology 
that could engage an audience outside of academia. Journalistically 
inclined, these authors revived a critical analytical style reminiscent 
of Veblen and faithful to Lynd’s call for a holistic approach to Ameri-
can culture.
At the same time, questions have abounded regarding the scientif-
ic status of this work. Some dismiss it out of hand as a form of “soft” 
social science failing the test of scientific rigor. While some grounds 
exist for this conclusion, it remains a somewhat biased and narrow 
judgment. With intellectual acumen and a medley of approaches and 
methods, these critics exhibited considerable investigative talents, 
skillfully connecting broad historical and cultural perspectives to a 
variety of observational research techniques. While their dependence 
on qualitative materials is cause for the displeasure of positivists, these 
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critics were no strangers to quantitative data and used them when 
appropriate. Moreover, lest we forget that science means more than 
mere research methodology, the real significance of this work resides 
in its perceptive conceptualization of societal problems and its critical 
and theoretical insights into American life.
At the same time, there is no question as to the uneven quality 
of this work. Despite the attention given them by Mills, issues of 
power and inequality received only limited treatment by other writ-
ers. Understandably, the social and psychological effects of increasing 
abundance during this period seemed of greater importance to these 
writers than the concentration of power that emerged with the onset 
of the Cold War.21 Also, these critics ignored inequities in the distri-
bution of material resources, most notably the persistence of poverty 
behind the appearance of affluence. Cleavages in class structure and 
culture were mostly missing from the pictures they drew. Predating 
the civil rights and women’s movements, these critics were relatively 
oblivious to issues of race, ethnicity, and gender. As middle-class 
white men living during a time of widespread upward mobility for 
urban and suburban whites, what they saw as problematic were issues 
of consumerism, suburbanization, and the plight of employees work-
ing in large organizations.
Additionally, while social character was one focus of attention, 
these writers failed to engage its study adequately. Lacking in-depth 
interviews and extensive participant observation, their depictions of 
changing social character and related psychological issues were often 
anecdotally based and relatively superficial and fragmentary.22 More-
over, in most of these studies an analysis of character was limited to 
the impact of social structure and historical change on the individual 
while questions of agency went largely unaddressed.23 Finally, while 
echoing many themes of the Frankfurt School, these critics’ analyses 
might have been more penetrating had they appropriated theoretical 
tools and insights from these European scholars.
These omissions aside, postwar social criticism was groundbreak-
ing for its portraits of the cultural and psychological characteristics 
of American society following the war. Abiding by the Millsian tech-
nique of taking historical social structure as context, these critics’ 
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broad field of vision enabled them to link evolving character and 
personality traits to “macro” social developments. Their work sought 
to characterize and question the institutional and cultural patterns 
and corresponding character types that were emerging in the chang-
ing worlds of work and leisure. These writers employed a comprehen-
sive critical method of identifying and analyzing problems along two 
dimensions of these worlds: the material/economic and the cultural. 
While recognizing the primacy of material growth in the shaping of 
postwar life, these authors framed their views of change in cultural 
and social-psychological terms. They saw the main drift of values and 
beliefs as a function of individuals’ adaptation to the group pressures 
accompanying materialistic lifestyles and bureaucratic organization.
More importantly, these critics’ insights resonated with some 
enduring themes of modern social theory. First and foremost, im-
plicit in this work is an extended discourse on the consequences of a 
weakening of traditional institutions, such as the family, religion, and 
community, as modern society shifts power and influence from these 
“primary” structures to the “secondary” structures of state and econ-
omy. These critics rightly saw bureaucratically organized patterns of 
work and leisure as overtaking communal influences and self-deter-
mined decision making among individuals and small groups. Post-
war social criticism was thus rich in the cultural and psychological 
implications of the inroads of modern capitalism into daily life and 
the resulting difficulties facing those who would resist this powerful 
influence.
Second, if we were to identify a topical pattern in this body of 
work, it would most likely be its sustained commentary on problems 
of alienation and esteem. The pairing of these concepts is most appar-
ent in Mills’s White Collar, which while preoccupied with new forms 
of alienation also addressed what Mills perceived as the psychic bur-
den attached to the quest for social esteem outside of work.24 Indeed, 
the concept of alienation, with its sociological genesis in the early writ-
ings of Marx, and the concept of esteem, derivative of Weber’s writings 
on status and status group, are thematized among all the social critics 
of this era. As historical social psychology, this work brought critical 
focus to the relationship between changing social and character struc-
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ture, examining the connections between alienation as an “objective” 
problem of structure (although Mills also talked about alienation in 
terms of “feelings” of powerlessness) and esteem as a “subjective” prob-
lem of self and identity. Although the interplay of these Marxist and 
Weberian themes is most obvious in Mills, it is implicit in the work 
of Riesman, Whyte, and other authors of the time who saw social 
conformity as a loss of individuality and an estrangement from self.
Finally, it is worth noting the similarities between the postwar 
focus on alienation and esteem and the earlier writings of Veblen.25 
While concentrating on issues of esteem, Veblen touched on the prob- 
lem of alienation in his comments on the contradiction between the 
socially cooperative demands of a machine-based economy and the 
predatory ways of capitalism.26 Though primarily a social critic, given 
Veblen’s familiarity with anthropology, economics, and history, the 
nature and scope of his work invite comparison to the classic theo-
rists, including not only Marx and Weber but also Durkheim.
With the exception of Mills’s work, American social criticism 
from the 1950s and 1960s is now largely forgotten but nonetheless re-
mains an impressive and still relevant body of social science writings. 
While many of the issues have changed, these writers identified a set 
of core sociocultural problems that remain pertinent today. Though 
the content may be dated, this literature continues to be a model of 
publicly accessible critical social inquiry. A response to Lynd’s and 
Mills’s call for a pertinent social science, this work provides concrete, 
comprehensive, and comprehensible sociological accounts of a chang-
ing society and culture. As such, this genre continues to offer a com-
pelling alternative to the overspecialized and formalist studies of the 
disciplinary mainstream of today.27

3
The pursuit of scientific respectability that shaped sociology during the 1940s and 1950s was followed in the 1960s by a strong reaction against this trend. Resembling an insurgency, 
this reaction manifested itself in a proliferation of new theories, meth-
ods, and research agendas that challenged the postwar orthodoxy of 
positivism and functionalism. The search for alternatives was driven 
largely by a growing perception of the discipline’s lack of pertinence 
to major events and issues of the day, specifically the social unrest and 
cultural upheavals of that decade. The attempt to establish a regime 
of functionalism and quantitative research was thus countered by de-
mands for different kinds of sociological inquiry reflective of the re-
alities of contemporary American life. Opponents of the mainstream 
turned to Marxist sociology, the Frankfurt School, feminism and 
gender studies, phenomenological sociology, and eventually cultural 
studies, new French theory (poststructuralism, postmodernism), and 
neocolonial theory. Within the mainstream, numerous scholars shift-
ed their attention to conflict theory, declaring it a more viable model 
of society than functionalism.1 These alternative perspectives, con-
stituting a new heterodoxy, represented a refusal of positivist science, 
system building, and mechanistic modes of explanation in favor of 
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historically oriented, critical approaches focused on issues of inequal-
ity, power, subjectivity, and identity.2
The overall impact of these developments, however, has remained 
ambiguous. Although they brought new energy to the field, turn-
ing it in a more critical and “inclusive” direction, these movements 
failed to reverse the trend toward specialization and a fragmenta-
tion of the field into piecemeal approaches. Often drawn toward 
abstract theory, the bulk of these innovations lacked sociological 
substance. Perhaps worse, in a kind of disciplinary co-optation, the 
more important of these movements were converted into new sub-
fields, further fragmenting the field. By offering their own particular 
perspectives, methodologies, and critical insights, this wide-ranging 
opposition fell short of constituting a new sociological vision of the 
kind advocated by Lynd in Knowledge for What? (1939) and Mills in 
The Sociological Imagination (1961). Moreover, the anti-Eurocentric 
and antiwhite male stance of many of these tendencies, fueled by 
the rise of what came to be called “identity politics,” undermined 
the credibility of major sources of sociological alternatives to formal-
ism, namely, the early Chicago researchers and the classic European 
theorists, all of whom were white men. By focusing on specific so-
ciocultural categories and groups, identity politics led to new divi-
sions in the field based on narrow preoccupations with group-based 
theoretical and political agendas. In sum, despite enriching sociol-
ogy through their critiques, these reactive tendencies were unable to 
coalesce around a genuinely new paradigm, leaving the discipline 
even further dispersed and bereft of a common rationale and sense 
of purpose.
Reorientation: Philosophical Origins  
of Mills’s Sociology
In contrast to these attempts at renewal, C. Wright Mills’s proposals 
for a historical and structural focus on the individual constituted a 
model of a critical, multidimensional social analysis implying genu-
ine change in the field. His work exemplified a creative theoretical 
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and methodological stance and, perhaps more importantly, a certain 
way of thinking about and doing sociology that imparted intellectual, 
human, and political significance to the enterprise.
Mills’s importance in this respect resides less in his own accom-
plishments, impressive as they were, than in the overall character 
and underlying presuppositions of his work. The most elemental of 
these are to be found primarily in the source both of Mills’s early 
writings and his larger sociological vision and practice, namely, the 
philosophy of pragmatism. A former philosophy student, Mills was 
intimately acquainted with this philosophy, the subject of his doctor-
al dissertation in sociology.3 From the very beginning, pragmatism 
shaped his intellectual disposition, directly contributing to his early 
work on social psychology and the sociology of knowledge and in-
directly influencing his later work. The underlying motive force and 
character of Mills’s thinking can thus be grasped and appreciated 
by examining its pragmatist origins. In short, pragmatism provided 
the philosophical moorings of the kind of sociology Mills advocated 
and practiced.4
The mode of inquiry Mills and the other postwar critics inher-
ited from Thorstein Veblen contained a strong pragmatist element, 
namely, a questioning attitude toward existing reality. This feature 
of pragmatism contributed to the philosophical and intellectual un-
derpinnings of Mills’s uniquely provocative and down-to-earth work. 
Pragmatism was thus the context of Veblen’s impact on Mills (Til-
man 1984) and the connecting link between Mills and the other 
critics of his time. This philosophy pointed Mills in a direction that, 
when combined with classical social theory, gave his brand of sociol-
ogy its critical intellectual energy, range, and depth.
The post–World War II social criticism discussed in Chapter 2 
offers concrete examples of a type of sociological inquiry that avoids 
the limitations and perils of formalistic sociology. The search for an 
alternative to formalism, however, ultimately leads us further back 
historically, past the postwar social critics and Veblen to the latter’s 
contemporaries in the pragmatist movement. In looking backward, 
we find that pragmatism’s outlook on and way of understanding the 
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world and human behavior have crucial implications for a transfor-
mation of sociology into a different kind of discipline. By extension, 
the basic principles and forms of reasoning and inquiry developed 
by the pragmatists, culminating in John Dewey, provide an overall 
theory, method, and raison d’être for more substantive and conse-
quential forms of practice in all the social sciences.
Formalism on Trial
Having acquired multiple meanings, the term “pragmatism” immed-
iately poses problems of definition. With origins in both nineteenth-
century American life and the philosophers who gave it intellectual 
currency, scientific ground, and a public presence—Charles Sanders 
 Peirce, William James, and John Dewey—this philosophy has been 
subject to numerous interpretations. As an innovative body of out-
looks, ideas, arguments, and claims, pragmatist thinking has circu- 
lated widely among philosophers in the English-speaking world, 
manifesting itself in a variety of ways in a range of contexts. En-
larged and enriched over the years, the pragmatist challenge to phil-
osophical tradition has nonetheless left an uncertain legacy.
In the writings of its originators, pragmatism comprises a more or 
less identifiable if not always consistent set of ideas, principles, and 
pictures of the world. What was distinctive and unifying about the 
views of its founders, however, was their opposition to formalistic 
modes of thought. Joining a host of similar thought movements, all 
of which, according to Morton White (1947), were in revolt against 
formalism, early pragmatism represented a sea change in Western 
philosophy involving a rejection of traditional metaphysics along 
with unending skepticism toward all ideas claiming a priori or uni-
versal status. In White’s words:
Pragmatism, instrumentalism, institutionalism, economic de-
terminism, and legal realism exhibit striking philosophical 
kinships. They are all suspicious of approaches that are exces-
sively formal; they all protest their anxiety to come to grips 
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with reality, their attachment to the moving and vital in social 
life. (1947, 6)
Arising from a common intellectual ferment, the intent of these 
movements was to disclaim all formal and abstract modes of thought. 
These movements stood for direct engagement with the problems 
posed by a social world of dynamic change and development, a world 
that could be grasped only from the perspective of modern empirical 
science. All of these movements, according to White, “insist[ed] on 
coming to grips with life, experience, process, growth, context, func-
tion” (1947, 13).
In one interpretation, this novel way of thinking was less a prod-
uct of internal developments in the field of philosophy than of ex-
ternal events. John Patrick Diggins (1994) argues that pragmatism 
took shape as a distinct philosophy at a time of cultural and spiritual 
crisis in American life. This was a crisis of authority precipitated by 
modern science and industry, forces perceived as threatening the tra-
ditional beliefs and values of rural, small-town America. For many 
thinkers, especially William James, it was mainly religion and spiri-
tual life that were endangered by the modernist outlook promulgat-
ed by technology, big capitalism, and rapid change. For Dewey and 
others, modernism meant a potential crisis in human values gener-
ally, a crisis calling for an expanded conception of science able to 
reconcile the scientific worldview with cherished and sacred beliefs.
Although James and Dewey saw a need to protect the realm of 
belief and value from the desacralizing effects of science, their prag-
matism was in a sense a modern response to modernism. These men 
saw pragmatism as fundamentally scientific in nature and as pro-
moting new habits of thought, attitudes, and social practices capable 
of accommodating science to the lay world of human values, a rec-
onciliation they felt was crucial for social progress and the general 
welfare. Democratically minded and suspicious of vested interests, 
the early pragmatists were motivated by a conviction that philosophy 
should join with modern science and technology to address the needs 
of the entire society. This meant overcoming the isolation of science 
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from the public through the formation of a democratic community 
of scientists producing knowledge serving the common good.
Situating Pragmatism
There is a common perception that pragmatism is a philosophy of 
“practicality” based on the criterion of “what works” and that this 
habit of thought has deep roots in American soil. Such a view chal-
lenges Diggins’s interpretation of pragmatism as a response to mod-
ernization. Regardless of the extent to which a “pragmatic” frame of 
mind informing daily life existed prior to extensive modernization, 
“what works” is hardly an accurate rendering of pragmatist philos-
ophy. While the common narrative that equates “pragmatic” with 
“practical” has its place, the view that pragmatism is a philosophy 
of practical results, or simple utilitarianism, is a gross misinterpreta-
tion of the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey. Rather, these men 
formulated a way of thinking that could be called a “philosophy of 
consequences.”
Situating pragmatism on the historical and intellectual map 
can be daunting, given its multiple origins and overlap with other 
thought movements of the time.5 In today’s context, although seem-
ingly unlikely, it is useful to compare pragmatism to philosophical 
postmodernism.6 That the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty, Hil-
ary Putman, Richard Bernstein, and others should emerge from the 
“postmodern turn” suggests a certain affinity between the two phi-
losophies. First, both pragmatism and contemporary postmodern 
philosophy reject absolutes, universals, foundations, final causes, and 
other conventional features of traditional metaphysics and monistic 
thinking, much of which the postmodernist Jean-François Lyotard 
captured in his phrase “master narratives” (1984). Both philosophies 
exhibit strong pluralizing tendencies, and both regard “truth” as al-
ways provisional, based on the principle of fallibilism. Second, both 
pragmatism and postmodernism are in different but overlapping 
ways representations of a sensibility reflecting a democratization of 
culture, understood as an attitudinal trend of openness and inclu-
siveness often associated with American ideals and manners. That 
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these philosophies were from the beginning so closely connected to 
their social and historical contexts, giving changing circumstances, 
perceptions, and sentiments theoretical expression, is itself testimony 
to a weakening of barriers between intellectual elites and the wider 
populace, a significant indicator of social and cultural democratiza-
tion.7 Dewey understood democracy as a necessary condition for and 
outcome of the realization of his philosophy, while the writings of 
American postmodernists exhibit strong antielitist and antihierar-
chical views. Thus, we find in both pragmatism and postmodernism 
democratic proclivities and an underlying populist spirit.
While this comparison offers a suggestive framing of pragmatism 
in the intellectual and cultural scheme of things, looking at pragma-
tism from this angle should not detract from its pre-postmodernist 
impact on numerous areas of twentieth-century thought. A “generic 
pragmatism” based on the basic philosophical premises of its origi-
nators has appeared not only among some postmodernists but also in 
the teachings of George Herbert Mead, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Her-
bert Blumer, and a number of analytical philosophers, not to men- 
tion its impact on a generation of mid-twentieth-century public in-
tellectuals.8
Philosophical Revolt
For the purpose of exploring pragmatism’s implications for soci-
ology and its connections to the work of Mills, it is sufficient to 
extract only the salient ideas of its founders, particularly those of 
John Dewey. The pertinence of Dewey for a rehabilitation of sociol-
ogy begins with the strong antiformalist tendencies in his thought. 
While maintaining a firm commitment to scientific thinking, more-
over, Dewey’s intellectual perspective and his conception of inquiry 
run counter to the basic premises of positivism, an anchor of socio-
logical formalism.
What I call Dewey’s “social pragmatism” is suggestive of a so-
ciological practice characterized by (1) direct engagement with sub-
stantive societal problems, (2) theory and research serving the public 
good, (3) recognition and accounting of the social origins and char-
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acter of knowledge, and (4) an approach to social inquiry in which 
positivist methods play a limited role alongside methodological pro-
tocols more germane to the requirements of the subject matter. Trace-
able to Dewey’s writings, these are cardinal features of Mills’s work 
that provide a fresh appreciation from a pragmatist perspective of the 
substance and spirit of his sociological project.
In Louis Menand’s view, pragmatism was reducible to what he 
called an attitude. More to the point, this philosophy was based not 
on a set of ideas but rather on
only a single idea—an idea about ideas. [These thinkers] 
believed that ideas are not “out there” waiting to be discov-
ered but are tools . . . that people devise to cope with the world 
in which they find themselves. They believed that ideas are 
produced . . . by groups of individuals—that they are social. 
. . . [I]deas do not develop according to some inner logic of 
their own but are entirely dependent . . . on their human car-
riers and the environment. . . . [S]ince ideas are provisional 
responses to particular and unreproducible circumstances, 
their survival depends not on their immutability but on their 
adaptability. (2001, xi–xii)
In fact, this characterization of pragmatist philosophy suggests much 
more than adoption of a mere attitude but indicates an approach to 
ideas and knowledge that changes the nature of philosophy itself, 
namely its grounding in concrete reality and the everyday problems of 
ordinary human beings. The pragmatists, in effect, redefined philoso-
phy, changing it from being a means to truth, a notion they repeatedly 
questioned, to being a guide to thought and action. In this respect, it 
would seem that Menand’s claim that pragmatism sees ideas merely 
as “tools” is an oversimplification of what is actually an intricate and 
comprehensive theory of the relationship of ideas to human experience 
and practice.
Though a highly original conception of the nature of knowledge 
was the unifying thread of pragmatism’s three major founders, there 
were significant differences among them with respect to the form 
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this conception took and how it was to be developed. As the most 
scientifically oriented member of the group and the inventor of the 
term “pragmatism,” Charles Sanders Peirce claimed that “knowing” 
was dependent not on philosophical reflection but rather an ongo-
ing process of inquiry that was social in nature. Formulating a set of 
logical and epistemological principles governing this process, Peirce 
from the beginning gave pragmatism a scientific foundation through 
a body of reasoning and rules regarding how to practice philosophy 
in a genuinely knowing yet provisional way. Most important was his 
formulation of the famous “pragmatic maxim.” This was a succinct 
statement about the nature of concepts that was to serve as the cen-
tral premise of pragmatist thought. According to this maxim, “the 
meaning of a concept is a matter of the practical effects of acting in 
accordance with it” (Bacon 2012, 3).9 For Peirce, “practical” had a 
broad meaning connoting “practice”; in other words, our concepts 
and ideas were to be understood in terms of their outcomes in the 
context of actual human practices. In this view, concepts in some 
sense literally “mean” their real effects in and on life. This is the origi-
nal formulation of the foundational pragmatist notion that thought 
and knowledge are to be understood and judged according to their 
consequences in the real world. Concepts and practices are thus part 
of a unity of human action.10
The better-known writings of William James exhibit some con-
tinuity with Peirce’s groundbreaking work but contain a provocative 
twist on the maxim. James complicates the maxim by arguing that 
the meaning of an idea or proposition depends on the psychological 
effects of believing in its truth (Talisse and Aiken 2008, 13). The 
notion of belief thus becomes a central theme in James’s version of 
pragmatism (see James 1955, 1985). This move in turn is an aspect 
of James’s introduction of the notion of experience into the prag-
matist lexicon and a refocusing of the maxim on the psychological 
and subjective dimensions of the individual. By these means James 
effectively redefines the consequences of thought in terms of what 
people come to believe as a result of their own personal experiences 
and how this translates psychologically into their view of the world 
and themselves. This conception is most apparent in James’s The Va-
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rieties of Religious Experience (1985), a study in the psychology of reli-
gious and spiritual belief.11 James’s psychologizing of the pragmatist 
theory of truth has both endeared him to a wide reading public and 
brought charges of an overly subjective and relativizing conception 
of the maxim.12 By turning to experience, James shifted emphasis to 
questions of epistemology and empirical verification, preparing the 
ground for a radical critique of traditional empiricism. According 
to James, the traditional empiricists (read “British empiricists”) held 
an atomistic view of the universe, in the words of Richard Bern-
stein, mistakenly seeing “experience as consisting of the aggregate 
of discrete units.” We know this view to be false, James argued, be-
cause “we have direct experience of the connections, relations, and 
transitions within the direct flow of experience” (Bernstein 2010, 
57; italics in original).13 It is through our own experience of the 
world, then, that we are able to discern the real nature of things and 
their evolving interrelationships. James thus developed a pragma-
tism predicated on a person-centered epistemology that privileged 
direct experience over analytical categories and formal methods of 
inquiry.14 Insisting, in pragmatist anti-Cartesian fashion, on the in-
separability of impressions and ideas (ibid., 56), James rejected both 
atomistic descriptions of the phenomenal world and intellectual ab-
stractions, claiming concrete experience as the source of knowledge 
and the ground of guided action.
Behind these differences was a consensus among the three think-
ers that was the basis of their modus operandi: philosophy was in dire 
need of reconstruction. For Peirce, this meant giving philosophy a sci-
entific foundation, and for James it meant subordinating philosophy 
to psychology and the repository of human experience. Building on 
these views, Dewey felt reconstruction meant a thoroughgoing cri-
tique of traditional philosophy, involving a new set of presuppositions 
and categories and the formulation of new principles and concepts. 
Accordingly, Dewey systematically developed an original and com-
prehensive philosophy with implications for the full range of human 
knowledge and activity, including psychology, society, politics, edu-
cation, logic, science, art, ethics, and morality. While he generously 
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credited Peirce and James for opening new doors, Dewey effectively 
turned pragmatism into a socially oriented, highly textured philoso-
phy of exceptional range.
Dewey’s Reconstruction Project
The problems of interpretation associated with Dewey’s writings 
stem in part from a lack of clarity and consistency in his work. How-
ever, many of the difficulties in understanding Dewey result from 
the originality and subtlety of his thinking as well as the challenges 
posed by the task of reconstructing philosophy in a wholesale man-
ner. Dewey’s tireless efforts to change the character of philosophical 
thought meant that his formulations often stretched the limits of 
conventional language and accepted philosophical discourse. Dif-
ficulty in interpreting Dewey also is aggravated by the sheer scope 
and volume of his work and the fact that in the course of his long life 
his work evolved through a number of phases.15
Dewey sought incessantly to change not what we think but how 
we think. This is apparent in his open dislike of the Western propen-
sity to categorize and compartmentalize and his persistent empha-
sis on the interrelatedness and interdependence of everything in the 
physical and social universes. Of special import for social science and 
social theory, Dewey was a unifier. A strong believer in “the unity of 
knowledge” (Menand 2001, 322), he was dismayed by modernity’s 
tendencies toward specialization and abstraction, as manifested in the 
differentiation of culture into distinct and separate realms.16 Against 
this trend, Dewey pursued a holistic philosophy geared to the prob-
lems of everyday life and aimed at removing what he regarded as 
artificial barriers among different spheres of thought and action. At 
the same time, rejecting traditional metaphysics, Dewey abhorred all 
dualisms—subject-object, mind-body, theory-practice, fact-value, sci-
ence-morality, art-life, and so forth. These are focal points of Dewey’s 
antiformalism and his resolve to transform philosophy from contem-
plative reflection into an integrated, practical, and grounded method 
of engagement with the concrete problems of life.
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The reach, complexity, and passion of Dewey’s efforts were des-
tined to result in an imposing but ambiguous legacy. Given the am-
bitiousness of his project, there are grounds to judge Dewey as having 
failed to reach his goal. Yet to this day, Dewey is widely regarded as 
the leading pragmatist thinker and most important figure in twen-
tieth-century American thought. Indeed, one difficulty facing any 
discussion of pragmatism is the fact that many ideas and principles of 
the original thinkers, primarily Peirce and Dewey, have been widely 
assimilated in various fields of knowledge.
Many of Dewey’s writings take the form of a critique of tradi-
tional philosophy. In a more positive vein, Dewey saw his own phi-
losophy as a worldview and method appropriate to the problems of 
modern life and consistent with the outlook of modern science. In 
regarding Dewey from a more affirmative perspective, however, we 
encounter a recurring problem. Dewey’s writings exhibit the same 
quality of interrelatedness that he saw in the world. It is virtually 
impossible to grasp the precise import of any one of Dewey’s claims 
or concepts without examining all of them simultaneously. Dewey’s 
metaphysics, logic, psychology, educational theory, social thought, 
and politics are so thoroughly intertwined that an understanding of 
any part of his philosophy depends on or is closely conditioned by 
knowledge of the other parts. Finally, it helps matters to allow room 
for Dewey’s polemical style and method, bearing in mind that the 
negative tone of much of his writing is a by-product of his tenacious 
critique of pre-Darwinian philosophy.
Deserving of greater attention than the scientific side of pragma-
tism, however, are the claims of Peirce and Dewey concerning the 
social foundations of knowledge. As a semiotician, Peirce had already 
given mental life a social cast in his theories of communication and 
the sign. As Bernstein notes, “Peirce argues that all language, signifi-
cation, and consequently all inquiry and its end product, knowledge, 
are essentially social in character” (1999, 176). This became the cen-
tral principle grounding Dewey’s metaphysical assumptions and the 
basis of his belief in the intrinsic connections among science, educa-
tion, and democracy. According to Dewey, the quest for knowledge 
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through experimental inquiry is always undertaken within a context 
of social meanings and relations and within a community of actors. 
Dewey’s insights into the social basis of ideas and inquiry were the 
source of a distinctive approach to the problem of knowledge and his 
most important contribution to our understanding of the purpose 
and practice of philosophy and science.
Indeed, as Mills discerned, by making the social foundation of 
human intelligence a key principle of his theorizing, Dewey estab-
lished a basis for a sociology of knowledge. Despite its obvious perti-
nence to social science and social theory, Dewey’s conception of the 
social character of thought and knowledge has never been adequate-
ly explored or appreciated. The weight Dewey placed on the social 
has two aspects. First, it implies that all scientific inquiry should be 
approached in terms of its social foundations and those of its objects 
of inquiry. The prominence of the social in Dewey’s philosophy even 
suggests that, for him, a sociology-of-knowledge perspective would 
ideally be the frame of all sociological theory and research. Second, 
Dewey’s belief in the social interconnectedness of all human activity, 
including mental activity, is a major source of his antipathy toward 
formalism, dualistic thinking, and excessive abstraction. Generally 
speaking, intimations in Dewey’s thought of a broad-based sociology 
of knowledge offer the possibility of greater intellectual perspective 
and depth in the practice of all the social sciences.
An understanding of Dewey, especially for social scientists, is best 
achieved by focusing attention on the two concepts central to his phi-
losophy and conception of science: experience and inquiry. Attuned to 
Peirce’s rigorous arguments about scientific method, Dewey was pre-
occupied throughout his life with questions concerning the logic and 
nature of scientific inquiry. At the same time, Dewey seized on the 
emphasis James placed on experience, and it became the foundation of 
his conception of “the empirical” and for his critique of abstract, reflec-
tive philosophy and the positivist version of empiricism. Dewey’s views 
of experience and inquiry were linked in the form of a biologically 
inflected “behaviorism” derived from Charles Darwin and shaped by 
Hegelian categories, a linking that became the basis of his conception 
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of both science and social life.17 While the recurring concern of Dew-
ey’s work was the conduct of inquiry (Mills 1964, 356), the notions 
of both inquiry and experience were the main weapons in Dewey’s 
dispute with philosophical orthodoxy, laying the foundation for his 
view of action as intelligent adaptation to a changing environment. 
Dewey’s point was that a mode of inquiry addressing real-life prob- 
lems could be developed only within the context of experience and an 
understanding of our place in the natural world. In short, as Bernstein 
notes, “Dewey attempted to combine a new method for dealing with 
specific problems within a comprehensive theory of experience and 
nature” (Dewey 1960a, xviii). 
Dewey on Experience
If Dewey has been a controversial figure it surely is not unrelated 
to his reliance on the concept of experience. As Martin Jay (2005) 
has demonstrated, the rich history of this concept provides abundant 
evidence of both its significance in Western thought and its problem-
atic character. With the rise in modern society of individualism and 
a preoccupation with subjectivity, the concept of experience gained 
considerable currency, and it continues to have a conspicuous pres-
ence in contemporary discourse. Given its innate ambiguity and af-
finities with psychology, however, the philosophical viability of the 
concept has been repeatedly questioned.18
Dewey himself was aware of the difficulties with the concept of 
experience but regarded it as too valuable to abandon. Holding firm, 
he converted its murky meaning into a strategic advantage, employ-
ing the inherent ambiguity of the concept in an astute theoretical 
move. Following James, Dewey recognized that its “troublesome” 
double reference to that which is both subjective and objective—
involving an experiencer and something experienced—made the 
concept of central importance to the pragmatist project of uniting 
subject and object. “Experience” served Dewey’s goal of overcoming 
dualistic thinking in general and the gulf between idealism and real-
ism in particular, essential features of Dewey’s assault on traditional 
philosophy. In this respect, the concept was instrumental in redefin-
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ing “the empirical” as involving simultaneously the active mental 
construction of phenomena on the part of knowers and the existence 
of an external world of observable “facts” and “events.”
For Dewey, the concept of experience performed the critical func-
tion of situating philosophy in lived reality. As an indication of its 
importance to his philosophy, Dewey employed the notion in two 
notably different ways. In a metaphysical sense, experience was the 
ground of all thought, knowledge, and inquiry. As carefully laid 
out in his essay “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (Dewey 
1960a) and in Experience and Nature (Dewey 1958b), a transforma-
tion in philosophical method depended on acceptance of the propo-
sition that, far from leading an autonomous existence, thought was 
“bound up” in the experience on which it reflected (Mills 1964, 364). 
As Dewey put it in Reconstruction in Philosophy, “Knowledge is not 
something separate and self-sufficing, but is involved in the process 
by which life is sustained and evolved” (1957, 87). In addition to this 
axiomatic use of the term, Dewey put forth a normative theory of 
experience. The concept takes on evaluative meaning in Art as Expe-
rience (Dewey 1958a), when Dewey postulates that the sense of con-
summation associated with aesthetic experience is the generic form of 
human fulfillment in all areas of life.
An appreciation of how Dewey arrived at his conception directs 
our attention to the genesis of his philosophical orientation. His early 
attraction to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, he claims, was moti-
vated by a “demand for unification” rooted in the isolating effects of 
“New England culture” (Dewey 1960a, 10). Initially, Dewey was at- 
tracted to the idea of the “organic” that Hegel had elevated to a uni-
versal category (ibid., xxi). The notion of the organic supported Dew-
ey’s growing belief in the principle of interrelatedness and served a 
vital purpose in his attack on what he believed were false dichotomies.
With Dewey’s turn to the Darwinian theory of evolution, the or-
ganic became a biological category referring to the relationship be-
tween an organism and its environment. This relationship became a 
framework for much of Dewey’s subsequent thinking, providing an 
image of the interconnectedness of things that was integral to what 
became his “naturalistic” theory.19 According to Dewey, the social 
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world exhibits certain generic traits common to nature. Life is full of 
activity, change, contingency—key features of Darwin’s view of evo-
lution in which processes of adaptation and structural differentiation 
account for the development of various species and their relationship 
to environing conditions. Not only did Dewey see Darwin’s theory 
as descriptive of social life; Darwin’s work also had implications for 
the application of scientific method to the study of human beings as 
biological and social creatures (Dewey 1965, v). Dewey’s adoption of 
a Darwinian perspective was the beginning of his lifelong belief that 
solutions to the problems of society depended on an evolutionary 
perspective and more generally the concepts and methodologies of 
science.
Despite a gradual transition to Darwin, Dewey remained faith-
ful to certain Hegelian ideas. This was facilitated by the concept of 
the organic, which linked the Hegelian and Darwinian dimensions 
of Dewey’s thought. While ignoring elements of Hegel that seemed 
unproductive, Dewey’s thinking continued to draw on basic Hegel-
ian principles (Jay 2005, 288). As Dewey put it, “Acquaintance with 
Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking” (Dewey 1960a, 
12). From the standpoint of social theory, the enduring influence of 
Hegel is most apparent in the emphasis Dewey placed on the social 
character of knowledge and his understanding of the intersubjec-
tive foundation of the sociocultural world. Another Hegelian debt 
is apparent in the historicist dimension in Dewey, an important but 
underplayed feature of his view of social change that he often com-
bined with the Darwinian conception to create a picture of “histo-
ries” within the workings of nature and society (Dewey 1958b, xii). 
While occasionally employing the organic concept in a biological 
sense, positing parallels and interconnections between nature and 
society, Dewey never completely abandoned Hegel’s conception of 
the organic character of social and cultural evolution. Contextual-
izing problems in historically specific periods and conditions was a 
significant feature of Dewey’s relativizing approach to knowledge 
and his method of moving from philosophical monism to the par-
ticulars of human history and the pluralistic character of society. 
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Relatedly, Hegel’s propensity to totalize reappears in Dewey’s drive 
to unify, perhaps most apparent in his view of society as a unity of 
differentiated but interconnected structures and functions seen as 
parts of a whole.
What has been called Dewey’s “naturalized Hegelianism” enabled 
him to devise an integrated and dynamic approach to knowledge. 
He saw the concept of experience as the means by which philosophy 
could be rid of both the subject-object dichotomy and the well-known 
error of “misplaced concreteness” (Whitehead 1958, 52).20 Dewey 
argues that experience is not just a matter of possessing knowledge 
but “an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical 
and social environment” (Dewey 1960a, 23). It follows that experi-
ence is not restricted to the category of subjectivity but designates a 
subject-object relationship based on functional distinctions in which 
an objective reality enters into the mental functioning of subjects and 
in turn is modified by their responses. Dewey states that experience 
is inherently empirical, full of particulars, but these particulars are 
tied together by all kinds of “connections and continuities” (ibid.). 
Contrary to the conventional belief that experience and thought are 
“antithetical,” thought is embedded in and emanates from experience, 
which is in Dewey’s words “full of inference” (ibid.). Reason is in-
trinsic to experience itself and thus inseparable from the life processes 
within which experience takes place.
By situating thought within the flow of experience, Dewey im-
parts to mental life an implicitly activist orientation. This was his 
means of rejecting the now widely disputed “spectator” and “copy” 
theories of knowledge, which treat the subject as a passive observ-
er and recorder of “external” phenomena. The active and dynamic 
character of experience, and therefore thought, becomes explicit in 
what is perhaps Dewey’s most consequential theoretical argument. 
He says that because most philosophies dwell in the past and the 
present, they have ignored the future, which is necessarily the preoc-
cupation of a philosophy like pragmatism, as it is focused on con-
sequences. Adopting a passive stance, traditional empiricisms have 
taken the past and present as a “given.” But “experience in its vital 
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form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is characterized 
by projection” (1960a, 23; italics added). The experimental attitude 
that inheres in experience is future oriented, marked by “anticipation 
and prediction” (ibid., 63). Here, Dewey is framing pragmatism at its 
modernist best, showing how thought is now geared to activity and 
action and how these aspects of experience direct our attention to the 
future outcomes of present actions and events. In this respect, Dewey 
gives expression to a major strand of late modern philosophy, citing 
the importance of the temporal dimension of existence (ibid.) and 
incorporating it at the center of his theory.21 Here we find an obvious 
parallel to Mead’s ideas as presented especially in The Philosophy of 
the Present (1980), in which Mead underscores the temporal character 
of social life.22 And temporality reappears in Herbert Blumer’s (1969) 
exposition of symbolic interactionism, which places emphasis on the 
anticipatory nature of action and interaction. In Blumer’s polemic, 
human behavior is accounted for less by causal explanations based 
on antecedent factors than by the forward pull arising from actors’ 
interpretations and definitions of their situations.
Finally, it is important to stress how thoroughly Dewey defended 
the “naturalistic” character of his theory. The title of Experience and 
Nature was intended to closely link these concepts, as the contents of 
the book clearly reveal. Implying widespread resistance to the inclu-
sion of nature in philosophical thought, Dewey comments, “In the 
natural sciences there is a union of experience and nature which is not 
greeted as a monstrosity” (1958b, 2a). Elsewhere he states, “Experi-
ence is of as well as in nature” (ibid, 4a; italics in original). Although 
the context of this statement clearly indicates that Dewey is saying 
that nature is what we experience, “of ” in this instance bears a double 
meaning that should not be lost on readers. Dewey’s line of reason-
ing suggests that experience and thus knowledge somehow embody 
nature. In either interpretation, he clearly posits experience as rooted 
in nature, thus claiming their inseparability. While Dewey does not 
make sufficiently clear what he includes in the category “nature,” 
we can reasonably infer that, viewed from a Darwinian perspective, 
Dewey intends “nature” as a reference to human existence as a whole, 
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with primary emphasis on the similarities between biological and so-
cial life. For him, these are comparable in character and intimately 
intertwined within the realm of experience.23
Dewey on Inquiry
For Dewey, a viable theory of inquiry depended on a radically trans-
formed conception of the nature of logic. Dewey’s writings on this 
topic are so unorthodox that they are probably “the hardest to under-
stand, even for the professional logician” (Hook 1995, 88). This fact 
bears a certain irony, considering that Dewey apparently was pre-
occupied with questions of logic and inquiry throughout his career. 
Fortunately, by contextualizing his remarks within the larger project 
of pragmatism, it is possible to grasp his basic position and intent.
We can best understand Dewey’s theory by first seeing it as an 
attempt to disavow traditional arguments in epistemology. These he 
dismisses as a wasteful diversion perpetuated by formal logic and ad-
herence to outmoded philosophical conceptions. As a counterpoint 
to what he considers epistemological dead ends, Dewey draws our 
attention to the function of logic. Beginning with the Greeks, logic 
has traditionally been a formal system of abstract, universally valid 
rules of reasoning. By contrast, Dewey defines logic as a set of men-
tal operations tied to controlled empirical inquiry. Once logic’s func-
tion in inquiry is properly understood, he argues, we can dispense 
with the insoluble problems of traditional theories of knowledge, 
and logic can assume its proper role as a component of experimental 
inquiry based on systematic observation.
As suggested by the title of his voluminous work Logic: The The-
ory of Inquiry, for Dewey logic is not a matter of abstract reasoning 
or a set of a priori formal rules imposed on thinking from the out-
side but rather an essential part of the act of inquiry. According to 
Dewey, “All logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise 
within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of 
inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions” (2013, 13). These 
forms “originate” (ibid.; italics in original) in the process of inquiry 
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itself, emerging from within investigations into the concrete prob-
lems for which we seek solutions. While Dewey seems to be rejecting 
all inherited conceptions, from the sound of his statement it would 
be a mistake to assume that his view consists of a complete rejection 
of basic Aristotelian logic. Rather, he seems to be saying that logic 
is not completely fixed in advance but is conditioned and shaped in 
practice in the course of a particular inquiry. Logic may involve ac-
cepted principles or rules of reasoning, but when employed in inqui-
ry these vary in meaning, application, and consequences, depending 
on the practical purposes they serve in resolving an actual problem 
at hand, in all its contingencies. Inquiry is the context of logic; logic 
thus takes form in the process of inquiry.
As with many of his ideas, it is important to grasp the functional 
character of Dewey’s conception. While he does not always make 
the distinction apparent, Dewey sees logic as performing both “de-
scriptive and prescriptive” functions (Bernstein 1966, 102). Logic is 
a strategy both of ascertaining how inquiry is actually conducted 
and of evaluating its procedures. Since inquiry is an observable act 
that can be “objectively” studied, “the function of logic is to discern 
methods and patterns of inquiry in order to provide us with a guide 
to better and more successful inquiries” (ibid.). Logic’s purpose, thus, 
is to bring about continual improvements in how we engage in the 
processes of discovery and knowledge production, thereby increas-
ing our likelihood of achieving desired ends. Dewey is effectively 
drawing a contrast between formal logic and logic-in-use, equating 
the latter to operations and procedures the purpose of which is to 
clarify and assess the methods and consequences of inquiry as actu-
ally practiced.
Dewey’s focus on the practical functionality of logic in experimen-
tal discovery underscores the pragmatist idea that mental functions 
are enmeshed in the activity of life itself. Logic is an instrument of the 
intellect embedded in our efforts to investigate, understand, and cope 
with the environment in which we live and act. Logic is a guide to 
action. More than a predetermined or principled set of abstract norms 
standing on their own, logic is integral to our experience of life and 
refracts the processes involved in discovering what we know of our 
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world. Linking logic to reason and rationality, and in one of his char-
acteristic warnings about the dangers of abstraction, Dewey strives to 
ground logic in practical activity in his claim that “reasonableness or 
rationality has . . . been hypostasized” (2013, 23). Here, Dewey in-
vokes the pragmatist concern for the relationship between means and 
ends, the basic framework within which all human activity, including 
thought, is to be defined and appraised.24 Insofar as it is an essential 
element of what we call reason, or rationality, logic is thus inherently 
practical and adaptive in character. As Dewey put it, “Rationality is 
an affair of the relation of means and consequences, not of fixed first 
principles as ultimate premises” (ibid., 22; italics in original).
Dewey’s view of the connection of logic to inquiry has consid-
erable significance in terms of his overall philosophy and in this 
respect conveys, like all of his ideas, an important set of social mean-
ings. First of all, it is apparent that logic is social in nature, insofar 
as inquiry is socially conditioned and situated. Logic is an integral 
part of scientific reasoning, which, as Peirce pointed out, is part of a 
social process occurring within a group or community of inquirers. 
Second, logic as an evaluative guide to the practice of inquiry is no 
longer to be considered as merely a conceptual operation but a form 
of action.25 Third, and most important, inquiry fulfills a purpose 
beyond empirical discovery and knowledge production: it is an act 
of problem solving, the very heart of Dewey’s philosophy. For him, 
the primary function of our capacity for reason is the overcoming of 
problems encountered in the course of living.
Inquiry, thus, is motivated by a need to solve problems, and logic is 
a mode or quality of thought that reflects and serves the requirements 
of such inquiry. In Dewey’s conception, logic is a kind of diagnostic 
mode of analysis intended to evaluate the consequences of methodi-
cal efforts at problem resolution. Intelligent/scientific thinking leads 
to inquiry as a problem-solving instrument; in turn, the consequences 
of inquiry shape intelligent thought around the most workable strat-
egy for solving problems, resulting in a revision of procedures and 
operations.
A number of important points follow from this account. First of 
all, it is clear that inquiry as problem solving is the central philosophical 
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theme of Deweyan thought, around which most of his major con-
ceptions “cluster” (Mills 1964, 356). Second, and closely related, the 
extensive attention Dewey gives to inquiry illustrates how, as Mills 
says, “Dewey’s analysis of ‘thinking’ constitutes the foundation of his 
thought” (ibid.; italics added).26 Third, Dewey’s detailed treatment 
of inquiry is indicative of the weight he gives to methodology in the 
pragmatists’ approach to science and specifically reflects the profound 
influence of Peirce in Dewey’s thinking. Fourth, it is apparent that 
Dewey conceives of inquiry as a form of action. The purpose of inqui-
ry is to change a problematic situation into one that is “workable,” in 
which doubts, tensions, conflicts, needs, and so on are resolved. Fifth, 
his conception of logic as a set of operations inseparable from the con-
crete act of inquiry is a manifestation of Dewey’s vigorous rejection of 
dualistic thinking. Inquiry involves a unification of subject and object, 
theory and practice, in a continuum of mental and physical activity 
that proceeds within a single, indivisible structure of discovery. In-
deed, Dewey’s battle against dualism is in a sense most tangibly waged 
in his strategy of removing logic from the realm of abstract reasoning 
and relocating it within the precincts of worldly investigation.
It is apparent that Dewey’s treatment of logic represents a de-
cisive statement of pragmatist methodology as a reasoned, empiri-
cal, situation-based, and methodical approach to problem solving.27 
More generally, as a fundamental revision of conventional thinking 
about the nature of logic, Dewey’s arguments convey his conviction 
that thought and theory are forms of action and therefore have real 
and tangible consequences in our lives. In this sense, his theory gives 
expression to the pragmatist project of approaching both thought 
and action from the standpoint of their actual consequences in the 
stream of human experience and in terms of how they serve to fur-
ther the realization of desired human ends.28
Dewey on Science
Despite the contribution of Dewey’s theory of inquiry to our under-
standing of pragmatist philosophy, the generic nature of his concep-
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tion raises a number of questions. For one thing, there are many 
kinds, or types, of inquiry, each of which involves a different set of 
conditions and circumstances. For another, Dewey’s “inquiry” is a 
slippery concept, bearing multiple shades of meaning in relation to 
the gamut of Dewey’s many concerns. As Mills observes, “Some of 
the surrogates and synonyms of ‘inquiry’ are ‘thought’ . . . ‘science,’ 
. . . ‘reflection,’ . . . ‘method,’ . . . ‘intelligence’” (Mills 1964, 357). 
In this respect, Dewey’s strategy of conceptual unification and in-
terlinking of different dimensions and domains of thought runs the 
risk of imprecision and confusion.
These are significant difficulties when it comes to interpreting 
Dewey’s view of science. As Mills comments, “Dewey’s theory of 
‘inquiry’ is allegedly ‘empirical.’ What does this mean?” (1964, 357). 
Mills considers a number of possibilities while pointing out that 
Dewey’s statements about the interconnections of observable phe-
nomena fail to address the question of what kind of evidence counts 
as “empirical,” and in relation to what particular types of subject 
matter.
This problem has a close bearing on the question of Dewey’s 
position on positivism. At first glance, his recurring appeals to the 
natural sciences suggest that he regards them as a model of science 
in general, placing him in the positivist camp. There is a definite 
antipositivist thrust, however, in Dewey’s insistence on the continu-
ity of science with other forms and fields of thought, particularly 
what he calls “common sense.” This could be taken to mean that he 
does not see the natural sciences as representing the model of scien-
tific inquiry, as the positivists do, and that inquiry takes many forms 
along a continuum from intelligent thinking in the everyday world 
to controlled laboratory experiments. Dewey, moreover, in his later 
years engaged in “long and vigorous debate” with the logical posi-
tivists (Tilman 2004, 236), a further indication of his antipositivist 
disposition. Perhaps most conclusively, Dewey’s theory of experience 
as the ground of discovery and test of knowledge is entirely incon-
sistent with the positivist belief in a world of sense data independent 
of the mental constructions of the observer. Dewey’s refusal of the 
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dichotomous opposition of subject and object and related dualisms 
effectively eliminates the gap between the world of “facts” and the 
mind of the scientist. For Dewey, facts are a product of human per-
ception and cognition and meaningless in the absence of valuation 
(see Chapter 5). The positivist attempt to separate sense data from the 
subjective and social factors affecting how these data are constructed 
conceptually is for Dewey also entirely unwarranted. Finally, in an 
antipositivist protest against the absolute authority of the natural sci-
ences, Dewey states, “The assimilation of human science to physical 
science represents . . . only another form of absolutistic logic, a kind 
of physical absolutism” (Dewey 1954, 199).29
Yet, when we consider how Dewey might distinguish between the 
natural and social sciences, his position on positivism would appear 
to be more nuanced. Dewey’s repeated appeals to the natural sciences 
indicate that he conflated them with the social sciences and imply 
that all types of inquiry must conform to the rules and procedures 
of the former. This seems to be the way Mills saw the matter, as he 
said that “Dewey’s statement and location of scientific method tends 
to be controlled by biological considerations” (Mills 1964, 384; ital-
ics in original).30 But while for Dewey the “natural sciences” means 
primarily biology, he understands this in terms of Darwin’s model 
of organism and environment, which immediately introduces a so-
cial dimension and the notion of an active subject. Dewey puts forth 
Darwinian biology as a model for thinking about the organic character 
of social relations and social inquiry, not as a definition of the nature 
of the subject matter and methods appropriate to it. Drawing on the 
model of biology, Dewey’s theory of experience strives, as we’ve seen, 
to “naturalize” the social world. As a basic life science and the field 
Darwin made famous, biology provides Dewey with a set of principles 
in terms of which he characterizes the adaptive and emergent char-
acter of knowledge and society. At the level of investigation, the bio-
logical model provides the framework within which Dewey outlines 
his theory of inquiry as problem solving, a theory that clearly pre-
supposes a Darwinian conception of adaptation through action and 
purposive change. The actual procedures of inquiry serve a Darwin-
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ian purpose insofar as they generate solutions to situational problems. 
Dewey thus sees inquiry as performing adaptive functions, regardless 
of content or subject matter, and thus serving a necessary scientific 
and practical purpose independently of any particular methodologi-
cal or analytical approach. This obviously leaves some room for the 
techniques and models of natural science without necessarily exclud-
ing interpretive methods.
Indeed, there is ample evidence that Dewey and, following him, 
Mills, believed that selection of a mode of inquiry should be deter-
mined by its appropriateness to a given problem, and it is apparent 
that this principle applies to subject matter itself. Consistent with 
Aristotle, Dewey recognized that “different subject matters require 
different rules of procedure” (Bernstein, in Dewey 1960a, xxxi). 
This “methodological pragmatism” (Tilman 2004, 258) contextual-
ized inquiry situationally, which in today’s terms means a commit-
ment to methodological pluralism. Viewed from this angle, Dewey’s 
arguments about science and inquiry would not necessarily preclude 
the use of positivist methods. The generality and openness of his 
conception of inquiry should thus be construed as allowing for both 
interpretive and positivist types of sociological theory and research. 
In this sense, despite his opposition to the positivist movement, 
Dewey would likely have endorsed both “meaningful” and “positiv-
ist” types of explanation, without necessarily advocating one over the 
other. The most plausible interpretation of Dewey’s position would 
thus seem to be that he opposed the reduction of science to the posi-
tivist paradigm.
Finally, Dewey’s generic conception conveys a picture of inquiry, 
and therefore science, as being a form of what we might call “every-
day methodology.” Despite its institutionalization as a body of spe-
cialized knowledge, science in his view is not—or should not be—an 
isolated, esoteric enclave detached from the rest of life, arrogating to 
itself absolute authority on factual and explanatory matters. Resisting 
this kind of elitism, Dewey believed that (1) science is rooted in the 
same capacities for intelligence and problem solving that we all share 
as human beings and (2) its findings have consequences beyond the 
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specialized, institutional confines of professional scientific fields. By 
the same token, the controlled procedures of scientific inquiry should 
serve as a model for thinking in everyday life, or “common sense.” 
This “Deweyan continuum” implies an inherent continuity between 
science and other cultural fields, and between academic/specialist dis-
course and public/lay understanding. While Dewey, then, acknowl-
edges important differences between science and common sense,31 
he does not regard these differences as an impenetrable barrier to a 
commonality of knowledge among all sectors of society.
Dewey and Social Theory
More than either Peirce or James, and following Mead, Dewey un-
derstood and appreciated the social foundations of thought, believing 
that social meanings and effects were inherent in all forms of thought 
and action. His writings are threaded with commentary on the social 
character of problem-solving situations and the coordinated responses 
to them on the part of active subjects. Indeed, the challenge Dewey 
put to philosophy was to reject self-enclosed, abstract reflection and 
to engage the problems of living human beings. For him, philosophy 
itself, like all fields of knowledge, was thoroughly social in nature 
and a form of social action. As social subjects, philosophers needed 
to adopt a scientific outlook in the search for methodical solutions to 
concrete problems.
These modest observations alone provide sufficient reason to re-
gard Dewey as an important social thinker, even without taking 
into account his voluminous writings on education and democracy, 
not to mention the widespread influence of his ideas on public life. 
Of particular relevance to sociologists, however, are suggestive con-
nections between Dewey’s thought and major types of social theory, 
including both the structural functional and interpretive action par-
adigms. Positioning him in the contemporary theoretical landscape 
runs a risk of retrospectively reading back into Dewey perspectives 
and ideas he might not have openly embraced. Nonetheless, as a 
strategy for identifying Dewey’s social theoretical insights and for 
The Social Pragmatism of John Dewey  / 77
indicating his affinities with familiar theorists, broadly situating his 
work in this field can prove fruitful.
On the “determinist” side of the field, given his use of Darwin-
ian theory, especially the notions of organism and the organic, the 
comparison and contrast that most readily come to mind are between 
Dewey and what might be called “generic structural functionalism.” 
As is most apparent in Émile Durkheim’s classic work The Division 
of Labor in Society (1965), the biological model illuminates the nature 
of society as a system of differentiated and interrelated parts, each 
performing a special function. Whereas in the structural functional 
model implicit in Durkheim’s analysis, society is regarded as an or-
ganism and treated as an adaptive and evolving entity in a changing 
historical environment, Dewey’s appropriation of Darwin equates 
“the organism” to the social actor and “the environment” to society or 
“the situation.” But in both cases, biology supplies basic principles for 
conceptualizing society as a life system undergoing evolution as it ad-
justs to changing conditions. Dewey’s notion of the social is conveyed 
in his frequent mention of interrelatedness and interdependence, fa-
miliar themes in structural functional logic and cardinal features of 
Durkheim’s notion of the “organic solidarity” of modern industrial 
society. Far from being an argument that Dewey was a structural 
functionalist, these observations merely underscore the theoretical 
value of the biological model and the part it plays in Dewey’s percep-
tion that modern society can be regarded as a system of functionally 
interrelated, adaptational parts.
On the “nondeterminist,” or interpretive, side of the field, Dew-
ey’s ties to social theory are more apparent. A part of his work no 
less dependent on the Darwinian model than his overall concep-
tion of social life, Dewey’s theory of experience contains numerous 
references to the social. The emphasis he places on subject-object 
relations in the form of the interaction or “trans-action” between 
organism and environment draws attention to the social relational 
character of action, in Meadian nomenclature, the interaction of self 
and other.32 Against the backdrop of the rest of his work, it is clear 
that for Dewey adaptation is a collective effort that manifests itself 
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in organized social activity. And Dewey sees even the isolated acts 
of individuals as part of a social nexus of meaning and action that 
constitutes the self and is the context in which thought and problem 
solving occurs.
Given the emphasis his theories of experience and inquiry place on 
active subjects, there is an obvious argument for categorizing Dewey 
as a social action theorist. Derived from the writings of Max Weber, 
“social action” has become a blanket term for theories that adopt 
the standpoint of the actor and are focused on interpretation and 
meaning.33 However, when Dewey phrases matters in the language 
of social action, he attempts to strike a balance between the actor and 
the social environment, between “actor” and “social structure.” More 
generally and abstractly, the defining features of Dewey’s view of the 
dynamic relationship between subject and object are (1) an active 
organism functioning within a life-sustaining environment and (2) a 
mental apparatus that maintains an anticipatory stance toward this 
environment, generating adaptive behavioral responses to changing 
external conditions. For Dewey, society comprises social actors who 
function according to imagined, desired, or anticipated states of af-
fairs in the future. This forward-looking rendering of social action 
is derivative of Dewey’s Hegelian and Darwinian perspectives of a 
dynamic society undergoing evolutionary change. But it is obvious 
that Dewey sees change not only in terms of the impersonal, collec-
tive forces of modernity but also as guided and shaped by decision 
making and action on the part of social subjects. In this respect, he 
attempts to wed a naturalistic and evolutionary perspective to a prag-
matist conception of agency.
Dewey’s place in the tradition of symbolic interactionism is his 
most obvious and well-known connection to social theory. Largely 
filtered through Mead’s teachings, Dewey’s ideas have had a notable 
impact on the theorizing of Herbert Blumer and have entered into 
the larger constellation of sociological work drawing on Blumer’s and 
Mead’s writings.34 The emphasis in symbolic interactionism on the 
meaningful and interpretive elements of behavior refracts Dewey’s 
focus on the experiential and cognitive dimensions of action and the 
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attention he devotes to processual concepts as opposed to structural 
variables. Less apparent, there is in Blumer’s theory implicit recog-
nition of the organic and coordinated character of social acts and 
relations, as evident in his statements about the ongoing, continu-
ous, “back-and-forth” nature of social interaction. Blumer, however, 
makes an important addition to Dewey’s picture of the subject-cen-
tered and creative nature of change by pointing to the formative ef-
fects of interaction.35 While Dewey makes considerable use of the 
concept of interaction, a case could be made that his preoccupation 
with problem solving gives him a view of change in line with so-
cial action theory. The Meadian elements in his thought, however, 
suggest a strong symbolic interactionist influence (see Chapter 5). 
Finally, there is an interesting parallel between Dewey’s translation 
of pragmatism into a theory of inquiry and Blumer’s discussion of 
the methodological implications of symbolic interactionism. In both 
cases, a theoretical position functions as an epistemology, linking 
theory and method in a single framework of scientific inquiry.36
In a more recent development, action theory has provided impor-
tant background to the sociological debate over agency and struc-
ture. Positioning Dewey as a social action theorist therefore raises 
questions of agency. Theories of agency commonly regard it as both 
creative and reproductive, incorporating the perspectives both of vol-
untarism and determinism, interpretation and structure.37 The very 
term “agency,” however, predisposes us to focus attention on the so-
cial actor and hence the dimensions of meaning and motivation. In 
this respect, an interpretation of Dewey’s conception of agency would 
most closely approximate the theoretical position taken by Anthony 
Giddens (1979, 1984). Giddens’s theory is centered on an interpretive 
and “meaningful” image of active, reasoning, and reflective subjects, 
a conception closely resembling Dewey’s view of the social individ-
ual. Reflexivity plays a key role in Giddens’s conception of actors, 
whom he sees as continually monitoring their own behavior. For him, 
the most important attribute of actors is their “practical conscious-
ness,” “the unarticulated beliefs and knowledge people use in orient-
ing themselves to situations and interpreting the actions of others” 
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(Tucker 1998, 81). Much of this is reminiscent of Dewey, suggesting 
comparison to his theory of habit.38 Giddens sees actors not as play-
ing “roles” but as engaging in human “practices.” In general, Dewey 
and Giddens both adhere to a view of social action that privileges 
cognitive factors, paralleling the approach of Meadian theory and 
symbolic interactionism.
Given the importance that social action and social relations held 
for Dewey, some final comparisons, one obvious and the other less 
so, can be made to Karl Marx. First, Dewey’s focus on “action” has a 
discernible parallel to Marx’s early philosophical emphasis on “prac-
tice.” A second comparison between Dewey and Marx is no less sig-
nificant but not as apparent. Both philosophers proved themselves 
highly original thinkers in perceiving the social interests shaping cul-
ture and intellectual life. With echoes of Marx’s theory of ideology, 
the social determination of thought and knowledge is, as we’ve seen, 
an implicit and recurring theme in Dewey’s work, qualifying him 
along with Marx as a nascent theorist of the sociology of knowledge, 
a dimension of Dewey’s thought that reappears explicitly in Mills’s 
early work and implicitly throughout his later writings.39 Dewey’s 
recounting of the history of philosophy and ideas demonstrates a 
perceptive grasp of the underlying social foundations, including class 
relations, of successive periods of cultural and intellectual develop-
ment.
The social basis of thought was an idea that firmly anchored every 
aspect of Dewey’s philosophy. Following on the foundation laid by 
Peirce and James, Dewey developed the central pragmatist theme of 
the interpenetration and consequentiality of thought and action into 
a comprehensive picture of society and life in general. Taking what 
would have otherwise remained a philosophy that subsumed the so-
cial under the logical and psychological, Dewey introduced and am-
plified the social dimension. While retaining a focus on the logical 
and psychological in his theories of inquiry and experience, Dewey’s 
primary contribution was to shift emphasis to social relations, with a 
focus on social action.
This chapter has prepared the ground for a fuller treatment of the 
social and sociological significance of Dewey’s pragmatism. Chap-
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ters 4 and 5 elaborate on what Dewey’s conceptions of social ac-
tion as problem solving can teach us about the practical, public, and 
moral meanings of sociology as a social science discipline. Through 
more concentrated discussion of the relationship between Dewey 
and the work of Mills, select aspects of their overlapping projects are 




The Unity of Theory  
and Practice
John Dewey’s polemics against Western philosophical orthodoxy can best be understood as an effort to overcome the longstand-ing division between theory and practice. Seeing no error in 
dualistic thinking more obstructive of scientific and social progress 
than the artificial separation of thought and action, Dewey took their 
unification—conceptually and in reality—as the primary goal of his 
effort to reconstruct philosophy along new lines. For Dewey, the 
pragmatist maxim first enunciated by Peirce meant that the true test 
of knowledge was the results it produced through action. Knowledge 
and theory, sustained by science and education, were authenticated 
in the form of practice. For Dewey, the raison d’être of thought was 
the intelligent guidance of human conduct toward desired ends. The 
union of theory and practice was thus the epistemological essence of 
Dewey’s philosophy and the underlying principle shaping all of his 
work.
Dewey’s comment that the experimental attitude implies “an ef-
fort to change the given” (see discussion in Chapter 3 about Dewey 
1960a, 23) is an expression of his belief in the deep connection be-
tween theory and practice and a bold, liberal assertion that “prac-
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tice” means changing society. The significance of this assertion for 
the social sciences and the role they should play in society points di-
rectly to the common ground between Dewey’s philosophy and the 
sociology of Mills. The determination of both men to forge a link 
between thought and action for the purpose of progressive change 
is the main source of the strong intellectual connections between 
these thinkers.
The ambitious goal of connecting theory and practice is most ap-
parent in Dewey’s and Mills’s abiding concern for bringing knowl-
edge into the public realm. Both men were opposed to the separation 
of intellectual and scientific work from the problems and concerns of 
lay publics, and each accordingly sought ways to connect intellectual 
elites and professional academics with the rest of society, meaning 
civil society. Both Dewey and Mills were opposed to science in the 
service of special interests, including those of scientists themselves. 
Endeavoring to overcome the isolation of intellectuals, both men 
hoped to promote a democratization of knowledge in the belief that it 
is a fundamental social asset and thus a public good. Both, moreover, 
believed that the ultimate goal of purposive, knowledge-based social 
change is to enhance the rationality and well-being of the individual. 
For Dewey, this meant mass education and creation of the conditions 
necessary for growth and self-realization through life experiences that 
are edifying and personally fulfilling.1 For Mills, it meant providing 
individuals access to intellectual resources that would enable them to 
understand themselves as social actors, their place in society and his-
tory, and the impersonal sources of their personal troubles. In both 
cases, a unity of thought and social action was the necessary condi-
tion for achieving the desired ends, which for both men was first and 
foremost the realization of reason and democracy.
The Legacy of Theory and Practice
Rooted in the dichotomy of subject and object, the distinction between 
theory and practice is a fundamental feature of Western thought. In 
the modern period, the differences and relationship between thought 
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and action, knowledge and conduct, have been a recurring theme in 
philosophical discourse, especially in the areas of politics, morality, 
and ethics. Early modern thought had established a strict separation 
between these categories, a consequence primarily of the Cartesian 
dichotomization of mind and body. While in Kantian thought these 
concepts remained categorically separated, Hegel’s dialectical philoso-
phy depicting an interrelated, dynamic, and evolving world of ideas 
and culture created a conceptual landscape containing new possibili-
ties for formulating the relationship between theory and practice. This 
initially bore fruit in the anti-idealist, activist leanings of the Young 
(Left) Hegelians, including, most notably, Marx, who grasped with 
powerful insight the radical social meanings and revolutionary poten-
tial of Hegel’s system. Finally, an activist orientation was implicit in 
the antiformalist movements accompanying the rise of pragmatism 
(see Chapter 3), movements emphasizing the dynamic and develop-
mental character of the modern world.
For thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Hegel, the relationship be-
tween thought and action had remained a highly formal and abstract 
affair. These thinkers’ disembodied conceptions of theory were a re-
flection of the elevated status that postantiquity notions of thought 
had long enjoyed. Thought had always been regarded as the pro-
genitor of action and the autonomous entity under which all human 
experience and activity were to be subsumed. The modern belief in 
progress through the systematic application of reason to human af-
fairs served to strengthen the privileged place of thought throughout 
the nineteenth century. This meant prioritizing the accumulation of 
formal knowledge, mainly in the form of science and its troubling 
offspring, instrumental rationality.2
While recognizing the expansion of rational thought as a modern 
phenomenon, Dewey saw the privileging of theory over practice as 
the ancient root of Western philosophy itself. For him, the separation 
of these concepts and the prioritization of thought originated in the 
creation of a realm of absolute ideas detached from the “perilous” 
world of imperfection, uncertainty, and change.3 In Dewey’s view, 
the Greek preference for knowledge over action was the manifesta-
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tion of a search for “immutable” and “final” principles that would 
give mind and soul protection against the insecurities and degrada-
tions of the real world. By promising intellectual and moral security, 
the fixed and universal ideas of the philosophers were from the time 
of antiquity highly valued by the educated classes as a shelter from 
the mundane and unpredictable affairs of daily life and the “lower 
orders.” For Dewey, this “quest for certainty” among the upper social 
strata created a transcendental realm of ideas laying the foundation 
both of Western philosophy’s focus on pure knowledge and a cloister-
ing of intellectual elites (Dewey 1960b, 7–24).
In the post-Hegelian era, the privileging of thought over action was 
called into question by growing recognition of the action-oriented and 
“practical” character of modern life. According to this view, theory 
begets practice only to be subject to critical reformulation in light of 
the latter’s consequences. This idea is the conceptual foundation of 
classic pragmatism and is most powerfully put forth in Dewey’s argu-
ments about the functional interrelations of thought and action in 
experimental inquiry, whereby theory is modified in response to its 
empirical outcomes.4 Increasingly, as pragmatism gained ground in 
American philosophical circles, practice achieved equity with and in-
creasing priority over theory. Dewey aggressively took up the challenge 
of questioning the autonomy of theory when insisting that philosophy 
achieved meaning and purpose only through engagement with the 
concrete problems and practices of life. This constituted a shift in 
emphasis toward the effects of action on theory, the cornerstone of 
pragmatism and other antiformalist movements that saw knowledge 
as enmeshed in real-life phenomena and as serving the practical in-
terests of society as a whole. Much of twentieth-century philosophy, 
influenced by the empirical turn of the founding pragmatists as well 
as Wittgenstein, consequently took a similar position, focusing atten-
tion on practice and use as the ground of meaning and “truth.”
Dewey: Thought and Action as Practice
As an antiformalist, Dewey’s thinking was dominated by themes 
of continuity and interconnectedness. Without denying important 
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conceptual distinctions, he insisted on incorporating into our theo-
retical constructions recognition of the mutual interactions of things 
within the phenomenal world. While his Hegelianism predisposed 
him to this way of thinking, the notion of interrelatedness, minus 
Hegel’s dialectic, was ultimately concretized and given its mature 
form in Dewey’s Darwinian model of social life. It was at this point 
that the couplet of theory and practice came to the fore, as Dewey 
began conceiving of the interconnectedness of thought and action in 
the context of human beings’ ongoing efforts to adapt to changing 
life conditions.
Despite Darwin’s influence, however, in treating Dewey as a phi-
losopher of theory and practice he is first and foremost to be situated 
in the Hegelian tradition and the theoretical and political ideas and 
movements to which it gave birth. Dewey’s affinities with the “phi-
losophy of praxis” associated primarily with Marx has been widely 
commented on.5 As did Marx, Dewey reacted to Hegel’s idealism, its 
failure to engage concrete social and political realities, and its neglect 
of human agency. Just as Marx famously said, “The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change 
it” (from “Theses on Feuerbach,” 1845, in Marx 1964, 69; italics in 
original), Dewey wanted to change these realities through human ac-
tion. This had a rather different meaning for Dewey, of course, than 
for Marx. Whereas Marx sought to “transcend” philosophy by “ac-
tualizing” it through collective revolutionary action (Bernstein 1971, 
54), for Dewey, changing the world meant reconstructing philosophy 
in a fashion that enabled it to guide enlightened action in a context of 
situational problem solving (ibid., 172–173). A topic of considerable 
controversy, Dewey’s early liberal reform politics have in this regard 
been criticized extensively on the political Left. But while he has been 
held suspect and even reviled for his reformist stance, Dewey has also 
been praised for his active involvement in liberal and Left-leaning 
causes and the example he set for other public intellectuals commit-
ted to social progress.6 Be that as it may, despite their many differ-
ences and Dewey’s disavowal of revolution, Marx and Dewey shared 
a deep conviction in the unity of theory and practice, which both 
men demonstrated in their recurrent linking of knowledge to social 
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and political action. In this respect, both thinkers held to a belief in 
the possibility of remaking humans by transforming society.  
Dewey himself never explicitly identified his philosophy with the 
Marxian tradition of praxis, relying instead on the concept of “ac-
tion,” which Peirce in his studies of scientific logic had already made 
the principal focus of pragmatist philosophy. In the account of Rich-
ard Bernstein, while these terms are very close in meaning, “praxis” 
has retained its strong association with Marxism, while the action 
concept was taken up by analytic philosophers in the mid-twentieth 
century as a category under which to explore issues of “‘intention,’ 
‘motive,’ ‘purpose,’ ‘reasons,’ and ‘teleological explanation’” (1971, 
xvi). Certainly, as an incipient social action theorist, Dewey was con-
cerned with these issues. Yet it hardly put him in the company of 
these thinkers, many of whom, though partially influenced by prag-
matism, were harshly critical of him. In contrast to the concerns of 
the analytic philosophers, the intertwining of thought and action on 
which Dewey predicated his entire philosophy more closely parallels 
the Marxist philosophers’ conception of praxis as theory manifested 
in the form of political action.7
Notable similarities between Marxist and Deweyan thought aside, 
“the unity of theory and practice” can be thought of in a number of 
ways, depending on discourse and context. In the case of Dewey, the 
phrase bears a rich array of interrelated meanings. This is apparent, 
first of all, in Dewey’s understanding of concepts. In his repeated at-
tacks on formalism, Dewey underscores the importance of avoiding 
static theoretical categories that detach thought from a fluid empiri-
cal reality. Such categories misrepresent the processual nature of life, 
which can be known only through the lens of experience. For Dewey, 
reality is changeful, in a state of continual flux and formation result-
ing from human action and ongoing changes in the environment. 
Our conceptual definitions, therefore, need to be given practical con-
tent in the broad sense of capturing the reality of these changes and 
the human practices shaping them. This entails developing concepts 
of a dynamic nature reflective of the ways that human action pro-
duces modifications in the environment through purposeful conduct.
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This conception appears in several passages from The Public and Its 
Problems, first published in 1927, where Dewey addresses the question 
of how we approach definitions of the state. Our idea of the state, he 
argues, should be based on its actual manifestations, in other words, 
what the state looks like in practice. Dewey seems to be saying that 
“the state” lacks validity as an abstract, general, and fixed concept. For 
him, the term designates a concrete, ongoing, empirically observable 
entity or formation constituted by human activity. Consistent with his 
processual conception of social life, Dewey here is advocating the use 
of concepts that take a particularizing and fluid form as opposed to a 
generalizing and static form.
Dewey’s way of thinking about “practice” as the basic principle 
of concept formation is evident in the following quotes. In keeping 
with his experimentalist inclinations, Dewey suggests that the state 
remains to be “discovered” through concrete effort, that its defini-
tion cannot be fixed in advance but must await the development of 
what “works” socially.
Thus the problem of discovering the state is not a problem for 
theoretical inquirers engaged solely in surveying institutions 
which already exist. It is a practical problem of human beings 
living in association with one another. (Dewey 1954, 32)
Against the grain of traditional political philosophy, Dewey argues:
There is no a priori rule which can be laid down and by which 
when it is followed a good state will be brought into existence. 
(Ibid., 33)
Finally, in a characteristically democratic and populist tone, he 
states:
It is not the business of political philosophy and science to 
determine what the state in general should or must be. (Ibid., 
34; italics added)8
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Dewey proposes, in effect, that concept formation be an ongoing 
process, geared to actual human practices that carry us into the fu-
ture, not contemplative theory or passive observation of either the 
past or present.9 Concepts that are pure products of the mind fail 
as accounts of reality, for reality consists of the concrete actions and 
strivings of social actors. In this frame, the unity of theory and prac-
tice means that our concepts, definitions, and explanatory accounts, 
indeed our very thinking, need to be processual and provisional in 
character. Only by this means can they be truly representative of the 
evolving nature of social existence.10
Indeed, for Dewey the thought process itself points to the notion 
of practice. Thought, in his view, arises in response to a belief that 
something is to be done. The notion of practice is thus absolutely 
central to his view of the nature of thought. Dewey reminds us that 
theory and practice are really “two kinds of practice” (Dewey 1957, 
65). Theorizing is something that people do, implying a set of conse-
quences. More to the point, an idea is “a plan of action” (Hook 1995, 
53; italics in original). Insofar as they arise in response to a need to 
act, ideas are by nature instrumental and situationally based, moti-
vated and defined by a given set of circumstances. As plans, ideas 
imply and shape practice. In this sense, theory and practice are con-
nected in the sense that practice inheres in theory.
This brings us to a second angle from which to consider how 
Dewey connects theory and practice. Immediately following his state-
ment rejecting formal intellectual approaches to notions of the “good 
state,” he presents the more conventional view consonant with modern 
thought since the Enlightenment. While philosophers and scientists 
are in no position to impose an ideal model of the state on others,
what they may do is aid in creation of methods such that 
experimentation may go on less blindly, less at the mercy of 
accident, more intelligently. (Dewey 1954, 34)
This condenses Dewey’s passionate belief in the power of intelligence 
and the efficacy of experimental method into a concise statement 
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about the need to base human action on rational or, as he might say, 
“scientific” thought. Here, Dewey is stating the obvious, that theory 
precedes practice, serving as a guide to action. Despite his polemics 
against the idealist and intellectualist bias of traditional philosophers, 
Dewey’s program for reconstructing philosophy thus necessarily gives 
equal weight to thinking and doing, as evidenced in the value he 
places on the role of education and “intelligent thought.”11
The remainder of the quotation above draws attention, third, 
to the effects of action on ideas. Dewey claims that experimental 
method should guide action “so that men may learn from their er-
rors and profit by their successes” (Dewey 1954, 34). Learning from 
one’s errors is a matter of insuring that actions have theoretical con-
sequences. Whether confirming or leading to a revision of theory, 
consequences are the final authority in matters of theoretical validity. 
For the pragmatists, a fallibilistic openness to the productive effects 
of error meant unrestrained testing of belief through the empirical 
consequences of the ideas and hypotheses emerging from those be-
liefs. Ideas are thus continuously subject to reappraisal depending on 
the outcome of the actions predicated on them.12
In sum, there is no shortage of explicit commentary by Dewey 
on the connection between thought and action. It is important to 
grasp, furthermore, the extent to which the connections he draws 
derive from his theories of experience and inquiry. First, Dewey’s 
concept of experience abolishes the separation of the inner and outer 
worlds of the actor, thus integrating subject and object into a single 
category, a differentiated unity of thought and action.13 Insofar as 
knowledge—the product of experience—is bound up with social 
processes, it is both source and consequence of human action. The-
ory for Dewey is always about some feature of the external world in 
which the subject lives and acts. Put differently, theory by its very 
nature implies and presupposes agency. By the same token, practice 
consists not of random or disconnected acts but is a more or less 
patterned outgrowth of theory, a manifestation and objectification 
of the contents of thought. Second, Dewey’s account of what hap-
pens in the process of inquiry presupposes a dynamic and intimate 
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connection between the ideas and theories guiding inquiry and their 
consequences in practice. The mediating link between these phases 
is logic, which provides the feedback loop between the outcomes of 
inquiry and the process of revising theory in light of its real-life ef-
fects. Thus, in the context of inquiry, theory and practice are linked 
by logical procedures.
The extent to which Dewey throughout his writings focuses on 
action cannot be overemphasized. Recognizing this, and in a worth-
while clarification of Dewey’s philosophy, Mills identifies two models 
of action in his work. The first, derived from the natural sciences, is 
that of “experimentation.” The second, rooted in behavioristic psy-
chology, is the “biologistic adaptive” model (Mills 1964, 391). Mills’s 
distinction roughly corresponds to a blurred line between Dewey’s 
writings on inquiry and his theory of experience. These facets of 
Dewey’s thought represent his two major and closely linked perspec-
tives on practice, the one scientific and the other behavioral. As Mills 
acknowledges, these types of action are intimately linked in Dewey’s 
understanding of the interplay of theory and practice. As Dewey sees 
the matter, this interplay is the dominant feature of all human en-
deavors and defines the dynamic character and activist orientation 
of modern life.
At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the two 
kinds of action identified by Mills are in Dewey’s view governed by 
the same principles of experimental method. For Dewey, method is 
not exclusive to science but integral to all human activity, includ-
ing that involving moral and ethical judgments. The centrality of 
method is implicit in Dewey’s argument that all ideas ultimately 
have an instrumental purpose. In short, for him the primary func-
tion of thinking is to provide the constituents of methodological 
procedure for a given task.14 Intellect is always geared to the ques-
tion of how best to do things in the interest of achieving one’s goals. 
Dewey accordingly invokes the classic problem of means-ends rela-
tionships. Approaching thought in terms of this problem, Dewey 
frames theory as an activity serving a methodological purpose in the 
pursuit of specified ends. By defining theory and practice in terms 
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of their instrumental functions, Dewey manages to postulate them 
as interrelated phases or aspects of methodological procedure, for 
him the foundation of not only science but also all forms of human 
thought and behavior.
Dewey and Mills on Social Change 
and Problem Solving
The foregoing discussion summarizes a number of Dewey’s leading 
methodological precepts, many of which have long since acquired 
the status of basic scientific norms. The feedback loops Dewey drew 
between thought and action constitute the familiar relationship be-
tween theory and research that is the basis for the formation, test-
ing, and revision of scientific hypotheses. In this respect, Dewey’s 
better-known ideas correspond closely to common understandings 
of controlled scientific inquiry.
The unification of theory and practice, however, far from being a 
mere methodological matter, is more broadly an idea with philosophi-
cal, theoretical, and political meanings and ramifications, to which 
Dewey’s life and work is a lasting testament. These larger meanings 
have significance for sociology in two respects. First, as a field that is 
in its broadest sense concerned with the condition and functioning of 
society—some might say with its “health”—sociology, as Robert Lynd 
(1939) argued, has an obligation beyond its scientific commitments to 
provide the larger society with a meaningful and comprehensive pic-
ture of itself. This would entail balancing a “passive empirical” stance 
that tends to reify existing social facts with an “active ideational” per-
spective on the role of ideas in social change and the purposive char-
acter of social action.15 Second, a discipline in which the action frame 
of reference has had an important presence can benefit substantially 
from Dewey’s theoretical insights into the nature of thought and ac-
tion. Indeed, Dewey’s distinctive understanding of their unity offers 
an original approach to social action theory.
The sociological significance of Dewey’s arguments becomes ap-
parent when viewing the unity of theory and practice in the context 
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of two key and interrelated aspects of Dewey’s philosophy: (1) an 
emphasis on the permanence of change and (2) his conception of 
human behavior as problem solving. This aspect of Dewey’s thought 
is especially relevant to those seeking a renewal of sociological in-
terest in social change. Relatedly, Dewey’s ideas about change and 
problem solving offer a fresh set of conceptual terms for thinking 
through the agency/structure problem.
Of immediate interest, the change and problem-solving dimen-
sions of Deweyan thought provide a frame for examining the re-
lationship between Dewey and Mills and the Deweyan influences 
in Mills’s work. While theoretical issues of change are less explicit 
in Mills’s writings, the corpus of his work can be read as a study of 
social change, one that examines its concrete structural and histori-
cal forms and features. The strong interest Mills took in intellectu-
als as social change agents, furthermore, puts him in the category 
of an agency/structure theorist (though certainly one bereft of the 
abstractness of this body of theory), paralleling Dewey’s belief in the 
role of intellectuals in bringing about progressive change. Finally, by 
attempting to reorient sociologists away from a preoccupation with 
theory and method in favor of a focus on problems and their con-
nection to social structure and history, Mills imparted sociological 
meaning to Dewey’s problem-solving perspective and his conception 
of society as an arena of dynamic change shaped by culture and his-
tory and guided by human action.16
The change and problem-solving themes pervading Dewey’s 
thought comprise a complex of ideas that constitute the core of his 
social and political views. Dewey was preoccupied with the reality 
of change, and putting thought and action together was for him 
a theoretical and methodological strategy for comprehending and 
directing change in a rational and purposive way. In short, Dewey’s 
philosophy, like that of Marx, is built on a metaphysics of change. 
It is important to realize, however, that despite his occasional his-
torical periodizations and commentaries on contemporary societal 
developments, change in Dewey’s writings tends to function as a 
generic concept. In contrast to Marxian theory, the term “change” 
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as used by Dewey has reference primarily to the evolutionary process 
inherent in the ongoing interaction and mutual adaptation among 
social actors in relation to their environments. Dewey’s concept is 
thus ahistorical in character to the extent that it remains abstractly 
lodged in the theory-practice dynamic of evolutionary adjustment. 
Nonetheless, Dewey’s erudite writings on the evolution of culture 
and ideas serve to indicate the importance he attached to the social 
and historical contexts of change. From either angle, a sense of the 
inevitability and weight of change pervades Dewey’s thought, shap-
ing his entire philosophy.
Both Marx and Dewey built on the insight that thought and ac-
tion are never autonomous but bound by processes of change already 
underway. As philosophers of theory and practice, neither thinker 
was able to avoid the difficulties posed by the elusiveness of social 
change—its ambiguities and contradictions—and the challenge of 
devising strategies for exercising human control over it. Both strug-
gled with the determinism-voluntarism antinomy, Marx at the level 
of social and political praxis, Dewey primarily in terms of the lim-
its and possibilities defining the complex relationships within and 
between the social individual and culture.17 Marx’s conception was 
more comprehensive, incorporating both deterministic and agentic 
factors while envisioning collective action in the form of organized 
social and political movements. By contrast, Dewey largely ignored 
structural and historical causation, stressing instead the notion of 
agency in the context of the present. While Marx mainly addressed 
the material, social, and political conditions effecting change in past 
and present societies, Dewey put primary emphasis on the processes 
of change shaping both present and future. His focus was the role 
of intelligence and methodical thinking in informing action that 
he hoped would affect the direction of change, showing little if 
any interest in explaining the origins, nature, and formation of such 
action.18
One gets a flavor of Dewey’s thinking about the significance of 
change from the following quotations. In a reference to change’s 
inevitability, Dewey comments that agency means “the redirection 
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of changes already going on” (Dewey 1960a, 63). More to the point, 
in a statement powerfully joining the unity of theory and practice to 
social change, Dewey asserts that “intelligence develops within the 
sphere of action for the sake of possibilities not yet given” (65). Like 
experience itself, thought and action exhibit a quality of temporality. 
As he succinctly puts it, we “live forward” (27).
Whereas the temporal dimension is very much at the surface 
in Dewey’s writings, it remains only implicit in Mills, despite the 
fact that a social change perspective is the unifying thread of his 
work. As we move from Dewey’s philosophical categories to Mills’s 
sociological categories, however, the question of change, important 
to both and a foundation of Mill’s sociological practice, becomes a 
theme around which seeming differences between the men begin 
to emerge. While Dewey tended to speak in abstract generalities, 
remaining vague on the specific forms and dynamics of change, for 
Mills change meant structural and historical change involving iden-
tifiable institutions and actors.19 The salient issues for Mills were (1) 
how history and the effects of social structure shape institutional 
and personal life and (2) how we are to identify agents of change that 
could turn society in a more enlightened and progressive direction.
Despite his appreciation of the structural and cultural barriers to 
change, not to mention his growing pessimism, Mills for the most 
part seemed to have as much faith as Dewey in the ability of science 
to discover and explain the causes of social ills. Also like Dewey, 
Mills had an enduring though somewhat faltering faith in the power 
of ideas to remedy such ills by means of the dissemination of knowl-
edge through the institutions of public discourse. Also, notwith-
standing his focus on the larger forces constituting society, Mills 
followed Dewey in keeping the individual in the picture, repeatedly 
returning to the human consequences of social forces. Especially in 
his work with Hans Gerth (1964), Mills sought to portray social 
science as a discipline concerned with the interface between institu-
tions and actors, social structure and character.20 In giving ideas a 
critical social role, Mills, like Dewey, posited a close relationship be-
tween theory and practice as a basis for the enlargement of freedom 
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and reason. Mills saw this possibility as predicated on the potential 
of reason to initiate and direct change on the basis of sociological in-
quiry and the expansion of sociological knowledge within the public 
realm.
In apparent contrast to Dewey, however, Mills thought of the 
theory-practice dynamic in terms of a change strategy designed to 
bring about structural transformation. To a large degree for Mills, the 
success of such a strategy was contingent on an empirically based 
diagnosis of the constraints on and openings for change inherent in 
the system of power and inequality. While Dewey often only men-
tions power and inequality, these realities are essential aspects of 
Mills’s analyses. Indeed, aside from The Sociological Imagination, the 
best-known parts of Mills’s work consist of his “trilogy” of books 
on the American class hierarchy, beginning with organized labor 
and moving upward to the middle class and finally to the higher 
echelons of society.21 On a quest to find agents of progressive change 
within the class structure, Mills was disillusioned by the first study, 
which found inroads of conservatism among labor leaders. This 
finding led Mills to conclude they had already been co-opted by 
the “system.” His subsequent studies, of the power structure and the 
new middle class, similarly diminished his hopes for the emergence 
of a strong progressive politics in the United States.
Just as important, however, in keeping with Dewey’s philosoph-
ical emphasis on particularity, these books exemplify Mills’s en-
during sociohistorical perspective and his rejection of sociology as 
a science whose modus operandi was generalization. Mills instead 
demonstrated the power of sociological investigation through his 
rich accounts of particular social and historical configurations,22 
of which his study of middle-class white-collar workers is perhaps 
the most notable example. This classic study in historically specific 
structural and cultural developments attempted to portray the social 
and psychological consequences of the postwar growth in bureau-
cracy and mass culture. With echoes of his work with Gerth, Mills 
was principally concerned with the characterological consequences 
of institutional formations appearing after the war, using sociology 
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as a tool for examining what he perceived as the impact of these 
formations on the individual and society at a given point in time.
The primary disagreement between Dewey and Mills seems to 
arise over the meaning and implications of the notion of problem 
solving, the central theme of Dewey’s philosophy and the ground of 
his reflections on action-based social change. Commentators have 
rightly characterized pragmatism as a problem-solving philosophy. 
Yet, there appears to have been scant attention paid to what problem 
solving actually looked like and meant to Dewey, not to mention the 
fit of this idea with the rest of his philosophy, including his chang-
ing political views. At once the most concrete and abstract of his 
ideas, problem solving based on scientific method is the reference 
point around which all of his propositions revolve. It is ironically 
both the simplest of ideas and the key presupposition of his elaborate 
and complex conceptual system. In Dewey’s interpretation, problem 
solving is the core of the Darwinian dynamic of adaptation and thus 
serves as the axiomatic principle in Dewey’s conception of change. It 
is in problem-solving behavior that Dewey sees the connections be-
tween thought and action to which he appeals in his call for change 
that is purposive and intelligently directed.
For those who believe, like Dewey, that the social sciences 
should be an instrument of social amelioration, the solving of prob-
lems is the unquestioned rationale for the very existence of these 
fields. As a theme with both scientific and moral/human meaning, 
the idea of problem solving reflects Dewey’s deep commitment to 
the enlightened progress of society. Indeed, what most distinguishes 
his work as a philosopher and social and political thinker, giving 
substance to his experimentalism, is his unyielding stress on prob-
lem solving as both definitive of the human condition and the key 
to social progress.
At the same time, what Deweyan problem solving means for the- 
ories of agency and change has been nebulous enough to provoke 
critical attacks on Dewey’s views. The problem-solving component 
of Dewey’s conception of change would seem to run counter to 
Mills’s avowed approach to sociological practice and his focus on 
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the structural sources of human problems. Dewey tended to see 
problems and problem solving as situational and circumstantial, 
specific to time and place, and as consisting of an essentially meth-
odological task of bringing about controlled adjustment to chang-
ing conditions. This limited, “small-scale” conception is suggestive 
of purposive change that is only incremental, in contrast to Mills’s 
more ambitious conception of political action aimed at changing 
the whole system. In Mills’s view, incrementalism amounted to a 
piecemeal approach to sociological inquiry that neglected the causal 
connections between the problems of milieu and larger social and 
historical forces.
Mills saw yet another problem with Dewey’s stance on change. The 
experimentalist character of incremental change in Dewey meant 
the danger of “‘implemented aimlessness,’ that is, . . . futile engage-
ment in directionless processes” (Tilman 1984, 134). Dewey re-
fused any kind of “fixed ends” because they would “divert attention 
from the examination of consequences” (ibid.). For Mills, this was 
an unfortunate result of Dewey’s experimentalist approach and an 
unacknowledged risk in placing one’s faith exclusively in the demo-
cratic process. While Mills himself lacked an adequate theory of 
social change, unlike Dewey he conveyed a stronger sense of the 
concrete problems of existing social arrangements and the direction 
of change needed to realize the values of freedom and equality. Mills 
gave the ends-in-view of a rational and democratic society, along 
with a possible means of achieving them, a sociological grounding 
in the existing social conditions and ideologies of mid-twentieth-
century America.
In short, Mills saw Dewey’s approach as inadequate for address-
ing large-scale structural and historical phenomena. Dewey’s instru-
mentalist model of problem solving thus appears to be incompatible 
with Mills’s belief in the structural roots of social problems and their 
resolution by means of structural as opposed to situationally specific 
measures. However, while these contrasts might make it appear that 
Mills’s and Dewey’s positions are mutually incompatible, the logic 
of Dewey’s ideas and his own explicit views are hardly as simple as 
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Mills supposed, and over time Dewey’s views evolved in a way that 
weakens Mills’s judgment of him.
Dewey and Mills on Politics:  
Divergence and Convergence
At the level of problem resolution and social change, the linking 
of theory and practice eventually raises questions of politics, as be-
comes evident in a contrast and comparison of Dewey’s and Mills’s 
approaches to bringing about a more democratic and rational soci-
ety. The incrementalist implications of what appears to be Dewey’s 
approach to problems open wide onto what at first glance seem like 
irreconcilable political differences between the thinkers. The logic 
of Dewey’s conception of problem solving tends to align itself with 
the position of liberal reformism, the main target of Mills’s critique 
of Dewey. Reiterating the familiar criticisms of political liberalism, 
Mills rejects Dewey’s reformism on grounds of its tacit compliance 
with the status quo, a strategy of fixing the wrongs of the present 
system as a substitute for a radical critique of the entire social order. 
For Mills, reformism was a legitimation of existing society and in-
consistent with the need for opposition to prevailing social arrange-
ments and for overcoming the conformist elements reinforcing them 
in what he later called the “cultural apparatus.”23
Along with his rejection of incrementalism, Mills more broadly 
took aim at Dewey’s failure to acknowledge the obstacles to progres-
sive change posed by the power structure of bureaucratic capital-
ism, accusing Dewey of failing to see the conflicts of interest arising 
from class inequalities and other inherently antagonistic social rela-
tions.24 Mills, in effect, argued that Dewey’s philosophy presupposed 
a harmony of social interests, whereas the property and employment 
relations of capitalism and its bureaucratic structures led to just the 
opposite. Mills and others have pointed to the contradiction be-
tween Dewey’s ideal of social intelligence serving a community of 
common interests and a society driven by economic motives and 
rivalry among competing interest groups.
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Ultimately, however, it seems that for Mills it was the reality of 
entrenched power that cast a cloud over Dewey’s assertions about in-
telligently informed conduct within a democratic community. Mills 
viewed society from the standpoint of the system of power created 
by the modern bureaucratized economy and state. It was this system 
of power, in his view, with which social analysis had to contend. By 
not directly addressing questions of power, Mills felt, Dewey failed 
to recognize the severe limitations on the liberatory possibilities of 
thought and action and was therefore unable to theorize a workable 
approach to purposive change. 
Certainly there is some justification for Mills’s critical comments 
on the minimal attention Dewey paid to the structural realities of 
inequality and power, but in fact Mills’s criticisms are highly prob-
lematic. For the purpose of weighing the merits of his criticisms, 
two points need to be kept in mind. First, the analytical reason-
ing shaping Dewey’s philosophy of action and change was often at 
odds with his actual political views and involvements. Second, and 
more importantly, Dewey’s politics changed over time, from an early 
position of liberal reformism that indeed seemed to limit political 
action to piecemeal efforts to a later position of socialist critique of 
capitalism and at least tacit support for confrontation with the power 
structure through collective action.
Unfortunately, Mills’s reading of Dewey on change and politics 
is highly selective, ignoring the nuances of Dewey’s thought and 
especially his later views. Mills thus presents a distorted picture of 
Dewey’s politics, overlooking the many indications of their overlap 
with his own. While his claim that Dewey’s reliance on the notion of 
biological adaptation leads to a reformist approach seems persuasive, 
Mills tends to read his own biases against liberalism into Dewey’s 
conception of adaptation.25 Although Dewey’s instrumentalist tropes 
on adaptation and adjustment would seem to suggest a politically 
accommodationist position,26 Mills tends to miss the context and 
actual meaning of Dewey’s statements about methodical problem 
solving, taking them to mean only acts of adjustment to the status 
quo. Certainly, Dewey’s statements are sufficiently general and vague 
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as to leave room for this interpretation. One could plausibly argue, 
however, that Dewey’s very lack of specificity creates room, at least 
in principle, for a variety of political approaches, including organized 
action directed at major social transformation.27 In fact, upon de-
veloping sympathy for socialism in the years prior to the Depres-
sion, Dewey came around to at least passive endorsement of collective 
strategies for change.28
It is regrettable that alleged political differences should have 
taken on such a disproportionate significance in Mills’s assessment 
of Dewey’s philosophy. One might argue that his negative posture 
toward these aspects of Dewey was understandable given Mills’s own 
faltering faith in the power of intellectual leadership to inaugurate 
change. Indeed, the contradiction between the potential of ideas to 
promote progressive action and the reality of power relations haunt-
ed Mills for much of his short life, contributing to his “disillusioned 
radicalism” (Geary 2009, 7–9). In his notion that public intellectu-
als were prospective agents of change, Mills at least concretized his 
belief in the unity of theory and practice, whereas Dewey’s ideas 
remained mostly abstract and formal. To the extent that Mills’s cri-
tique consisted of saying that Dewey’s belief in the power of ideas 
over structural realities was naïve, Mills was giving frank expression 
to a sociologist’s estimate of the uncertain structural and cultural 
possibilities of societal transformation. The incongruity between his 
own hope that intellectual activism could create the conditions of a 
rational and democratic society and his recognition of the empirical 
realities of American capitalism at least constitutes a picture more 
grounded than that of Dewey.
More damaging to Mills’s apparent position, however, is the fact 
that he overlooks the many statements in Dewey’s later writings refer-
ring to the structural inequalities of society as impediments to the for-
mation of a democratic community. Sydney Hook is correct in claiming 
that Dewey fully appreciated the structural impediments to pur- 
posive change, seeing the “primary obstacles” as “institutional.” Further- 
more, hardly a naïve observer of society, Dewey saw political institu-
tions as “concentrating power in the hands of a few” (Hook 1995, 
153–154).
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In a compelling account of how he sees the real meaning of lib-
eralism in the modern age, and perhaps the most potent expression 
of his own views on the need for social and political transformation, 
Dewey’s Liberalism and Social Action (2000), originally published in 
1935, confirms much of Hook’s interpretation. The chapter titled 
“Renascent Liberalism” contains the following passage:
In short, liberalism must now become radical, meaning by 
“radical” perception of the need for thorough-going changes in 
the set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to bring 
the changes to pass. For the gulf between what the actual situ-
ation makes possible and the actual state itself is so great that 
it cannot be bridged by piecemeal policies undertaken ad hoc. 
(Dewey 2000, 66; italics added)
Dewey continues in this chapter to speak of the use of “force” by 
those in control of economic institutions and the “power” that is “ex-
ercised by concentrated and organized property interests” (ibid., 68). 
In this publication Dewey not only disavows “piecemeal” solutions, 
despite the incrementalist strategy implied by his earlier writings; he 
also largely refutes Mills’s impression that he was blind to institu-
tionalized power and coercion. As for the social democratic position 
he eventually adopted and which these passages reflect, Dewey saw 
socialization of the means of production as a “necessary” condition 
of “organized intelligence” (Hook 1995, 157). Recognizing the real-
ity of class struggles (which he believed were pluralistic and not two-
fold as in Marxist doctrine), Dewey openly favored a restructuring 
of society along economically democratic lines.29
Dewey not only perceives society as divided into adversarial in-
terest groups; according to Hook, he also “defines social problems 
in terms of conflicts of interest” (1995, 173). While Hook’s claim 
on this score might be open to question, once again it is precisely 
the generic and philosophical character of Dewey’s thinking that 
provides latitude for sociological and political interpretation. This 
raises a more fundamental objection to Mills. Even putting aside 
his misrepresentations of Dewey’s politics, measuring a philosopher’s 
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work by the theoretical and empirical standards of the social scienc-
es seems unwarranted, despite Dewey’s considerable knowledge of 
these fields. Regardless, and contrary to Mills, Dewey did acknowl-
edge the reality of social disparities and conflicts, their economic 
foundations, their structural character, and the need for a socialistic 
solution, even though he failed to seriously engage them on a socio-
logical basis.30
Sociological Consequences
Despite the seeming rejection of liberal reform in Mills’s criticisms 
of Dewey, there is arguably considerable “slippage” in the politics of 
both men. The evidence is suggestive of more similarities than dif-
ferences between them in the realm of politics and in their overall 
assessment of the conditions and problems facing those seeking a 
more democratic society. In any case, such questions are of less im-
portance than the common vision Dewey and Mills bequeathed to 
later generations of social scientists.
Dewey’s conception of knowledge was an inseparable part of his 
commitment to the idea of science as a democratic and communally 
based enterprise. Importantly, his theoretical and methodological 
arguments for the connections between theory and practice estab-
lished an epistemological foundation for this conception of science. 
His was a theoretical model that denied the possibility of valid and 
genuine knowledge except in the context of practice, which for him 
meant activity and action intended for a socially useful purpose. For 
sociologists, this implies taking up scholarly work with a social end 
in view and engaging in efforts to produce socially beneficial knowl-
edge with concrete consequences. Of perhaps greater significance, 
Dewey’s conception undermines the usually unquestioned ideal of 
“knowledge for its own sake.” Sociological work, in his view, should 
be inspired and designed exclusively by considerations of its meanings 
and purposes for the creation of the “good society” and the enrich- 
ment of human life.
While in implicit agreement with Dewey on basic issues, Mills 
moved beyond his arguments, translating them into concrete socio-
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logical terms. Whereas Dewey stressed that all action was methodi-
cally based, Mills gave the question of method genuine embodiment 
by defining the practice of sociology as a “craft.” Mills saw the soci-
ologist as a craftsperson who relied less on codified procedures than 
on his or her own experiences and intellectual, social, and practical 
resources. Indeed, this was a very pragmatist, and pragmatic, ap-
proach to social research, giving the pragmatist experimental spirit 
and inclination toward methodological pluralism tangible form.31 As 
Mills’s most engaging and personal statement to aspiring sociologists, 
the essay “On Intellectual Craftsmanship” (Mills 1959, Appendix) 
invokes the spirit of independence and creative, nondisciplinary in-
quiry that was his trademark as a dedicated intellectual and down-to-
earth social investigator. Even in this brief piece on research, Mills is 
singularly critical of “normal” sociology. At the same time, however, 
he is judicious in his sociological instincts, expressing a tempered 
skepticism toward empiricism while appealing to Dewey’s insistence 
on the supremacy of intellect. In a statement bound to be unsettling 
to sociological convention, Mills says:
There is no more purpose in empirical inquiry as such than in 
reading as such. The purpose of inquiry is to settle disagree-
ments and doubts about facts, and thus to make arguments 
more fruitful by basing all sides more substantively. Facts dis-
cipline reason; but reason is the advance guard in any field of 
learning. (Ibid., 205; italics added)
Dewey’s wide-ranging and comprehensive philosophy laid a 
foundation for a sociology dedicated to the resolution of social prob-
lems from within a perspective of change. Despite his recognition 
of the weight of culture and habit, and the encumbrances of institu-
tionalized power, Dewey constantly emphasized the active and for-
ward-looking character of social life and its potential for continuous 
betterment. While acknowledging the effects of social structure, he 
called attention primarily to the processual, dynamic, and evolution-
ary nature of society. By placing emphasis on the close relationship 
between practice and knowledge, Dewey shifted the focus of action 
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theory toward cognition and learning, without minimizing the role 
of other factors. But of greatest importance was his repeated conten-
tion that the fundamental purpose of knowledge was the promotion 
of intelligently directed social progress. For Dewey, achieving this 
goal depended on scientists and intellectuals building strong ties be-
tween the institutions of knowledge production and public life.
By contrast, Mills’s more perceptive view of society created a 
tension in his thinking between the potentiality of change inherent 
in knowledge and the reality of power relations and mass culture. 
Nonetheless, despite their differences, in his preoccupation with the 
social role of knowledge and its relationship to social change agents, 
Mills was the evident heir to the sociological and political concerns 
underlying and emanating from Dewey’s philosophy. Notwithstand-
ing his misplaced political antipathy toward Dewey, Mills’s work 
represents an ambitious and passionately independent attempt to 
develop Dewey’s vision of science in the interest of public enlighten-
ment and the enlargement of the individual. In the spirit of Dewey’s 
philosophy, Mills sought to create an intellectually informed and 
responsible sociology connected to the public realm. This was a so-
ciology predicated on the principle that ideas and theories can serve 
a useful purpose only “on the ground,” in the context of public dis-
course and democratic dialogue.
While Mills was not a social problems theorist per se, his ap-
proach to social science clearly presupposes Dewey’s belief that the 
solving of human problems was a salient feature of social life for 
which all forms of human inquiry, especially science, should assume 
a responsibility. But whereas in Dewey the problem-solving concep-
tion of practice remains vaguely circumstantial and situational, for 
Mills practice meant an effort to implement large-scale structural 
change that would minimize or eliminate altogether the fundamen-
tal causes of society’s problems. Accordingly, as Mills makes clear in 
The Sociological Imagination and other works, sociological analysis 
has a responsibility to engage subject matter that is both humanly 
relevant and full of substance. In this approach, the union of theory 
and practice is intrinsic to sociological subject matter and the actions 
of sociologists themselves. Mills stresses that scientific investigators, 
The Unity of Theory and Practice  / 107
no less than their subjects, are social actors and therefore the bearers 
of shared cultural understandings of the role of knowledge in the 
worlds in which they act.
The imperative expressed by both Dewey and Mills to deploy the 
power of intellect in the interest of social progress implicitly called 
on specialists to become generalists, and for technicians to become 
intellectuals. In this view, the intellectual function of social scientists 
largely consists of engaging the public in rational and democratic 
discussion of issues and ideas. While connoting a devotion to one’s 
chosen field of study reminiscent of Weber’s notion of the “calling” 
(1958a), the essence of this conception is a dedication to the diffu-
sion of knowledge within the public sphere. As we’ve seen, Dewey’s 
theory of the active and “instrumental” character of ideas firmly 
linked the world of mind to the realm of action. This meant the ex-
tension of scientific knowledge beyond its institutionalized borders 
and its implementation in the wider society. The public usefulness of 
knowledge was thus at bottom a guiding principle for both Dewey 
and Mills.
Finally, the convergence of Dewey and Mills on the linking of 
knowledge with the public draws attention to the idea of a “public 
sociology” proposed by Michael Burawoy (2005b). Part of a fourfold 
typology of the discipline that includes “professional,” “policy,” and 
“critical” sociology, Burawoy’s public sociology raises the question of 
how sociologists could address the public in dialogue and debate on 
matters of public concern. For Burawoy, public sociology is direct 
engagement with constituents of civil society in settings where socio-
logical knowledge and resources are shared with nonspecialists, and 
the work of sociologists is informed by contacts with members of the 
public and their problems.
Dewey’s and Mills’s conception of social science clearly fits this 
category but represents a broader approach. Dewey’s emphasis on 
problem solving puts him also in the category of policy sociology 
in which sociological knowledge is applied to the solution of social 
problems, while Mills’s critique of the profession places him in the 
critical sociology category. While both thinkers promulgated the 
values of science and scholarship, Dewey and Mills would disavow 
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much of the actual practice falling under the category of “profes-
sional.”32 These are only dominant tendencies, however, and beyond 
a point, as Burawoy correctly indicates, the four types of sociology 
tend in practice to overlap and draw on each other in mutually de-
pendent and enriching ways. As Chapter 5 shows, however, while 
Burawoy is supportive of critical sociology, he is primarily an ad-
vocate of public sociology, whereas a discipline in emulation of the 
thought of Dewey and Mills would on balance seek a strong combi-
nation of Burawoy’s critical and public sociologies.
As we’ve seen, the Deweyan and Millsian unification of theory 
and practice draws attention to the complicated and untidy interface 
between sociology and politics. These men grasped the meaning of 
“the political” as referring in the most general sense to any indi-
vidual or collective action intended to challenge or change existing 
social arrangements for the purpose of creating a more democratic 
and rational society. More than politics in the conventional sense 
of contending for power or influencing people and the distribution 
of goods, politics for Dewey and Mills meant the much larger task 
of building a public sphere in which the values of freedom, reason, 
and democracy could flourish. Dewey envisioned this task in many 
ways, perhaps most famously in the form of educational practices 
that would cultivate the minds of young people in the ways of in-
formed and responsible citizenship. For Mills, the goal of such a task 
was to develop and employ social scientific knowledge to further 
actors’ understanding of society in relationship to their own lives.
Unfortunately, neither Dewey nor Mills was entirely successful at 
theorizing the extent to which a public sphere actually existed or the 
means by which it could be created or strengthened. At best, Dewey 
recognized the concentration of power as a barrier to democratic dis-
cussion and public participation, and Mills aggressively explored the 
consequences for civil society and character formation of a bureau-
cratized economy and state as well as the corrosive effects of mass 
culture.
In both cases, the lesson for a reformed sociology is clear. A field of 
study attempting to model itself on the vision of Dewey and Mills needs 
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to investigate questions surrounding the public sphere itself.33 This 
implies critical inquiry into the inroads of mass culture (consumer- 
ism, mass media, commercial entertainment) and the impact of the 
dominant ideologies of corporate capitalism and the state. More affir-
matively, attention needs to be paid to those remaining practices and 
institutions (formal learning, public forums) that could nourish this 
sphere. In effect, the vision cultivated by Dewey and Mills reorients 
sociology back to its roots in civil society. This entails an active con-
cern for protecting civil society from today’s wave of neoliberal ideol-
ogy that, under the rubric of “privatization,” portends a colonization 
by the market of ever-wider segments of society.

5
Values, Social Science, Pragmatism,  
and Social Critique
In the words of the philosopher Hilary Putnam, “The classical prag-matists, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, all held that value and normativity permeate all of experience” (2002, 30). Despite the in-
tellectual merits of this claim, and the wide influence of these think-
ers on twentieth-century thought, the conventional wisdom that 
factual and value judgments are incompatible and separable seems to 
persist. This has been true especially among social scientists, whose 
“value-free” proponents have attempted to portray values and valu-
ations as “subjective” in character and therefore antithetical to the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge.
Concerns surrounding the impact of values have troubled social 
scientists ever since the time of Dewey and Max Weber, not to men-
tion the sardonic social criticism of Thorstein Veblen. Although the 
value debate in sociology appears to have subsided, given its close 
bearing on the problem of “objectivity,” the impact of values on the 
conduct of science remains a disputed topic. This has been the case 
particularly in exchanges between positivists and antipositivists, 
groupings with fundamentally different conceptions of both sociol-
ogy’s subject matter and science in general.
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Despite repeated assertions that fact and value, the “is” and the 
“ought,” belong to separate epistemological categories and therefore 
need to be compartmentalized, in affirmation of the view of the early 
pragmatists, the case for a value-free social science has been decisively 
refuted.1 First of all, the separation of fact and value has long proven 
in practice to be a logical and empirical impossibility. In affirmation 
of Dewey’s opposition to formal dualisms, when put to the test of ex-
perience the fact-value dichotomy loses all credibility. So thoroughly 
are valuations woven into our thoughts, motivations, and actions that 
even the futile admonition to keep fact and value separate entails 
an implicit value judgment.2 As one observer puts it in reference to 
liberal economic theory, “The strict separation of . . . (fact and value) 
. . . is not, as it claims to be, morally neutral” (Streeten 1958, xliii). 
Value judgments are thus embedded even in putatively reasoned po-
sitions intended to defend scientific “neutrality” and “autonomy.” 
Second, it can safely be said that attempts to maintain the fact-value 
separation are tantamount to suppressing the human element that is 
the very core of truly meaningful social analysis. Misguided efforts 
at segregating fact and value contradict the very nature, purpose, and 
distinctiveness of the social sciences.
Given the inherent ambiguity of their effects, the debate over val-
ues has been unusually convoluted. The intrusion of values has po-
tentially negative consequences for scientific “objectivity” while at the 
same time promising a more substantial, meaningful, and relevant 
scientific practice. Valuations can be sources of bias and errors, caus-
ing unwanted misperceptions and misrepresentations of the “facts.” 
Yet, values stand at the center of the distinctively human element that 
separates social from natural science and that enriches the former 
by combining causal explanation with meaningful interpretation. 
Which of these two views is to be taken more seriously is reducible in 
part to an epistemological and methodological issue; positivists will 
emphasize the objectivity problem while those more interpretively 
disposed will stress values’ meaningful ramifications. In any case, 
the importance and challenge of values in social science cannot be 
underestimated. Values and valuations are fundamental features of 
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all human activity, scientific and otherwise. Of crucial significance, 
they constitute a basic link between social science on the one hand 
and the larger culture of civil society and politics on the other. In this 
respect, the consequences of our response to the value problem reach 
far beyond particular disciplines into society itself.
Finally, there is a more pertinent perspective on the fact-value 
problem, one that is closely related to the spirit of Dewey’s pragma-
tism. The value debate has often been a surrogate for the far more 
fundamental questions raised by Dewey, Lynd, Mills, and many oth-
ers: What is the purpose of the social sciences and whose interests do 
they serve? These questions seldom get openly asked, and yet the po-
sition one takes on values ultimately depends on how these questions 
get answered. Such questions underlie a recurring question faced by 
Dewey and Mills: How can social science play a useful and critical 
role in the resolution of major societal problems, and what role do 
values play in this endeavor?
Values and the Normative Character 
of Social Science
It is apparent that abstract a priori reasoning presents a barrier to an 
understanding of the value problem, which requires grounded analy-
sis and concrete, practical assessment of how values actually operate 
in the social sciences. In line with the arguments of Putnam (2002, 
chap. 2), instead of dichotomizing fact and value we need to establish 
a workable distinction between them that enables us to ascertain how 
they are connected and with what consequences.
An assessment of the value problem at minimum depends on con-
sideration of the following questions: (1) How do values enter into 
social science? (2) Are values “subjective” or “objective,” and what do 
these terms mean in the context of social inquiry? (3) What is the 
relationship of values to scientific “objectivity?” (4) How do we judge 
the overall import of values’ presence in social science?
Crisscrossing these questions are two possible ways of approaching 
the problem. On the one hand, the impact of values can be considered 
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from the standpoint of practicing theorists and researchers. Values 
are often thought of as primary constituents of the “subjective” out-
looks and dispositions of individuals and therefore can be regarded as 
building blocks of a worldview or ideological position that frames the 
social scientist’s work. On the other hand, the subject matter being 
investigated, involving other actors, is also inherently “subjective” in a 
similar sense. These are the two aspects of the perceived threat to ob-
jectivity. Not a dichotomous division, these sides of the problem are 
connected by mutually interactive effects that can skew research and 
its results in a particular direction. The valuations of the researcher 
influence how subject matter is selected and defined, while both facts 
and valuations manifested in the empirical content of research can 
elicit evaluative responses on the part of the researcher. In effect, the 
density of culture and social relations means that the researcher is in 
essence part of the social world he or she is investigating and therefore 
not a truly detached and “neutral” observer.3
In reality, social scientists face an amalgam of fact and value that 
mixes evaluative judgments with scientific method and findings. 
This suggests that a dichotomization of what we think of abstractly 
and intuitively as an axiomatic distinction turns out to be unten-
able in practice. The fundamental impediment to keeping facts and 
values separate is language itself, which frequently obscures the dif-
ference between factual and evaluative judgments. As Putnam points 
out, the “entanglement” of fact and value routinely manifests itself in 
ordinary, everyday vocabulary. Familiar terms such as “correct,” “in-
correct,” “true,” and “false,” contain valuations that are embedded in 
the very meanings of these terms (2002, 33). By definition, we place 
a positive value on “correctness” and “truth” and a negative value on 
their opposites. More obvious is a familiar category of words such as 
“cruel” and “crime” that have unequivocally “normative and . . . ethi-
cal uses” (ibid., 34). Such words merge description and evaluation in 
a fashion that makes it virtually impossible to separate an empirical 
category of human behavior from its moral or ethical significance. In 
short, descriptive terms themselves often contain evaluative mean-
ings, in both ordinary discourse and the specialized lexicons of the 
sciences and other professions.
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To illustrate the latter, Gunnar Myrdal presents a short list of pu-
tatively “neutral” social science terms that are implicitly value-laden. 
Such words as “equilibrium,” “balance,” “stable,” “normal,” “lag,” and 
“function,” he argues, have “served as a bridge between presumably ob- 
jective analysis and political prescription” (1969, 52). In actual usage, 
these kinds of terms imply evaluative judgments of given states of af-
fairs, in this case in the form of subtle support for the status quo.4
These are common examples of an everyday phenomenon. While 
the language of the natural sciences and especially mathematics is 
another matter, the discourses of the social sciences are dependent 
on conventional everyday language, thereby reproducing taken-for-
granted cultural meanings and valuations in what is a putatively 
scientific discourse. Though one implied purpose of specialist ter-
minology is to “cleanse” social science of extrascientific influences, 
such efforts seldom succeed, and if anything compound the prob-
lem. The practice of what Myrdal calls “terminological escapism” 
(1969, 57) in effect creates a false sense of neutrality.5
Of the many kinds of values that could be mentioned, there are 
two categories that are commonly found to be most troubling, pri-
marily because they are perceived as deep seated and highly subjective 
in nature. Given the ideological and partisan character of politics, 
the intrusion of political values is usually regarded as anathema to 
science. Similarly, ethical and moral values tend to be seen as covert 
sources of bias. An exclusive focus on such values, however, encour-
ages a distorted picture of the involvement of science with evaluative 
standards. As the classical pragmatists understood, science is con-
ducted within a thoroughly normative structure that ranges over a 
wide spectrum of different kinds of values. Putnam draws our at-
tention to the pragmatist’s insight into the inherent normativity of 
science when he singles out “epistemic” values, such as “coherence,” 
“simplicity,” “plausibility,” “reasonableness,” and the like (2002, 4, 
30–31), values underpinning such familiar scientific norms as proce-
dural rules and rules of evidence. These kinds of values are highlight-
ed in Peirce’s writings on science and Dewey’s theory of intelligence 
(Bernstein 1999, 191–199). Such values are reflected in the normative 
standards governing how we define “good” scientific work, and they 
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impart a sense of what we believe is distinctive and valuable about 
science and rational thought generally. For the pragmatists, especially 
Dewey, science was unthinkable without ethical/moral and epistemic 
values. Importantly, as we shall see below, following Dewey’s concep-
tion of values, Putnam claims that both kinds of values are “objec-
tive” in nature, saying that epistemic values are “in the same boat 
with ethical values with respect to objectivity” (2002, 4).6
Weber on Values in Social Science
Before proceeding, we need to question what is meant by “subjective” 
and “objective” in the context of the fact-value debate and social sci-
ence more generally. Some divergence can usually be found between 
“hard” and “soft” definitions of “subjective.” In the first instance, 
the term refers to the distinctive emotional, idiosyncratic, or intui-
tive inclinations of an individual, all of which are believed to be a 
source of distortion or personal bias. In this sense, “the subjective” is 
something nonrational or irrational, the direct opposite of “the ob-
jective” (in the sense of implying “rational”) and thus an obstacle 
to scientific thought. This way of defining the term coincides with 
the notion that individuals are swayed by value-related conscious and 
unconscious mental or feeling states that undermine scientific neu-
trality. While Myrdal’s conception leans in this direction, by limiting 
himself to a discussion of valuations, which may or may not be of an 
emotive or intuitive kind, he tends to simply characterize all values as 
subjective and to equate “subjective” with “personal,” leaving impor-
tant questions unanswered.
By contrast, the complex and detailed arguments of Max Weber 
present a more comprehensive and challenging conception of the 
problem. While attributing more than one meaning to “subjective,” 
Weber on balance adheres to a “soft” version of the term. Weber’s 
remarks in “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” (1949) 
locate “the subjective” in the mind but not necessarily in that of a sin-
gle individual. At first, in seeming contradiction to Putnam, Weber 
states, “Undoubtedly, all evaluative ideas are ‘subjective’” (83). But he 
goes on to say:
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It obviously does not follow from this that research in the cul-
tural sciences can only have results that are “subjective” in the 
sense that they are valid for one person and not for others. (84)
For Weber, “subjective” is primarily a term for characterizing “cul-
ture,” for him the main object of social scientific study. Accordingly, 
he classifies the “psychological and intellectual” (74) content of the 
cultural sciences as “subjective” phenomena. Indeed, Weber is noted 
for his interpretive methodological approach, or “Verstehende Soziol-
ogie,” which takes as objects of investigation actors’ subjective mean-
ings (ideas, beliefs, values) and their motivational and behavioral 
correlates. By implication, in this broader conception Weber would in- 
clude under “subjective” both “irrational” and “rational” factors.
While often considered less complicated, defining “objective” can 
be just as difficult a task as determining what is covered by the term 
“subjective.” These definitional problems are best handled by address-
ing both categories at once. When Weber draws a solid line between 
“the sentiments” and “the analytical understanding” at the level of the 
researcher (1949, 60), he attempts to distinguish between “subjective” 
and “objective” in a way that avoids giving a clear definition of “objec-
tive” while complicating his conception of “the subjective.” He does 
not say exactly what it is about “the analytical understanding” that is 
“objective.” He does, however, change the meaning of “subjective,” 
reverting here to the notion of personal bias involving emotions and 
ideals that presumably interfere with scientific “objectivity.” In effect, 
for him “the subjective” has two different meanings: in one context, 
he applies the word to the emotional or ideological disposition of the 
individual (the “Vocation” lecture), in another to the “meaningful” 
character of culture (the “Objectivity” essay). In the first case “subjec-
tivity” (and by implication personal valuations) hinders intellectual or 
scientific objectivity. In the second case subjectivity promotes objec-
tivity. Thus, valuations are to be firmly distinguished from empirical 
science when they take the form of personal preferences. At the same 
time, valuations assuming a more “collective” form have an objective 
status as cultural and social phenomena and are therefore within the 
province of scientific study.
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Perhaps of greatest importance, Weber sees values as playing an 
active role in the theorizing and research process.
The very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem 
coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically ori-
ented motives and values. (1949, 61)
Far from being a fact-free matter, our very judgment of what consti-
tutes a “scientific problem” depends on a value orientation. In this 
sense, values serve as an instrumentality in the very selection of the 
problems we investigate.
Like Putnam, Weber thus appears to have an objective conception 
of values that he arrives at from within a sociological context by em-
ploying a technical definition of “objective.” Aside from “analytical 
understanding,” the closest Weber comes to defining “objective” is 
his reference to “an unconditionally valid type of knowledge in the 
social sciences, i.e., the analytical ordering of empirical reality” (1949, 
63). In subsequent discussion, however, he further complicates mat-
ters by stating, “There is no absolutely ‘objective’ scientific analysis 
of culture” (72). With the exception of his injunction to keep “senti-
ments” out of “analysis,” Weber seems to see no possibility of main-
taining a separation of facts and values in the practice of what he calls 
“cultural science.” This view informs his historicist methodological 
approach, whereby the object of study is conceptualized as a distinc-
tive social and historical configuration or “historical individual” (79). 
Such an entity gets identified and defined solely on the basis of its 
cultural and historical “significance” in terms of a given “value orien-
tation.” Judgments of facts are thereby seen as derivative of judgments 
of an evaluative nature.
Paralleling the emphasis Dewey put on “the particular” and 
Mills’s historicizing of social structure, Weber the historicist disavows 
the search for immutable laws of causation, claiming validity for only 
empirically identifiable, particular, delimited patterns of sociocultur-
al meaning. Such patterns can include historically specific relations 
of causation but are unlike causal explanations of the kind involving 
general laws, common to the natural sciences (1949, 75–81). Rather, 
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Weber’s particularistic conception sees causation as involving singular 
patterns of ideas and motivations.
As if to leave no doubt of his conviction that social science is 
of a particularizing as opposed to generalizing character, as well as 
his acceptance of the subjective/cultural limitations of investigators, 
Weber asserts that “all knowledge of cultural reality . . . is always 
knowledge from particular points of view” (1949, 81; italics in origi-
nal). “Objectivity” for him ultimately seems to mean employing the 
most effective method of representing what is only a piece of reality 
in a fashion that recognizes it as no more than a partial yet meaning-
ful picture. Weber’s reflections converge on two general strategies 
for accomplishing this. One is to acknowledge the value-determined 
interests shaping social/cultural/historical analysis and one’s choice 
of problems. The second strategy is to develop an approximate rep-
resentation of an “historical individual” by means of an “ideal type” 
concept, a special analytical construct that, based on a “one-sided 
accentuation” (90) of a singular viewpoint, seeks to identify both 
common and distinctive features of a given historical pattern.7
Weber’s intricate analysis demonstrates that values are to be 
thought of in different ways at different levels and stages of the in-
vestigative process. Far from positing an unbridgeable gap between 
facts and values—a common but badly mistaken interpretation of 
his position—Weber’s propositions establish a close interconnection 
between the two categories.
Insofar as the fact-value distinction is seen as an issue of “objectiv-
ity,” we can draw the following conclusions. Keeping valuations out 
of sociology is unattainable, but taking them seriously as a core part 
of the field is imperative for a science worthy of its name. “Scientific 
objectivity” depends not on efforts to rid the field of valuations but 
rather on strategies for bringing them to conscious awareness and 
making them a manifest and integral part of theory and research. As 
Weber and others have argued, this is not only an essential condition 
for accuracy in social inquiry; it is also the closest we can come to a 
meaningful definition of “objectivity.” Myrdal (1969, 55–56) essen-
tially concurs when he states that making one’s own value preferences 
explicit is a first step in controlling for hidden bias while imparting 
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genuine meaning to the subject matter. Finally, consonant with Web-
er’s statement that sociologists study problems, Mills declared, “No 
problem can be formulated unless the values involved and the appar-
ent threat to them are stated” (1961, 129).8
Many concede, perhaps reluctantly, that values and valuations 
are an unavoidable feature of the scientific process but continue to 
define the situation as presenting a procedural or methodological 
problem of controlling for “extrascientific” factors. Others, agreeing 
with Weber, accept values and valuations as vital and decisive factors 
in the pursuit of knowledge and essential components of sociological 
explanation. Yet others, adopting Mills’s position, see social science 
as based on valuations and as appropriately and overtly conduct-
ing itself on their behalf. Indeed, Mills’s approach presupposes the 
pragmatist refusal to partition fact and value, a position at the core 
of Dewey’s writings and a further obvious influence of Dewey and 
Weber on Mills’s sociology.9
It is noteworthy that Weber’s conception of social science as 
structured by values and based on a methodological protocol empha-
sizing particularity converges both with Dewey’s abiding concern for 
values and his historicist perspective.10 Similarly, the Weberian con-
ception reappears both in Mills’s belief that values shape the subject 
matter and practices of sociology and in his focus on historical social 
structures. Most important, the intellectual and theoretical affinities 
among these theorists and their arguments in support of the central-
ity of values offer solid ground for Putnam’s appeal to an objective 
conception of valuation. In Dewey’s case, this conception originates 
in his strong concern for morality and its relationship to science as 
well as his interest in developing a scientific theory of ethics.
Dewey on Values, Science, Morality
American pragmatism and social science were born in an atmosphere 
of waning Victorian values and an emerging secular culture shaped 
by the growing authority of science and a growth in commercialism 
and the market economy. With religion in relative decline, Dewey 
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feared these trends would undermine morality and a sense of com-
munity and common purpose essential to a truly ethical and demo-
cratic society.11 While embracing the scientific method, Dewey was 
disturbed by the strain placed on time-honored beliefs and values by 
the discoveries of natural science. As a consequence, he regarded a 
reconciliation of the two domains a pressing challenge, asking blunt-
ly, “How is science to be accepted and yet the realm of values to be 
conserved?” (1960b, 41). In effect, Dewey rendered the problem of 
“the traditional” versus “the modern” as a challenge of creating com-
patibility between scientific knowledge on the one hand and values 
essential to the well-being and progress of society and its members on 
the other.12 This meant reconstructing values along secular and sci-
entific lines together with the creation of scientific goals and practices 
that would meet the moral needs of society (Bernstein 1999, 218).
Dewey at times characterized the transition from religion to sci-
ence as involving a loss of the human dimension of life. The scien-
tific study of nature revealed a reality beyond the realm of human 
values and was therefore indifferent or blind to the moral, spiritual, 
and other needs of the individual. The shift from a human-centered 
world to one based on the impersonal, immutable laws of nature thus 
entailed, in Dewey’s view, a kind of dehumanization that threatened 
personal beliefs and a trust in the efficacy of human agency. Equat-
ing, in Durkheimian style, “the moral” and the “social,”13 Dewey 
correspondingly underscored the inseparability of “values” and “the 
human.” Overall, he saw adaptation to modernity as chiefly a prob-
lem of sustaining and reconstituting the realm of values in a man-
ner conducive to social progress and, ultimately (and by Darwinian 
implication), survival. Hence, Dewey’s philosophy was preoccupied 
with questions concerning the task of integrating values with the 
project of modern science in a fashion that was mutually accommo-
dating, reconstructive, and beneficial to both.14
Dewey saw this not as a matter of connecting two different 
spheres, although the separation of science from the rest of society 
was a historical process already underway. Rather, he argued that sci-
ence was predicated on values and that values in the modern world in 
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turn depended on scientific inquiry; the two spheres were internally 
related and mutually dependent, thus forming a unity. More broad-
ly, the social relations of science made it a moral enterprise, connect-
ing it to the larger society and the general interest. As Rick Tilman 
puts it, “Dewey believed that scholarly work was inherently social 
and that this fact implied a deep moral obligation” (1984, 131).
Dewey’s conception of morality was extraordinarily broad and 
elastic. While “values” meant primarily moral values, referring to 
questions of “right” and “wrong,” he didn’t always draw a clear dis-
tinction between the cognitive/rational and moral/ethical conceptions 
of these terms, perhaps because he regarded them as representing two 
sides of the same coin. In Dewey’s hands, these words had nuanced 
and fluid meanings that shifted with context and situation. At times, 
“moral values” referred to a particular kind or category of values, 
those directly pertaining to how one should or should not act as a 
member of a group or society.15 At other times, Dewey, following 
Peirce, regarded values per se as having a moral character and thereby 
carrying moral force insofar as they defined what were deemed “cor-
rect” and “incorrect” choices and ways of doing things in general. Val-
ues, in other words, were in some sense generically moral in character.
Contrary to what might appear to be the case, Dewey’s conception 
of the connection between science and morality is not “tacked on” to 
his experimentalist philosophy but inheres in fundamental pragmatist 
principles. First and foremost, pragmatism posits the consequences of 
ideas and actions as the basic criteria for judging their worth. Being 
largely a matter of the outcome, or effects, of our thoughts and ac-
tions, a notion of morality is thus implicit in the pragmatic maxim 
discussed in Chapter 3. A more obvious manifestation of Dewey’s 
preoccupation with morality is the problem-solving orientation of his 
philosophy. Moral convictions and commitments form part of our 
motivation to solve problems as well as providing evaluative standards 
and tools for doing so, furnishing scientific and practical procedures 
with moral guidelines. The very notion of problem solving, by which 
Dewey ultimately meant the solving of social and human problems, 
carries moral connotations imparting to science a sense of moral pur-
pose as an instrument for improving the human condition. In short, 
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the theme of problem solving per se, conceptually and practically, con-
nects science to morality.
The counterpart of Dewey’s interest in the moralization of sci-
ence was his wish to construct a methodical approach to morality 
and eventually a scientific theory of ethics.16 Recognizing that the 
absolutisms of religion, tradition, and custom were impediments to 
experimental and pluralistic forms of thought and inquiry, Dewey 
sought a means of putting questions of morality and ethics on an em-
pirical and practical basis. As a prelude to an ethical theory, Dewey 
in many of his texts presented the rudiments of a theory of values 
and valuation, the main outline of which can be found in his Theory 
of Valuation, first published in 1939 (1966b). Elaborating on the dif-
ference between what is “desired” and what is “desirable,” Dewey, 
in his customary antidualistic mode, disposes of “subjectivist” theo-
ries, which locate value in personal desire, and “objectivist” theories, 
which locate value in the desired objects (Brinkmann 2013, 112). 
Transcending this dichotomy, he argues that our conception of the 
desirable is a product of thoughtful deliberation, involving intelligent 
judgment regarding what is “good” in a general or universal sense. 
The desirable, in short, is a concept rooted in thought and intrinsic 
to the relationship between thought and action.
By means of this reasoning, Dewey contextualizes values in the 
unity of theory and practice, locating valuation behaviorally in “the 
act”—in social relations, actions, and interactions—as opposed to 
either personal preference or the qualities of objects themselves. 
Dewey thereby sees an objectification of values emerging from the 
deliberative mental and social processes involved in a determination 
of “desirability” as something separate from both individual desires 
and the characteristics of objects. Dewey’s conception of values thus 
places them in the category of what Durkheim called “social facts,” 
in the sense of being collective products arising from associational 
life. For Dewey, however, as fruits of thoughtful deliberation, values 
are not merely by-products or artifacts of group experience but ide-
als to be pursued and intelligently cultivated for the good of society.
Dewey, in agreement with Weber, further considers values as ob-
jects of empirical study, saying:
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Since desire and interest are behavioral phenomena (involving 
at the very least a “motor” aspect), the valuations they produce 
are capable of being investigated as to their respective condi-
tions and results. Valuations are empirically observable patterns 
of behavior and may be studied as such. (1966b, 51; italics in 
original)
Putnam stands in agreement with both Weber and Dewey that val-
ues, whether in the form of subjective preferences, the qualities of 
objects, or collective notions of the desirable or general good, are 
just as subject to empirical investigation as any other observable 
phenomenon. As he puts it, “What is valid for inquiry in general is 
valid for value inquiry in particular” (Putnam 2002, 110). Putnam, 
furthermore, in line with Dewey’s view of “the desirable,” under-
scores that the objective status of values in this sense means they 
are also subject to our powers of rationality. As he argues, “It is time 
we stopped equating objectivity with description,” saying, “There are 
many sorts of statements . . . that are not descriptions but are under 
rational control, governed by standards appropriate to their particu-
lar functions and contexts” (ibid., 33; italics in original). In other 
words, though values may not always be “describable” in the familiar 
sense of the term, values and valuations not only are real facts ame-
nable to scientific discourse but also, as Dewey implied, exist within 
the province of reasonableness and rational judgment.17  
The Concept of Critique
By demonstrating the indispensability of values to scientific work, 
Weber, Dewey, Mills, and Putnam established a basis for the idea of 
a critical sociology based on normative criteria. Not only do values 
imply deliberative judgment and choice among competing alterna-
tives; evaluative judgments are inherently critical insofar as they ques-
tion empirical reality as well as one’s own interests and motivations. 
In the presence of values, reality and its analysis do not speak for 
themselves (as in positivist sociology) but are subjected to norma-
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tive challenges. Values, therefore, are the substratum of critical ap-
proaches to social inquiry.
While none of these thinkers outlined a program for the develop-
ment of a critical sociology, by virtue of the close connections they 
established between valuations, theory, and science they disclosed the 
implicit critical potential of classical social theory, a body of work root-
ed in Enlightenment and normative ideas of reason and democracy. 
More to the point, in their efforts to reconcile science and values, 
Weber, Dewey, Mills, and Putnam taken together offer constituents 
of a critical sociology explicitly predicated on valuations. Notwith-
standing possible objections to the inclusion of Weber in a grouping 
of pragmatists, this raises the possibility of an innovative pragmatist-
based sociological approach to social critique.
A modern idea with multiple meanings and uses, the notion of 
critique is traceable to nineteenth-century philosophical, social, and 
political thought. It is also today a common notion in literary and 
artistic criticism. Generally speaking, critique is a process of engag-
ing in critical questioning and systematic analysis of a given object or 
state of affairs for the purpose of evaluative assessment. In its generic 
meaning, critique involves both positive and negative judgments in-
tended to reach a comprehensive evaluation. In social and political 
theory, however, the dominant tendency in critique has been toward 
negative or oppositional arguments formulated within a normative 
and sociohistorical framework. This type of critique preoccupies 
itself with normative standards themselves, specifically their “fit” 
with a given set of empirical conditions. The structure of this type 
of critique generally is both analytic and synthetic, concerned with 
understanding the “whole” and its relationship to the “parts.” Ac-
cordingly, this type of critique rejects closed theoretical systems and 
formal schema, presupposing instead the historical, changeful, and 
contingent character of knowledge and “truth,” the underlying prem-
ise of most modern philosophy since Hegel and Darwin and a major 
precept of Deweyan thought. Thus, critique always operates within a 
historical framework that is the context for empirical and evaluative 
statements and arguments.
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The work of the postwar critics presented in Chapter 2 approxi-
mates select aspects of this sense of critique by engaging in critical 
descriptive accounts of American society at a given point in time. 
As illustrated in the case of Mills especially, social critique often 
employs sociological ideas and methods and, (in accordance with 
Weber) like all sociological analysis, makes an appeal to value orien-
tations in the determination of what constitutes a societal problem. 
Like literary criticism, social critique examines constituent elements 
of its object of study (institutions, social practices), analyzing and in-
terpreting them contextually as a means of developing an assessment 
of the whole work (society as a whole). As Mills demonstrated, this 
entails examining major components of social structure and culture, 
overarching social ideas and ideologies, and the dynamics of change 
shaping both present society and its future tendencies. This is ex-
emplified by Mills’s practice of relating parts to the whole within 
a historical context while employing a mode of inquiry in which 
normative criteria become a means of assessing the human features 
and meanings of social structures and arrangements.
In a predominantly negative posture, social critique presupposes 
that something is fundamentally defective or dysfunctional with so-
ciety. The postwar critics viewed American society as failing in a 
variety of ways to adequately fulfill the genuine needs, ideals, and 
aspirations of upwardly mobile individuals. Bringing normative 
considerations to bear, these critics drew on sociological and jour-
nalistic methods to characterize these failings in terms of changing 
attitudes, values, and character structure. Though weak in substan-
tive theory and causal explanation, this body of work illustrated how 
values form a vital part of this kind of criticism, a point of view 
taken for granted by Mills in particular.18 Mills’s own work presup-
posed a need to preserve the values of freedom and reason, values 
he considered “the thread of classic social analysis” (1961, 130) and 
that he saw as threatened by bureaucratization, power structures, 
and the deceits of mass culture. Other critics, too, articulated the 
values behind their critiques of society. Predating the postwar critics, 
Veblen referred to an “instinct of workmanship,” which provided a 
normative ground for his critique of the degradation of pride in work 
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in a privately owned system of machine production. He saw this “in-
stinct” further violated in the rise of conspicuous consumption as a 
compensatory means of accumulating social esteem in the absence of 
productive achievement (1934, 16, 93). For Riesman, who was criti-
cal of the social adjustment ethic of the other-directed personality, 
a fourth character type expressing the value of “autonomy” became 
a normative criterion for his consideration of historical personality 
types (1960, pt. 3).
Consistent with Weber’s conception of sociology as a cultural sci-
ence and Lynd’s argument for integrating the social sciences around 
a focus on the whole culture, these critics believed that social phe-
nomena had meaning only within a framework of cultural values. 
Indeed, most of the works in this genre could be regarded as studies 
in values, insofar as they explored the attitudinal and behavioral ef-
fects of social change in terms of shifts in value orientations. These 
studies took values as a frame of reference in attempting to define 
the type of person characterizing a particular historical social struc-
ture. In doing so they also provided concrete illustrations of how 
cultural values link person and society.19
What perhaps today most distinguishes the postwar critics’ ver-
sion of social critique was their ability to employ a type of analysis 
and discourse accessible to the tastes and needs of an educated read-
ing public. They accomplished this largely by avoiding the formal 
esoterica of “impartial” studies that in the name of “objectivity” were 
designed to eliminate the human factor. As against this, these writers 
made the human factor the focal point of analysis, bringing humans 
back in. They did this in a manner both relevant and available to 
thoughtful and concerned readers. In this respect, these critics were 
unique in making public discourse and understanding a crucial fea-
ture of critical social inquiry.
Immanent Critique
The main shortcoming of postwar social criticism, with the partial 
exception of Mills, was its lack of a normative framework that enabled 
methodical criticism from within a comprehensive theoretical and 
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epistemological position. The best-known model of such a framework 
is the Hegelian-Marxist tradition of immanent critique associated 
with the Frankfurt School of critical theory.20 Immanent critique is a 
distinctive method of social critique that goes beyond the Millsian ap-
proach by critically examining society in terms of its “self-understand-
ings.” This type of critique proceeds from the standpoint of society’s 
own avowed ideals, with the aim of disclosing contradictions between 
“the ideal” and “the real” as manifested in prevailing social practices. 
Such contradictions are seen as engendered by the dominant social 
powers in the pursuit of their own interests.
An approach developed by Marx in his analyses of the struc-
tural and ideological contradictions of capitalism, immanent critique 
was used by members of the Frankfurt School in explorations of 
what they perceived as new forms of social domination in advanced 
capitalist society. In a revision of Marx, Frankfurt thinkers saw the 
structures of capitalist modernity precipitating a crisis in the ideals 
of reason and freedom in the form of “instrumental rationality,” a 
Weberian concept given famous expression in the term “iron cage.”21 
Seeing the contradictions of twentieth-century capitalism in terms of 
a crisis of subjectivity, the Frankfurt School believed that conscious-
ness was now being penetrated by increasingly subtle, complex, and 
powerful forms of ideology. This development manifested itself most 
directly in the form of a “culture industry” that cloaked the system’s 
internal contradictions and manipulated social consciousness to con-
form with the interests of the dominant powers, thereby forestalling 
or dispelling opposition to existing arrangements.
Immanent critique thus attempts to reveal how the ideological 
processes of society effectively mask contradictions between pur-
portedly consensual ideas and beliefs—how society “sees itself”—
and its concrete reality. Examples abound in American society of, 
for instance, the contradictions between the ideal of equality and 
its superficial appearances and the reality of inequality, between the 
American Dream of prosperity and the reality of widespread pover-
ty, and between proclamations of support for Enlightenment values 
of reason and democracy and the irrational consequences of capital-
ist society with its rule by powerful economic and political elites.
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Immanent critique finds the source of societal problems and po-
tential instability in the structural and cultural contradictions of the 
whole society. Those immanent critiques retaining overtones of Marx-
ism go even further, and against Frankfurt thinkers, to envision sys-
tem breakdown as creating dynamic forces of emancipatory change in 
the form of social movements and revolt against the system.
Despite its particular political, moral, and theoretical origins and 
intent, the analytical method of immanent critique can serve as a 
model for social critique generally. For purposes of social inquiry, the 
method can be appropriated in its basic outline, retaining its norma-
tive character and moral/ethical purpose, without necessarily repro-
ducing its Marxist themes. This method is highly adaptable to critical 
sociological analysis, as has been demonstrated in numerous norma-
tively oriented studies of social problems and social change in which 
principles of immanent critique are implicitly or explicitly employed. 
At the same time, few would argue that it is possible to practice im-
manent critique without encountering numerous problematic condi-
tions traceable to the system of capitalism. Given its analytical depth, 
when applied at the level of the whole society, this kind of critique 
invariably exposes characteristics of capitalism that explain its contin-
ued dominance and predictable social deformations.
Social Critique as Diagnosis
The connections between immanent critique and critical strains 
in the classical sociological tradition, primarily the work of Marx 
and Weber, are suggestive of a number of genealogical and theo-
retical continuities between critical and social theory. Both lines of 
development emerged within what Hans Sluga (2014) has called 
“the diagnostic turn” in philosophy and political thought during 
the nineteenth century.22 The diagnostic approach rejects the ab-
stract speculative mode of traditional philosophy, adopting instead a 
critical and historically based stance toward the crises of modernity 
and its concrete problems, seen within a framework of the unity of 
theory and practice (ibid., 25). The unmistakably Deweyan flavor of 
this description situates him, too, in the diagnostic tradition and is 
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yet another indication of Dewey’s affinity with the Marxist tradition 
of critical social theory.
The basic commonality between immanent and other types of so-
cial critique can thus be seen in their diagnostic character. Most con-
ventional sociological work tends to restrict itself only to the symptoms 
of social dysfunction. By contrast, social critique, like much of classi-
cal social theory, is in search of what lies behind these symptoms in the 
overall logic, structure, and condition of society. In its essential form, 
critique emulates the medical model of diagnosis, which identifies 
problems of the human body by interpreting bodily symptoms. These 
symptoms are read as signs of abnormality, indications that something 
is wrong with the patient that requires remedial treatment. Following 
a determination of the underlying causes of the symptoms, corrective 
action is taken in an effort to eliminate these causes, thereby return-
ing the body to a healthy or “normal” state. In sociology, poverty and 
crime, for example, can be read as symptomatic of socioeconomic dys-
function or abnormality in the “social body.” The causal explanation 
provided by immanent critique might be the contradiction between 
the “land of opportunity” ideology and class-related structural and 
cultural barriers to upward mobility. Whether or not employing the 
principle of contradiction, sociologists practicing critique are thus in 
effect acting as “social diagnosticians” insofar as they are engaged in 
critical assessment and causal accounting of social ills.
A classic model for this, its incongruities with critical theory not-
withstanding, is Durkheim’s study in which suicide (and by exten-
sion crime, violence, and other social pathologies) is interpreted as 
a sign of an abnormal social condition, for the French sociologist a 
state of anomie, or “normlessness.”23 While Durkheim’s ideas might 
seem only tangentially related to the diagnostic tradition discussed 
by Sluga, his theory of anomie follows the diagnostic model of think-
ing by singling out a behavior pattern that he attempts to explain in 
terms of underlying social and cultural conditions.
In sharp contrast to the functionalist outlook of Durkheim, how-
ever, social critique in the mode of immanent critique and critical 
theory examines the deep systemic sources of social and human dys-
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function, indicating how eliminating its causes depends on changes 
in the system itself. In this context, system dysfunction is defined in 
terms of its failure to fulfill basic human needs, not the system needs 
implicit in Durkheim’s conception of normative breakdown. This 
mode of inquiry and evaluative analysis is exemplified by the Marx-
ist critique of the prevalence of alienation and poverty in early indus-
trial capitalism, a critique predicated on beliefs in the intrinsic value 
of the individual and basic democratic principles.24 Derivatively, in 
the American context, the central contradiction defining system dys-
function in human terms is that between the ideologies and realities 
of capitalism on the one hand and the ideals and goals of democracy 
and the fulfillment of basic human needs on the other.
In addition to its use in identifying disjunctions between ideals 
and reality, the concept of contradiction can be applied sociologi-
cally at a nonideological level.25 This use of the concept consists of 
a theory and method for assessing the structural contradictions of 
society. This has taken different forms, but Marx’s analysis of the 
contradiction between the institution of private property and growth 
in the social means of production remains a pertinent example. Marx 
saw this as the central contradiction of nineteenth-century capital-
ism, the primary source of the alienation and oppression of the indus-
trial working class, and the pressure point of system breakdown and 
revolutionary change. A comparable example of structural contradic-
tion exists today between the existence of a domestic American job 
market established on the basis of manufacturing and services and 
the rapid growth of informational technologies driving globalization. 
This historical process is creating globalized patterns of employment 
that shift American jobs overseas while these selfsame technologies 
facilitate the concentration of wealth in the high-tech world of inter-
national finance.26
The foregoing illustrates two possible uses of the notion of con-
tradiction. In one case it involves ideological analysis, and in the 
other, explanations of the structural sources of social problems, most 
notably economic and social inequality. At the same time, the Marx-
ist version of structural contradiction (forces of production versus 
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relations of production) is not entirely applicable to the more devel-
oped and complex structures of contemporary society, and despite its 
explanatory power, the idea of contradiction itself is not definitive of 
either social critique or critical theory. Both bodies of work are suf-
ficiently comprehensive in scope and purpose to draw on ideas and 
methods from a variety of theoretical perspectives, including that of 
pragmatism.
Pragmatism and Social Critique:  
Critical Dimensions of Dewey’s Philosophy
We find in classical pragmatism, specifically in the writings of Dewey, 
recurring references to the notion of a radical democratic commu-
nity. From the beginning, pragmatism displayed a democratic style 
of thought, apparent in Peirce’s vision of a community of scientists, 
implied in James’s celebration of human experience, and evident in 
Dewey’s enduring belief that reason was possible only under genuinely 
democratic conditions. Dewey took democracy and reason seriously as 
inseparable twins of the Enlightenment, a tempered version of which 
informed many of his views. The Enlightenment ethos of progress 
was a particularly strong influence on Dewey, reinforcing his faith in 
science and the virtues of social and political action.
While animated by Enlightenment ideals, however, Dewey re-
jected the absolutisms accompanying this philosophy and embraced 
instead the dynamic and evolutionary viewpoints of Hegel and Dar-
win, the main sources of his conception of a pluralistic, dynamic, 
and continually evolving social universe. These aspects of Dewey’s 
philosophy contributed to his critical perspective by orienting him 
to the potentialities of human intelligence and action in an indeter-
minate and unfinished world. Reminiscent of Marx, Dewey effec-
tively brought Enlightenment ideals and Hegelian categories down 
to earth in the particulars of historical, social, and political reality 
and the needs and possibilities they presented for change.
In doing so, however, Dewey’s project departed from orthodox 
Marxism and its animating teleology focused on the revolutionary 
overthrow of capitalism. Largely dispensing with notions of contra-
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diction and the conflict model of two opposing classes, Dewey saw 
multiple forces at work in a society that he described in evolutionary, 
pluralistic, and sociocultural terms. For Dewey, democracy was not 
dependent on a transformation of the “economic base.” Rather, de-
mocracy could and even needed to be realized within existing prop-
erty relations by means of institutional changes—transformation 
of the “superstructure”—that would promote more egalitarian and 
participatory forms of association. In this respect, Dewey diverges 
sharply from Marx’s scenario of class revolution by embracing a radi-
cal democratic politics that envisions strategies for ameliorating the 
harsh and unjust effects of a market-based, privately owned econo-
my. Despite their philosophical affinities, then, Marx and Dewey 
followed different theoretical and political paths to the formation 
of a democratic community: for Marx it should be a community of 
“producers” attained by revolution and for Dewey a community of 
“social actors” achieved through institutional reform.
Dewey’s non-Marxist trajectory can be understood in terms of 
his intellectual commitment to basic pragmatist principles and their 
compatibility with American culture and experience. Indeed, his ex-
ceptionally comprehensive work was largely an outgrowth of his abil-
ity to adapt Hegelian and Darwinian ideas to the American context. 
Dewey found the fundaments of pragmatism as much in the Ameri-
can proclivities for the social-psychological, practical, and experimen-
tal as in the critical and historical methods of the Hegelian tradition, 
a combination that gave his philosophy an unusual power.
Dewey’s accomplishments in this regard are all the more remark-
able given the differences between European and American philos-
ophy and social thought. Scholars steeped in European intellectual 
traditions, especially German philosophy, have typically looked upon 
pragmatism with disfavor if not contempt, regarding it as an expres-
sion of an American disposition toward narrow technocratic and utili-
tarian thinking.27 This faulty charge is among many that Dewey’s 
work still endures, largely based on misunderstandings he engendered 
by failing to sufficiently clarify certain of his ideas, especially the 
meaning of the term “instrumentalism.” Fortunately, continental prej-
udices against pragmatism have diminished in the wake of the work of 
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second-generation Frankfurt theorist Jürgen Habermas, whose highly 
respected writings incorporate into critical theory ideas from Peirce, 
Dewey, and Mead. Habermas has attempted to strengthen critical 
theory through an assimilation of notions of a free and democratic 
community based on principles of unconstrained social interaction 
and symbolic communication (Antonio 1989; Antonio and Kellner 
1992; Jay 2016, chaps. 6 and 7). Appropriating a range of ideas from 
Anglo-American theories of language and communication, Haber-
mas subsumes much of this material under the Meadian concept of 
symbolic interaction, which he claims offers an emancipatory model 
of speech and communication. In a summary of Habermas’s think-
ing, Robert Antonio states, “The core idea is that a universal ideal of 
uncoerced communication underlies symbolic interaction” (1989, 732).
Despite the multiple influences shaping Habermas’s assessment 
of pragmatism’s critical potentials, an exclusive focus on Dewey and 
Mead suffices to indicate the gaps in classical critical theory that 
Habermas addresses and how they can be overcome by pragmatist 
ideas, ideas with deep ties to Hegelian-Marxist philosophy. Based 
on his early exposure to Hegel, Dewey established certain habits of 
thought paralleling those of the Marxist tradition of critical social 
analysis, as indicated by Dewey’s humanist orientation, historicist 
outlook, antipositivism, and critical responses to the deleterious ef-
fects of capitalism. Despite these tendencies, Dewey, as we have seen, 
was not a Marxist nor did he seem to find any use for the dialectical 
method with which the idea of contradiction is often associated. Nor 
was “emancipation” or the terminology of immanent critique part of 
his vocabulary.
Still, by declaring that philosophy had a social and moral purpose, 
Dewey defined this field as an evaluative enterprise engaged with 
the real problems of human society and possessed of the logical and 
scientific tools for critically appraising them.28 In his attack on dual-
isms, Dewey successfully fought against the split between the intel-
lect and material existence, reuniting theory and practice and thereby 
reconnecting reason to experience (Kadlec 2006, 530–533). Change 
and growth, innate to life itself, were seen by Dewey as embodying 
the conditions of possibility for social and moral progress, develop-
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ments for which the experimental attitude and method were neces-
sary preconditions. Toward this end, the pragmatist commitment to 
the idea of a community-based radical democracy informed by social 
and scientific knowledge meant that society was to be the object of 
sustained criticism and ongoing experimentation.
The social-theoretical view informing this conception redresses 
elements of Frankfurt School thought that have been the object of 
considerable criticism, most notably its one-dimensional perspec-
tive and essentially pessimistic and passive outlook on what Herbert 
Marcuse and other members of the school referred to as “the totally 
administered society” (1964). As critics have argued, it was largely 
the Frankfurt School’s adherence to a “philosophy of consciousness,” 
which locates reason within the isolated, contemplative individual, 
that was a prime source of its inability to develop a convincing theory 
of domination and, importantly, emancipation.29
From a pragmatist perspective, this shortcoming, partly an out-
come of the school’s Freudian tendencies, stems from a failure to rec-
ognize thought as a social process, as theorized in Mead’s writings and 
as appropriated in Dewey’s conception of reason as an outcome and 
embodiment of social relations and practical experience. In Mead’s 
theory, “taking the role of the other” (1956, chap. 7) involves a shar-
ing and exchange of attitudes, implying a “rich intersubjectivity” 
(Antonio 1989, 738) that contextualizes reason in social interaction. 
While assuming a condition of rationality, Mead’s concept, expressed 
as “the generalized other,” breaks with the exclusively rational presup-
positions of classical critical theory by including, in Antonio’s words, 
“the capacity for sympathetic identification with other persons’ 
needs, sufferings, and feelings” (ibid.). The Meadian strains in Dew-
ey’s thought thus provide critical theory a crucial social-psychological 
perspective on the human dimensions of associational life. This shifts 
social critique from a restrictive focus on the conservative tenden-
cies of social structural and cultural constraints to the potentials for 
change inherent in the symbolic processes and social dynamics of 
group life, factors generative of human agency and action.
The Meadian ideas in Dewey have several specific consequences 
for a concept of critique. First of all, Meadian theory locates the 
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origins of normative criteria in social relations, not abstract reflec-
tion, on which Frankfurt critical theory heavily depended. Second, 
Meadian social psychology projects a democratic conception of so-
ciety. The democratic narrative running through Dewey and Mead 
accordingly affords many of the components of normative thinking 
on which social critique depends. This feature of pragmatism, fur-
thermore, refracts a democratic conception of reason and knowledge 
as opposed to the “elitist” conception often attributed to the Frank-
furt School.
A further productive difference lies in Dewey’s confidence in sci-
ence, a noticeable contrast to the predominantly gloomy Frankfurt 
view, which tended to reduce modern science to positivism in all of 
its ideological ramifications. While clearly recognizing the conserva-
tive implications of positivism, Dewey, as we have seen (in Chapter 
3), held to a more nuanced position, refusing positivist science on 
predominantly epistemological grounds while seemingly leaving 
room for a limited use of positivist methods. He held to a practical 
understanding of science as a pluralistic, democratically based, and 
experimental method of knowledge production, for him a method 
essential to all purposive human activity. Dewey would see his ex-
perimentalist approach, furthermore, as implying a need to engage 
in normative critique of the very values and criteria informing the 
practice of critique, a neglected task of classical critical theory. This 
self-reflexive approach is an analogue to Mead’s observation that we 
can make objects of ourselves, implying a capacity for self-criticism. 
This approach is an expression also of the Meadian conception of 
behavior as governed by a symbolic process of recognition, inter-
pretation, and potential reworking of socially shared norms. On all 
counts, Dewey’s understanding of modern science was more open 
and expansive than that of the Frankfurt School.
Of considerably more significance than the action frame of ref-
erence tying him to Weber, the symbolic interactionist elements in 
Dewey’s pragmatism geared his thinking to the liberating potentials 
of human interaction. This body of theory builds on ideas about the 
creative role of agency in social change and the power of symboliza-
tion to facilitate change in consciousness. As such, Dewey’s pragma-
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tism brings not only balance to the overly deterministic outlook of 
Frankfurt School theory but also a framework of critique amenable 
to sociological theory and inquiry. In this respect, his work, and 
pragmatism as a whole, represents, at least prefiguratively, a philo-
sophical and theoretical approach in keeping with the tradition of 
critical theory.30
Reprise
Questions regarding the validity and function of normative criteria 
in the practice of critique, finally, bring us back to the problem of 
values. This chapter has demonstrated the inextricable relationship 
between values and the social sciences. These fields are laden with 
values and as a consequence possess a unique potential for critiquing 
society and projecting into their practices conceptions of “the desir-
able,” in Dewey’s sense of the term. The question of values, then, is 
inseparable from questions surrounding the use of social critique and 
the deployment of normative criteria in the critical study of society 
and human behavior.
Given choices among the many kinds of norms on which cri-
tique might be based, perhaps the greatest difficulty in this practice 
is the challenge of establishing workable definitions of “normative 
criteria” and a methodology for their use. While much of critical 
theory is vague on this point, we have seen that Dewey and Mills 
worked from value-based definitions of societal problems, invok-
ing the ideals of democracy, reason, and freedom in considering the 
problems of institutional life. Dewey’s position, of course, was more 
complex and wider in scope than this short list of uncontroversial 
values might suggest. He appealed to a range of moral and ethical 
principles in critiquing existing social conditions and arrangements 
and in gauging the progress of democracy and reason. In any event, 
in the views of Dewey and Mills, social critique ultimately depend-
ed on an articulation of the historically and socially situated values 
most central to our lives.
Given its complexity, it is in the nature of normative thinking to 
contain internal inconsistencies and contradictions of its own. As 
138 \ Chapter 5
Myrdal points out, valuations are inherently unstable, “usually shift-
ing and contradictory” (1969, 16). Values, furthermore, tend to be 
highly disputatious. A recurring difficulty for a culturally complex 
and diverse society is how to determine what/whose values are at 
stake. The huge panoply of values defining American society, com-
bined with its strong ethos of individualism and personal choice, 
poses a potential risk of endless regression into particularism, relativ-
ism, or triviality, and at worst a decline into naked power relations.
The strong liberal orientation of most social scientists, fortunately, 
suggests other possible outcomes. For instance, though they might 
disagree with his style and method or his assessment of American 
society, most social scientists today, especially the more progressively 
minded, would likely agree with the values dear to Mills. Addition-
ally, a reasonable amount of agreement would seem to be possible 
with regard to values pertaining to what many regard as inviolable 
rights, such as protections against unnecessary harm and suffering, 
guarantees of justice through due process, the preservation of human 
dignity, and so forth, what Myrdal calls “higher order” as opposed to 
“lower order” values (1969, 16–17, 67).
Dewey was joined by Mills in his conviction that science should 
be consciously and explicitly guided by intellectual, political, and 
moral norms. For both thinkers, this was a precondition for a critical, 
human-oriented social science. Mills, unfortunately, failed to develop 
the full potential and richness of Dewey’s moral and ethical con-
cerns and the place of these in science. His work, therefore, falls short 
of the true meaning of critique. By contrast, Dewey’s pragmatism 
provides a groundwork for constructing a framework within which 
evaluative judgments could play a systematic role, involving an in-
tersubjective and social-interactionist-based model of social critique. 
Such a model could build on existing critical theory to develop a 
more comprehensive and potentially transformative conception of 
society and politics. Despite overlaps between his work and that of 
the Frankfurt theorists, Mills’s approach, less theoretical overall, has 
only indirect consequences for critical theory. For these reasons, the 
important precedents he set notwithstanding, Mills’s views are less 
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useful than Dewey’s for building a scientific and socially and morally 
conscious sociology.
Finally, Dewey’s conception of values as products of thoughtful 
deliberation transcending both individual desires and the objects of 
these desires offers a challenge to practicing social scientists to cul-
tivate notions of the general good and strategies for implementing 
such notions in their work. In the spirit of Dewey’s philosophy, such 
an effort would facilitate an integration of moral and ethical con-
cerns into the very fabric of the social sciences, imparting to these 
fields a strong sense of mission and purpose.

Conclusion
The scholarly convention of a “conclusion” does not seem like an entirely appropriate ending for this book. Given the archi-tecture of this study, the nature of the subject, and the range 
of topics covered, there are numerous “conclusions” that could be 
reached. I have touched on a series of problems and issues with no 
easy solutions. The reader, I hope, is left not with conclusions and 
straightforward answers but with a number of challenging questions.
Yet, the problems and issues raised in this book are closely inter-
connected, and what at times might appear to be an array of dispa-
rate topics, polemics, and themes is organized by an overall logic and 
rationale. Ground zero has been the critique of positivist and formal-
ist sociology, to be sure a familiar, even timeworn exercise but one I 
hope to have presented from a fresh point of view. My claims about 
the failings of formalism and the shortcomings of conventional soci-
ology have been rendered as symptoms of a need for a fundamental 
rethinking of the discipline. Guiding this task have been a number 
of basic questions about the purpose of sociology, its relationship to 
the public, and its potential as a form of social criticism. Such a task 
could take many forms and proceed in a number of possible direc-
tions. My own argument for a morally and politically conscious crit-
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ical sociology built on the social pragmatism of John Dewey reflects 
my own conception of social critique and the mission of sociology.
I stand in agreement with Mills that the classical European tra-
dition in social theory and its contemporary derivatives, wedded to 
social psychology, remain definitive of the field, providing a source 
of ideas for understanding the historical and structural problems 
that should be of concern to both sociologists and the public. Mills 
demonstrated that a sociological perspective of this kind is inher-
ently critical, always pointing to a need for directed change based 
on the role of human agency in the making of history. This view 
puts a premium on the moral and political significance of sociologi-
cal knowledge and the implications this raises for progressive social 
change. Accordingly, one aim of this study has been to recapitulate 
the legacy of Mills: his original and critical work on American soci-
ety, his critique of mainstream sociology, and his aspirations for an 
enlightened democracy based on reason and the fruits of “the socio-
logical imagination.”
This study, however, has situated Mills’s achievements in the con-
text of American pragmatism and, specifically, the thought of Dewey. 
Among the manifold reasons for this particular treatment of Mills 
has been, first, to remind readers that American sociology was born 
largely of the progressive politics and moral concerns that appear in 
Dewey’s lifelong philosophical work. The problems characterizing 
the historical period of sociology’s formation were instrumental in 
defining the meaning and purpose of the discipline. I have tried to 
show that the intellectual and moral spirit of that time reemerges in 
Mills’s sociology. Closely related, the symbolic interactionist school 
and social problems tradition that originated at Chicago in the theo-
retical environment shaped by Dewey and Mead have been and re-
main sources of critical alternatives to later trends in the field. I have 
suggested that the strength of Mills’s work in large measure derives 
from his skillful integration of these Chicago influences with Euro-
pean theory.
Second, my discussion has attempted to show that pragmatism rep- 
resents a comprehensive way out of the blind alleys of the formalism 
and dualistic thinking shaping postwar sociology. These trends have 
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been at the expense of sociology’s engagement with the realities of 
American society, inhibiting the creation of theories and research 
programs capable of grasping Mills’s “big picture.” Dewey’s evolu-
tionism, historicism, antidualism, theory of experience, conception 
of inquiry, and focus on human action—all are conceptual tools that 
could enable sociologists to discard habits of thought that unneces-
sarily restrict our understanding of the real nature and problems of 
American society, how they need to be studied, and why. A close 
reading of Dewey’s critique of traditional Western philosophy and 
his effort at reconstruction brings to light a host of presuppositions 
behind contemporary sociological practice that became outmoded 
long ago with the advent of modernity and its recurrent crises. Fa-
miliarity with Dewey and pragmatism shows that mid-twentieth-
century sociology took a regressive turn, against which Mills and his 
fellow critics reacted but from which the field has never completely 
recovered.
A third reason for this book’s appeal to Deweyan philosophy is 
the importance that I believe should be given to metatheoretical think- 
ing. Dewey’s pragmatism constitutes a metatheory of society that 
challenges how we usually think about and practice the social sci-
ences. It is a highly inclusive theory, premised on an epistemology 
and a method that reintegrate what disciplinary specialization has 
artificially disjoined. More than merely reaffirming the centrality 
of method, Dewey’s work broadens our conception of method with 
pragmatist insights into the nature of science, knowledge, and human 
behavior. Dewey’s metatheory, moreover, projects a picture of soci-
ety and a vision of science in which questions of value are of para-
mount importance and in which there is a unification of scientific 
and moral values. His is not a sociological theory but a philosophical 
and theoretical program for putting the study of society on a scien-
tific and moral foundation, bringing the two realms together in a way 
what enables morality and science to mutually clarify and strengthen 
each other within a single sphere of knowledge. As we have seen, the 
underlying principle of Dewey’s metatheory is the unity of theory 
and practice. For Dewey, knowledge and action presuppose one an-
other. For him, the conduct of science and intellectual life should be 
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motivated by the human priorities and needs of society as a whole. 
Correspondingly, the moral and ethical norms governing society are 
subject to scientific scrutiny and are thus to be treated just as method-
ically as other objects of science. Finally, Dewey’s metatheory rests on 
certain assumptions about the organization and condition of society 
and its institutions. Inherent in his philosophy is a model of a lib-
eral, open, fluid, participatory, intelligently governed society. From 
Dewey’s perspective, then, there exists a principled continuity among 
morality, science, and democracy.
In a world of monumental problems and crises, to propose that 
sociology rehabilitate itself by replacing formalism and its abstract 
esoterica with relevance and substance is to necessarily point sociol-
ogy in a more critical and challenging direction. This suggests a 
need to rehabilitate the idea of social critique, which constitutes my 
fourth reason for focusing attention on Dewey, whose pragmatism 
contains many of the normative and analytical elements of this prac-
tice. In their critiques of American society, Mills and his contempo-
raries fell short of systematically developing this concept within a 
framework of social science. Nor did they indicate, except perhaps 
in only fragmentary and superficial ways, any links between their 
work and the tradition of critical theory developed by the Frank-
furt School and others. Beginning with the precedents set by Mills 
and his critical cohorts, I have attempted to consolidate my main 
arguments for a substantive and critical sociology under the concept 
of social critique, conceived of as both an analytical method and a 
moral enterprise.
What needs to be explicitly affirmed, however, is the important 
role played by values in the practice of critique. As a normative ex-
ercise, critique presupposes a set of evaluative standards that support 
critical claims about a given state of affairs. Given their implicitly 
normative character, social theory and sociology occupy a continuum 
with social critique. The latter is a practice predicated on the val-
ues informing our moral judgments, expressing our beliefs about the 
pressing need for change in the present state of affairs and the means 
for achieving this goal. In their reflections on the normative character 
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of science and social science Myrdal, Putnam, and Weber should be 
remembered for having established grounds for an objective concep-
tion of values, thereby putting to rest allegations that values are sub-
jective and therefore harmful to science. I have observed a significant 
convergence between the views of these thinkers and those of Dewey 
and Mills, both of whom regarded values as foundational to social 
and political analysis as well as scientific inquiry. Values are both the 
core of social critique and the main element grounding critique in so-
ciological analysis. Accordingly, Dewey would likely have seen sociol-
ogy as taking the form of critique, serving to indicate how changes in 
society suggested by normative inquiry could be attained. He would 
have further endorsed Weber’s position on the possibility of studying 
particular values empirically from the standpoint of their practical ef-
ficacy. In this respect, given his interest in a science of ethics, Dewey 
would surely have seen the appropriation of sociological principles 
and methods as a means of providing moral and ethical guidance to 
the conduct of human affairs.
This book represents an attempt to reinterpret Dewey and reframe 
Mills for a fresh look at the prospects of a critical sociology. This ef-
fort has involved an encounter with several of the discipline’s “exis-
tential” issues. Enduring tensions between the pursuit of “knowledge 
for its own sake” and sociological practice in the interest of the public 
good and progressive change will surely not be entirely eliminated by 
my polemics in favor of the latter. Nor is my preference for the histo-
ricizing approaches of Dewey and Mills likely to assuage those who, 
with some justification, are committed to the belief that sociology is 
a generalizing science. At the same time, I hope to have succeeded in 
identifying false theoretical and methodological choices based on “ei-
ther-or” thinking as opposed to the “both-and” character of Dewey’s 
and Mills’s pluralistic approaches. In this respect, the thrust of my 
discussion has been toward what I think are realistic strategies for a 
reconciliation of interactionist/interpretative/action approaches em-
ploying notions of agency and the more determinist implications of 
theories focused on structure and culture, an issue that only appears 
to entail two horns of a dilemma. Closely related, the antipositivist 
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position of the entire book should not be misconstrued as a wholesale 
rejection of positivist methods, which should not be confused with 
“positivist sociology.”
My allusions to the sociology of knowledge are intended to broach 
the possibility of reviving this neglected area of study. A subtext of 
my presentation of Dewey has been the suggestion that his insights 
into the social and historical bases and variability of ideas constitute 
a potential contribution to empirical studies of the social bases of 
knowledge. This is apparent in his sensitivity to the social condition-
ing of thought, his unifying of theory and practice, his evolution-
ism and historicism, his situating of reason in experience, and his 
philosophical reunification of subject and object. If it is unfortunate 
that Mills did not pursue his own early investigations in this area, 
he at least articulated the importance of the social determination of 
knowledge as an area of study. For him, the sociology of knowledge 
was an epistemological problem bearing closely on issues of validity 
and verifiability in the research process (Mills 1963a). In his later 
work, however, a sociology of knowledge frame was a continuing in-
fluence in the form of his historical and structural perspective on the 
psychology of the individual, specifically the formation of “character 
structure.”
Mills makes references to Dewey’s work on logic and inquiry in 
asserting a close relationship between the sociology of knowledge and 
epistemology. I would submit that a pragmatist version of the sociolo-
gy of knowledge, by approaching problem solving from the standpoint 
of how social position and background shape and condition percep-
tion and thought, provides ground for a social “deconstruction” of 
social problem theorizing and research. Mills took a provocative step 
in this direction in his early essay on the ideological orientation of 
social problems researchers (1963c).
While not definitive of the larger subject of this book, the pragma-
tist theme of problem solving has been a recurring motif. An orienta-
tion toward substantive, historically based problems is a significant 
thread running from the methodological statements of Weber through 
the polemics of Dewey to the critical sociology of Mills. My discussion 
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does not address the question of who controls the process of defining 
what constitutes a “problem.” Inattention to this question is a serious 
weakness of pragmatism, which in its neglect of power has left the 
topic to thinkers like Mills. The notion of a “politics of truth” (Mills 
2008), which aptly characterizes the way Mills practiced sociology, 
speaks to the nature of the problem. Dewey certainly was cognizant 
of “the problem of defining problems” in his understanding of the 
political and moral contexts of science, but his grasp of this process 
was abstract and limited.
The ideals of democracy, reason, morality, and informed opinion, 
always in need of vigilant protection, have been a recurring theme 
in my discussion of Dewey and Mills. Threats to these ideals today 
seem more alarming than ever, adding urgency to a call for the kind 
of sociology and social science implicit in Dewey’s and Mills’s shared 
vision. Much of the Frankfurt critique of domination by the “cul-
ture industry” is rapidly becoming obsolete in the face of a new set 
of conditions with threatening consequences for an informed pub-
lic and thriving democracy. While bearing the promise of greater 
democratic participation, the rise of digital technology in the form 
of the Internet and “social media” has posed unprecedented dangers 
to the preservation of reason and freedom. The dark underside of 
this dramatic “democratization” of communication and opinion is 
a potential breakdown of normative standards of any kind through 
the encouragement of an “anything goes” mentality. Unfortunately, 
when everyone becomes an “authority” or “expert,” no one can claim 
this status. The digital revolution is speedily and thoroughly dis-
rupting accepted standards of ethical, scientific, and political judg-
ment and behavior, not to mention our very grasp of reality and 
sense of what constitutes a “fact.” As a consequence, adequate under-
standing of this technological transformation and effective means of 
counteracting its ill effects seem for the moment beyond reach. The 
implications for a critical and relevant public sociology are pressing 
enough to raise serious concerns about the priorities of the discipline 
and the promise of those ideas in the pragmatist tradition discussed 
in this book.
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There are, of course, daunting barriers to disciplinary change. 
A sociology of knowledge perspective tells us that formalistic agen-
das tend to thrive under certain economic, occupational, and social 
conditions. Although academia provides considerable autonomy for 
social scientists, contacts outside the university are often limited to 
corporations, government, and other funding entities. Institutional-
ization and professionalization have created a discipline still too often 
preoccupied with its own scientific identity, organizational problems, 
and internal politics, all of which interfere with direct involvement 
in public life and civic culture. Additionally, the middle- and upper-
middle-class backgrounds and positions of the majority of sociolo-
gists constitute a major disincentive for challenging the status quo. 
The understandable lure of career-building pursuits geared to a de-
sired set of academic and professional goals that are personally and 
economically rewarding tends to encourage conformity to established 
disciplinary norms and paradigms. The desire for knowledge for its 
own sake, fears of violating conventional norms of scientific “objec-
tivity” and “respectability,” and unending funding difficulties have 
discouraged most sociologists from doing research that is controver-
sial or involves recommendations for fundamental change. This is es-
pecially the case when such change is not in keeping with hegemonic 
social policy and the interests of the elites who shape it. In sum, these 
are factors posing serious obstacles to the formation of a critical and 
public sociology of the kind advocated by this book.
Nonetheless, change is always possible. Dewey was a pivotal fig-
ure in the transition from the nineteenth century, with its profound 
philosophical, social, and political developments, to the twentieth 
century and the promises and dangers posed by science, technology, 
and a capitalist market economy. He was preoccupied with the prob-
lems precipitated by these developments and devoted to theorizing a 
means of addressing them through a philosophy of methodical think-
ing and practice. His response to the uncertainties and rapidly chang-
ing environment of modernity was to transform philosophy into a 
form of critical engagement with the empirical world. Early American 
sociology refracted Dewey’s conception of intellectual and scientific 
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endeavor as serving the purpose of problem solving and social prog-
ress. As members of a discipline that began in a spirit of diagnosing, 
documenting, and explaining the problems of modernity, sociologists 
will, I hope, continue to see their work in this light, focusing their 
efforts on analyzing the forces that undermine the common good 
and the fulfillment of individual human need. In this respect, I be-
lieve the philosophy of pragmatism and the contributions of Dewey 
and Mills to the idea of a reformed sociology contain the intellectual 




1. My list of the “founding fathers” of sociology includes Karl Marx, Max 
Weber, Émile Durkheim, Alexis de Tocqueville, Georg Simmel, and Ferdi-
nand Tonnies.
2. A clear distinction is seldom made between social and sociological the-
ory, and the terms are often used interchangeably. I define “social theory” as a 
broad body of ideas and concepts related to the formation, development, and 
impact of modern society. The model of this is the work of the classic European 
social thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “Sociologi-
cal theory” refers to bodies of explanatory propositions that are subject to em-
pirical testing and verification. This type of theory is characteristic of American 
sociology. I strive to maintain a distinction between the two, although in some 
cases my statements refer to both. 
3. There is a little-known alternative narrative. In the account of Aldon D. 
Morris (2015), whereas Robert E. Park at the University of Chicago is com-
monly regarded as the founder of the discipline, this official “white” version 
of sociology’s domestic origins ignores the pioneering work of the prominent 
black scholar W.E.B. Du Bois at the University of Atlanta. Morris argues that 
through a collaboration between Park and Booker T. Washington, the story 
of Du Bois’s Atlanta school of sociology was effectively suppressed. This story, 
Morris argues, needs to be brought into the open as the true version of the 
birth of American sociology.
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4. In what follows I present only the barest outline of the direction sociol-
ogy has taken in the United States. This abbreviated retrospective is intended 
to serve only as background for a critique of formalism. For fuller historical 
accounts, see Wiley 1979, Haney 2008, and Morris 2015.
5. The close connection between these thinkers is a subject unto itself. 
While Dewey is better known, it would appear that many of his key ideas came 
from Mead. 
6. Although it is customary to refer to the “Chicago School,” Howard S. 
Becker has argued that there never was a “unified and coherent body of thought” 
at Chicago. Rather, in the period between the 1920s and 1960s sociologists 
there were engaged in a variety of work reflecting a range of interests and ori-
entations. Becker states that a more accurate characterization of the Chicago-
ans would be a “school of activity.” See Becker 1999. Hans Joas (1993, chap. 
1) offers a retrospective of the Chicago School that conveys the diversity and 
complexity of this early generation of sociologists, a rather complicated picture 
often at odds with much of the commentary on the period. The weight I place 
on the reformist elements of the Chicago tradition thus ignores the variety of 
scientific work engaged in by these early sociologists. For a comprehensive ac-
count, see Wiley 1979.
7. “Positivism” has more than one meaning. Generally, the term describes 
social scientists’ adoption of the natural science model of causality and invari-
ant laws within a closed universe of empirically observable “facts.” Steinmetz 
(2005, “Introduction” and “Sociology”) reduces this general conception to the 
search for so-called covering laws. These are general propositions believed to be 
universal in character and the basis for connecting the two parts of an explana-
tion (“cause” and “effect”), an idea associated with the logical positivists. He 
refers to this version as “methodological positivism,” as distinguished from Au-
guste Comte’s positivism (a vision or model of “enlightened” empirical science) 
as well as other variants of the term. Wiley (1979) points out that positivism 
can also refer to the Durkheimian conception of culture and social structure 
as “external and constraining” forces. I use the term loosely to include these 
several meanings but with emphasis on a belief in the general applicability of 
the natural science model. 
The positivist turn was closely related to a rhetoric and mythology of con-
trol. Positivism is in part a manifestation of the extension of the Enlighten-
ment vision of control over nature to society itself and, in its worst forms, to 
human beings. The critique of positivism waged by members of the Frankfurt 
School of Critical Theory coincided with their theory of domination in ad-
vanced capitalist society. While not necessarily implicated in forms of domi-
nation as understood by this school, the growth of positivist social science, 
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heavily supported by American administrative and political interests during 
and following the crises of the 1930s and 1940s, was a key strategy in the 
search for effective scientific means of guaranteeing social stability and order. 
From another angle, there is curious irony in Alvin Gouldner’s claim that so-
ciology was born of a realization of the modern problem of “alienation,” a term 
usually associated with the Marxist tradition, in which society and culture, 
while human creations, take on a life of their own. In Gouldner’s words, “The 
emerging academic social sciences thus came to conceive of society and culture 
as autonomous things: things that are independent and exist for themselves” 
(1970, 53). It is precisely this image of society that provides an epistemologi-
cal rationale for positivist forms of inquiry. This is manifested in Durkheim’s 
early positivist-oriented work in which society is conceptualized as a thing-like 
power over the individual. 
8. The terms “formal” and “formalism” in this context have nothing to do 
with Georg Simmel’s “formal sociology.” See Tenbruck 1965.
9. See especially Merton 1957, pt. 1.
10. In this context the terms “scientism” and “scientization” refer to a soci-
ology based on the methods of the “hard” sciences (e.g., physics and biology), 
a position resting on a belief in the methodological unity of natural and social 
science. See Steinmetz 2005 283. Thus, the word is roughly equivalent to 
“positivism.” 
11. It is perhaps no coincidence that the Society for the Study of Social 
Problems was founded in 1951, suggesting the need for a separate professional 
organization devoted to the study of social problems at a time when the disci-
pline was moving in a different direction. This event left the American Socio-
logical Association as the representative of the mainstream.
12. A more detailed and nuanced account of sociology’s embrace of the natu-
ral science model is laid out by Steinmetz (2005, 287–309), who attributes this 
change to certain features of “Fordism” in postwar American society that made 
sociology more amenable to the principles informing natural science. For a fuller 
picture, see Haney, who points out that, among other factors, scientific values 
were being increasingly accepted by society-at-large around the same time, pro-
viding added support for a scientization of the social sciences (2008, 3). 
13. This observation seems to be confirmed by the titles of roughly six of 
the ten articles cited in Jacobs 2015, 9–10, titles indicating a preoccupation 
with method.
14. Here I am using “dialectical” in the sense that Berger and Luckman 
(1967) use the term in The Social Construction of Reality.
15. The classic psychological expression of this view is found in Sigmund 
Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, which argues that humans are destined 
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to be chronically unhappy, given a perpetual conflict between their innate de-
sires and the constraining requirements of civilization.
16. In sociological discourse, modernity is often characterized as the experi-
ence of forces beyond the individual’s control. While amply supported by his-
torical evidence, such a view neglects the fact that people have likely had similar 
experiences throughout history. In the modern era the notion that people have 
lost control over their lives arose mainly from the experience of rapid change 
through industrial capitalism and advances in technology. The thematization 
of modernity as a set of uncontrollable forces coincides also with the iconic rise 
of the individual in Western society, seen as a volitional and self-determining 
agent. This theme also resonates with Enlightenment values of progress, ratio-
nality, and control over nature. In this sense, the modern question of “control” 
gives expression to a historically specific cultural outlook that gets reproduced 
in social theory. Thus, the theme of external forces always contains an ambigu-
ity, which is often ignored in the context of modern sociology: To what extent 
is lack of control a historical phenomenon of “alienation” caused by the system 
of private property and instrumental rationality, and to what extent is seeming 
lack of control an existential problem, part of the human condition?
17. The concept of “reification” was introduced by the Marxist theoretician 
Georg Lukacs. For Lukacs, reification was the process under capitalism where-
by a commodity assumes a thing-like existence independent of its producer, 
where “a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus 
acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’” (1971, 83). We might say that sociological 
formalism comprises a body of concepts and postulates that have acquired the 
character of objects, each having a thing-like existence independent of the social 
world from which it originated. In a contemporary and more generic definition: 
“Reification means treating something as an independently existing object or 
reality when it does not genuinely possess this status, or when it does not have 
the entity-like character attributed to it” (Bloor 1997, 136).
18. During a public appearance by Talcott Parsons, the theorist of nor-
mative order, Herbert Blumer, the leading symbolic interactionist, asked the 
speaker, “Talcott, have you ever seen a norm?” This simple question exempli-
fies how the problem of representation has been a bone of contention between 
these schools of thought.
19. The error involved in what I am calling “false realism” is largely an 
outcome of adherence to the natural science model of inquiry, which involves a 
positivist denial of any difference between culture and nature.
20. See Berger and Luckman 1967.
21. The “human sciences” is a term often used by scholars who advocate an 
interpretive, or nonpositivist, approach to social science. The term is traceable 
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to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1961), the nineteenth-century German phi-
losopher of hermeneutics whose classic statements on the difference between the 
“human” and “natural” sciences is a foundation of many interpretive approaches. 
For an overview of contemporary theoretical statements, see Rabinow and Sul-
livan 1979, 1987.
22. This is not to minimize the major contribution sociology has made to 
our understanding of the structural sources of human problems. The struc-
turalist perspective has been a valuable corrective to the American tendency to 
perceive problems in individualistic terms. My remarks are intended to suggest 
only that in sociological accounts structure has often been overprivileged at 
the expense of action and agency.
23. In an intriguing twist on the story of the discipline’s “withdrawal,” 
David Paul Haney suggests that by the 1960s, sociologists had succeeded in 
painting a picture of an American mass society and culture that bred medioc-
rity, passivity, and conformity, in effect portraying the public as intellectually 
inept. More generally, the themes of alienation and anomie inherited from 
European social theory fed into a pessimistic view of Americans’ capacity to 
participate meaningfully in public life. The discipline’s disengagement from 
the public was thus also driven by a “new elitism” that grew out of sociological 
theory and research itself. See Haney 2008, chaps. 4 and 5. 
24. As we know, formalist jargon and esoterica are a major source of the 
unflattering reputation sociology often suffers among other academics, intel-
lectual workers outside of academia, and the general public. 
25. Mills’s statements on personal troubles and public issues, biography 
and history, prefigure a sociology of knowledge that was implicit in most of his 
work but never fully developed. Mills engaged in polemics with other theorists 
over the nature and status of the sociology of knowledge, primarily in response 
to the reception of Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia in the United States. 
See Geary 2009, 30–37.
26. I am using the term “system” in a semipejorative way. My usage is not 
that of structural functionalism or other systems theorists. I intend the term 
to have both historical and quotidian meanings: historical in the sense that 
society as a system of interdependent parts or institutions is a historical prod-
uct and quotidian in the sense that I want the term to reflect what ordinary 
people have in mind when they voice frustrations with “the system,” by which 
they typically mean the bureaucratic system of power and wealth embodied in 
corporate capitalism and the modern state. Thus I am employing a historically 
and socially specific definition.
27. See Tawney 1948 for a classic statement of the negative consequences 
characterizing a society based on property rights. Acquisitiveness in our time 
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has taken extreme forms in (1) unrestrained individual and corporate greed, (2) 
obsessive consumerism, and (3) an aggressive neoliberalism seeking to privatize 
and marketize everything in its path. 
28. See Burawoy 2005a on the notion of provincializing sociology.
Chapter 2
1. This reputation is based largely on Durkheim’s foundational text, The 
Rules of Sociological Method (1982). Durkheim drew rather heavily on anthro-
pological research. While he established the concept of sociology on the basis 
of its methodological procedure, this did not blind him to the role of material 
from related fields in documenting and supporting sociological explanation. 
2. The European tradition has continued in the work of theorists such as 
Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, and Pierre Bourdieu, who are now also 
“classics.” In Mills’s time, studies by the Frankfurt School, which reworked 
Marxist and Weberian themes, in several respects resonated with the concerns 
of Mills, especially later in his life when he gave increased attention to culture 
and politics. 
3. Regarding differences between European and American sociologists, the 
macroscopic focus of European theory is perhaps related to the organization 
of European universities around professorships, while the more microscopic 
orientation of American sociologists is perhaps shaped by the departmental 
organization of the university. Individual professors with student followings 
tend to take on major historical problems, whereas the departmental pattern 
of American universities encourages specialized studies of particular, small-
scale topics. (This observation was suggested to me by Norbert Wiley.) The 
microscopic orientation is likely also a reflection of a greater American interest 
in the individual and interpersonal/group relations.
4. Lynd employs the conventional anthropological conception of culture as 
“a whole way of life,” as distinct from the narrower sociological conception of 
“a symbolic system of shared meanings.” As a rule, the broader anthropological 
conception embraces both nonmaterial and material culture, whereas in sociol-
ogy emphasis tends to be placed on nonmaterial culture, specifically beliefs, 
values, norms, attitudes, and so forth.
5. Sociology as a form of diagnosis is a notion that is explored in Chapter 5.
6. Certainly, there were signs of this in Mills’s time in the dramatic post-
war expansion of public higher education and the rise of a publishing industry 
providing both specialized material for an elite readership and mass circulation 
materials for an increasingly educated public. But there are grounds for judg-
ing Mills as having underestimated the influence of commercial mass culture, 
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which has grown into a gigantic, multibillion-dollar entertainment industry 
with dubious consequences for mass education and literacy. Indeed, these com-
ments in The Sociological Imagination would seem to contradict Mills’s earlier 
assessment in White Collar of the detrimental effects of mass culture and spe-
cifically his critical analysis of the destructive intellectual and political effects 
of the corporate mass media. Furthermore, as Haney points out (2008, 14–15), 
postwar sociology had already begun to portray the public as alienated and 
apathetic, a view consistent with Mills’s portrayal in White Collar. 
7. See the introduction in Geary 2009. 
8. See Tilman 1984, 2004. 
9. See discussions of this period of professionalization and critical reaction 
in Haney 2008, chaps. 6, 7, and 8. There is further irony in the fact that those 
who expressed the strongest objections to the claim that sociology had become 
a “science”—namely, Pitirim Sorokin and Lynd—only seemed to have had the 
effect of strengthening consensus around the new positivism. See Haney 2008, 
124. The popularizing work of the social critics surely intensified this effect. 
The commentary and work of the leading proponents of formal sociology and 
positivist methods during this time (notably Parsons, Merton, and Lazarsfeld) 
would seem to corroborate such a claim. 
10. The title of a chapter in Erich Fromm’s The Sane Society, “Man in Capi- 
talistic Society” (1955, 78), illustrates the point.
11. My discussion omits from consideration a number of prominent think-
ers associated with the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Erich Fromm, who 
was connected to this group, published pioneering studies in the psychology of 
mass society (1941, 1947, 1955). Fromm also devoted himself to a neo-Freudian 
approach to the study of social character. It is significant that David Riesman 
studied under Fromm and mentions in the preface to The Lonely Crowd the 
influence of two works of Fromm, Escape from Freedom (1941) and Man for 
Himself (1947), which Riesman characterizes as “influential models in the 
application of socially oriented psychoanalytic characterology to problems of 
historical change” (Riesman, Glazer, and Denny 1961, xiv). Herbert Marcuse 
wrote Freudian- and Marxist-oriented critiques of advanced capitalism, the 
best known of which was One Dimensional Man (1964). Mention need hardly 
be made of the work of the leading members of the school, Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno, whose essay “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as 
Mass Deception” (1969), originally published in 1944, is the classic theoretical 
critique of American mass culture. Also, Adorno was a member of the research 
team that produced The Authoritarian Personality (1964), a monumental ex-
ample of scholarly psychological interest in social character following the war, 
in this case provoked by the rise of European fascism. Leo Lowenthal contrib-
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uted to the Frankfurt project through his sociological studies of literature and 
character structure. The gloomy prognoses of the Frankfurt thinkers, who in 
a “one-dimensional” manner saw only new forms of domination and manipu-
lation in advanced capitalist society, have since been widely challenged (see, 
for example, Kellner 1983). Mills’s White Collar (1956) echoes many of the 
Frankfurt scholars’ concerns. Their work constitutes an important chapter in 
the story of critical psychological and cultural writings on postwar America. 
Finally, any characterization of this period would be incomplete without men-
tion of noted critics of mass culture such as Dwight MacDonald, Irving Howe, 
and other figures in the circle of New York intellectuals during Mills’s time and 
with whom he had ties. See Geary 2009, Haney 2008, and Horowitz 1983. 
See also the edited collection titled Mass Culture (Rosenberg and White 1957), 
which contains an assortment of critical essays by Mills’s contemporaries.
12. Strictly speaking, “personality” and “character” refer to different as-
pects of the individual, but in the social criticism literature the terms tend to 
be used interchangeably or at least in closely related ways.
13. As Daniel Geary has pointed out, the study by Gerth and Mills was 
part of a trend in the 1940s toward social psychological inquiries precipitated 
by the rise of totalitarianism. In addition, under the influence of Talcott Par-
sons and through a growing American awareness of European social theory, 
social scientists at this time were taking up a strong interest in social structure 
(see Chapter 1). Mills was also a part of this trend, but unlike most others in 
the discipline, he stressed the importance of a historical perspective. See Geary 
2009, 50–53. The popularity of Freudian theory during this same period par-
tially accounts for the tendency of scholars to use psychological categories in 
their investigations. Regarding the vogue in “national character” studies dur-
ing the same period, Mills did not regard his work on social character as be-
longing to this body of research, which has subsequently fallen into disrepute. 
14. The emergence of consumer culture is a historically complex topic, as 
it occurred over a long period of time, and it would be a mistake to date the 
phenomenon to Veblen’s era. See Dunn 2008.
15. For a fuller discussion of Galbraith’s observation, see Dunn 2008, 
40–41. A notable feature of his argument is its implicit support of the no-
tion of capitalist “need creation” set forth by members of the Frankfurt School 
(particularly Herbert Marcuse) and their followers. Galbraith locates the phe-
nomenon not in the Madison Avenue sales apparatus but in the economic logic 
of capitalism itself. What his argument overlooks, however, is the fact that pro-
duction decisions are largely an outcome of market research, whose purpose it 
is to make preproduction determinations of consumer tastes and preferences. 
While the status and relevance of market research findings and how they are 
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interpreted and used remain murky, they nevertheless constitute an important 
part of our understanding of consumer behavior.
16. Whyte’s observations and his contemporaries’ emphasis on conformity 
provide an interesting contrast to the later book by Philip Slater, The Pursuit of 
Loneliness (1970). As the title implies, Slater attributes what he sees as the trou-
bling problems of American life during this period to an excessive individual-
ism, effectively inverting the dominant view of other social critics of the time. 
I would submit that the two views are not incompatible. Without paying any 
attention to structural factors that are its cause (with the exception of lip ser-
vice to “institutional analysis” at the end of the book), Slater talks only about 
the socially isolating effects of the ideology of competitive individualism. One 
might argue that the consequences of this ideology are partially responsible 
for pressures toward group conformity, independently of the organizational 
forces discussed by Whyte. In any event, while offering a provocative array of 
insights, Slater’s arguments are almost wholly cultural and psychological in 
nature, resting exclusively on voluntarist premises and a view that blames the 
victim: Americans’ problems are traceable to the actors themselves.
17. Wasting no time introducing this image of the new middle class, Mills 
in the introduction to White Collar refers to “the decline of the independent 
individual and the rise of the little man in the American mind” (1956, xii).
18. See Adorno 1975.
19. See Geary 2009. In his thoughtful and judicious assessment of White 
Collar, Geary among other things contextualizes the book in Mills’s politics. 
According to Geary, the book is best understood in terms of Mills’s trajectory 
from an earlier belief in the possibility of labor developing into a progressive 
political force in the United States to a state of “political disillusionment.” The 
conservative implications he saw in the formation of a white-collar middle 
class subjected to the stifling effects of bureaucratic control and mass culture 
caused Mills to lose hope (ibid., 108–125). Geary also presents an extensive 
comparison of White Collar and The Lonely Crowd, which he regards as highly 
similar works that captured the same social and psychological syndromes in 
postwar America. In a journal review, Riesman wrote approvingly of Mills’s 
study, despite the limitations he saw in the overly simplistic and unfavorable 
portrayal of the white-collar worker (ibid., 135–142). 
20. A book that in certain respects complements the critique of 1950s 
America presented in White Collar but reaches far beyond it is the scorching 
attack by Paul Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (1956). Goodman indicts not 
the organization or the world of white-collar work but what he calls the “Orga-
nized System,” which he sees as a concentration of power that misappropriates 
society’s resources in a way that destroys values and common sense. His main 
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concern is with the plight of disaffected youth, whom he believes the Organized 
System deprives of a chance to grow up sane and healthy.
21. The major exception to this was Mills’s study The Power Elite (1959).
22. Perhaps the main exception is the work of Riesman, Glazer, and 
Denny (1961). 
23. White Collar, for instance, “concentrated its attention almost exclusively 
on how social structure shaped character” (Geary 2009, 133). Mills devoted 
little effort to showing the role of human behavior in the constitution of social 
structure or indicating how actors could shape structure and history, a reflec-
tion of his growing political pessimism by the time he wrote the book.
24. Arguing that people unsuccessfully seek social esteem in their non-
work lives as compensation for workplace alienation, Mills is not clear and 
consistent enough to convincingly explain the dynamics of this predicament. 
Also, while providing some grounds for his claim of alienation in both work 
and leisure, he overlooks aspects of both that might be sources of esteem and 
self-fulfillment. His one-sided analysis thus seems to preclude any possibility 
of white-collar workers finding genuine meaning and identity on the job.
25. Riesman took an especially strong interest in Veblen’s work, and Mills 
was indebted to the economist (Riesman 1960; Riesman 1993, 374–401; 
Horowitz 1983, 8).
26. The idea of contradiction that surfaced in Veblen’s critique was subse-
quently marginalized in favor of the vague and more neutral sociological term 
“cultural lag.” The latter is an imprecise concept loosely referring to maladjust-
ments between nonmaterial culture and the changing material base of soci-
ety, in which the former lags behind the latter. Veblen’s writings on the social 
dysfunctions of industrial society have led some authors to characterize him 
as a cultural lag theorist, effectively watering down his trenchant criticism of 
turn-of-the-century American capitalism. The term “cultural lag” was coined 
in 1922 by William Ogburn (1966). See Tilman 2007.
27. Of course, this tradition of criticism never entirely disappeared. Social 
scientists with journalistic and generalist bents have continued to make a mark 
on the field despite the reigning orthodoxy. Some familiar examples are Habits of 
the Heart by Robert Bella et al.; numerous works by Barbara Ehrenreich, includ-
ing Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class and Nickel and Dimed: On 
(Not) Getting By in America; The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human 
Feeling and The Second Shift, both by Arlie Russell Hochschild; Haven in a 
Heartless World: The Family Besieged and The Culture of Narcissism: American 
Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, both by Christopher Lasch; and many 
others. Fortunately, such best-selling commentators on contemporary American 
life have kept the intellectual and human sides of social science alive.  
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Chapter 3
1. Grounds for the rise of conflict theory had already been laid in the 1950s 
with the publication in paperback of Lewis Coser’s The Functions of Social Con-
flict and Ralf Dahrendorf ’s Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. How-
ever, it was mainly the surge of interest in Marxism that drew attention to this 
model. The case of Coser is interesting, as his study of conflict could be read as 
an astute defense of the functionalist paradigm.
2. In the late 1960s, opposition to the positivist consensus and its conserva-
tive overtones was a feature of a number of peripheral “grassroots” movements 
connected to university communities, including the New Left, the so-called 
counterculture, and second-wave feminism, all of which were in part expres-
sions of opposition to prevailing academic paradigms and doctrines in many 
fields of study.
3. While at the University of Texas Mills earned a master’s degree in “Amer-
ican philosophy and modern logic,” concentrating on the work of “Charles S. 
Peirce and G. H. Mead.” His “key teacher was George V. Gentry, a student of 
Mead’s” (Mills 2000, 80).
4. See Tilman 1984 for an informative treatment of the influence of prag-
matism, and especially John Dewey, on Mills and his work.
5. For historical perspectives on pragmatism, see West 1989, which finds 
its beginnings in Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Menand 2001, which situates the 
birth of pragmatism in the formation of “The Metaphysical Club.” See Jay 2005, 
chap. 7, for a detailed account of the early sources of pragmatist ideas, especially 
those of James. 
6. See Brinkmann 2013, 5–8, for a discussion of affinities between Dew-
ey’s thought and postmodernism. I stress the importance of a comparison only 
to philosophical and to some extent political postmodernism. The founding 
pragmatists would be dubious of other varieties. Ironically, with the exception 
of its qualified use among some contemporary scholars, the term “postmod-
ern” has acquired so many meanings as to become rather useless.
7. This, of course, has hardly been a matter of increasing economic de-
mocracy, with the exception of the affluent 1950s and 1960s. Regarding the 
relationship between pragmatism and social change, James and Dewey offer 
interesting cases. The teachings of James resonated with much of the educated 
public, in part due to his gifts as a speaker but also as a result of his close, sym- 
pathetic attention to the variety of beliefs, faiths, and experiences of the “com-
mon man.” Dewey has been widely known not only for his active participation 
in civic culture and political life but also, most notably, for his educational 
theories, which have had a wide and democratizing influence. One could read 
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Dewey’s whole philosophy as based on the notion of a democratization of 
knowledge and reason. For a sociology-of-knowledge approach to these think-
ers that explores their social backgrounds, positions, achievements, and defi- 
ciencies, see Mills’s published dissertation (1964). On democratization, see 
Mannheim 1956, pt. 3.
8. See Sydney Hook’s 1995 biography of Dewey for a discussion of the lat-
ter’s political involvements and impact on public and intellectual life.
9. I quote Bacon’s formulation for its clarity, as opposed to the original 
statement by Peirce.  
10. Richard Bernstein asserts, “The point of the pragmatic maxim is to relate 
thought and judgment to human conduct” (2010, 45). He claims that for Peirce 
“action” is singular, whereas “conduct” is general. According to Bernstein, the 
function of the procedure, then, is clarification of our “habits of conduct and 
the inferential consequences of our thoughts and judgments” (ibid., 46). For 
Bernstein, this comes into view when we look at the maxim from the standpoint 
of Peirce’s theory of signs. For Peirce, thought is impossible without signs (we 
might say more generally “language”). It is noteworthy that in the context of a 
discussion of Peirce’s semiotics Bernstein makes an explicit connection between 
the maxim—a philosophical scientific proposition—and human conduct. This 
implies a deep association in Peirce’s thinking between his scientific concerns 
and the conduct of social life. Such a connection becomes explicit in Dewey’s 
work. 
11. Regarding James’s reorientation of pragmatism toward the psychol-
ogy of the individual, it is worth noting the subtitle of this book, “A Study of 
Human Nature.” 
12. For a comprehensive biography of the life of James that addresses this 
and related issues, see Richardson 2006.
13. James’s embrace of “the flow of experience” has an obvious affinity 
with the “intuitive” philosophy of the Frenchman Henri Bergson and specifi-
cally the latter’s concepts of élan vital and durée. The two men were personally 
acquainted, and James spent a considerable amount of time in France, becom-
ing a highly popular lecturer with the French public. See Richardson 2006. 
14. Given its focus on subjective experience, James’s thought is often por-
trayed as a precursor of phenomenology. 
15. See Featherstone 1972 for a retrospective and insightful interpretation 
of the evolution of Dewey’s thought. 
16. See the observations in Weber 1958b and Habermas 1984 on the rise 
of instrumental rationality and its manifestation in the modern differentiation 
of value spheres. 
17. See Mills 1964, chap. 20, for a discussion. The quotation marks around 
“behaviorism” are intended to problematize this term in light of its several 
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meanings. Dewey critiqued the prevailing stimulus-response behaviorism of 
his time while formulating his own behaviorism, one that acknowledged the 
self-reflexive, thought-based, and “organic” character of behavioral processes. 
See Dewey 1896.
18. Its focus on experience was a chief target of Durkheim’s attack on prag-
matism. As evident in his lectures on the subject (Durkheim 1983), Durkheim 
developed a sympathetic interest in pragmatism toward the end of his life, one 
of a number of signs that his theorizing was leading him in the direction of 
symbolic interactionism (Stone and Farberman 1967). While supportive of 
pragmatism’s criticism of the excesses of rationalism, Durkheim complained 
that its conflation of “experience” and “reality” erased the latter, thus under-
mining rational thought and any foundation for “truth.” Attempting to retain 
the idea of an objective world “out there,” Durkheim rejected Dewey’s merg-
ing of subjectivity and objectivity and James’s notion of “radical empiricism,” 
which claimed that nothing existed outside of experience. Despite his compel-
ling defense of the distinction between subject and object, Durkheim actually 
misconstrues Dewey’s ideas and intent. A clarification of Dewey’s thought 
would most likely have dispelled much of Durkheim’s misperception of prag-
matist principles by reasserting pragmatists’ firm belief in the social founda-
tions of thought and action, a thoroughly Durkheimian idea. 
19. The attention I devote to the impact of Hegel and Darwin serves my in-
terest in the social aspects of Dewey’s philosophy and should not minimize the 
important role played by Dewey’s encounter with behaviorist psychology. His 
critique of this tradition in “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896) is 
the key to Dewey’s whole reconceptualization of human behavior and in certain 
respects prefigures his theory of experience. 
20. One might think of Dewey’s entire philosophy as in part a long battle 
against the chronic mistake of taking abstractions for reality. 
21. While Hegel and Darwin are obvious sources of the temporal di-
mension in Dewey’s thought, Bergson should be mentioned as contributing 
to the prominence of the concept of temporality in nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth-century philosophy and thus also likely having an influence 
on Dewey. 
22. The main chapters of this 1932 publication comprise the Carus Lec-
tures that Mead delivered to a meeting of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion at Berkeley in 1930. Interestingly, this book contains “Prefatory Remarks” 
by Dewey in which he praises Mead’s contribution to the field, commenting 
particularly on his notions of “emergence” and “sociality,” key concepts in 
Mead’s never fully completed philosophy.
23. Jay points out that late in life Dewey conceded that “historical ob-
stacles” had “prevented understanding of my use of ‘experience.’” Dewey says 
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he would have instead used the term “culture.” Further complicating matters, 
in his last published work, Knowing and the Known (Dewey and Bentley 1960), 
Dewey states that “trans-action” might have been the preferable term for con-
veying what he meant by “experience.” See Jay 2005, 298–299.
24. In Dewey’s conception, “means” and “ends” are thoroughly relative 
terms. In the ongoing process of experimental inquiry into problems and acts 
of adjustment to a continually changing environment, means can turn into 
ends and vice versa in an extended chain of adaptation-based action. In other 
words, knowledge and action are never completed or finished, “final ends” 
never achieved in a world that is constantly changing. See Dewey’s 1939 Theory 
of Valuation. 
25. See Hook 1995, chap. 5.
26. In Menand’s interpretation, “pragmatism is an account of the way 
people think—the way they come up with ideas, form beliefs, and reach deci-
sions” (2001, 351).
27. Instead of “pragmatism,” Dewey preferred instead the terms “natural-
ism,” “experimentalism,” or “instrumentalism” (Brinkmann 2013, 19). In the 
preface to Logic, Dewey says, “The word ‘Pragmatism’ does not, I think, occur 
in the text” (Dewey 2013, 4). By the time he wrote this massive volume, late in 
life (it was published in 1938), “so much misunderstanding and relatively futile 
controversy [had] gathered about the word” that he chose to “avoid” it altogether 
(ibid.). He admits, however, that “in the proper interpretation of ‘pragmatic,’ 
namely, the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propo-
sitions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as 
to resolve the specific problems evoking the operations, the text that follows is 
thoroughly pragmatic” (ibid.; italics in original). 
28. In this and other texts, Dewey leaves himself open to a number of criti-
cisms. By speaking of means and ends in the abstract he can be easily attacked 
for moral relativism. We need to know whose and what means and ends are at 
stake. Additionally, his emphasis on the “instrumental” and “natural” as com-
ponents of an experimental approach seems to omit consideration of the inner 
life and the place of contemplation and reflection in the way humans think. 
29. Bernstein claims that a number of studies of the pragmatists “show the 
striking differences between pragmatism and positivism” (1999, 168).
30. It is not entirely clear what Mills means by this comment. Generally, 
Mills tends to misinterpret Dewey’s use of “the biological.” See Dewey 1960b, 
chap. 9.
31. Dewey devotes chapter 10 of Knowing and the Known (first published 
in 1949) to a clarification of what he sees as the similarities and differences 
between science and common sense.
32. See Jay 2005, 298–299.
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33. See Weber 1947, 87–157.
34. An example of Blumer’s appreciative references to Dewey is the impor-
tance he attached to Dewey’s “Reflex Arc” article, which Blumer often referred 
to in his writings and teaching. See Blumer 1969. Blumer believed that Dewey’s 
critique of the stimulus-response model was fundamental to an understanding 
of Meadian theory and laid important groundwork for the concept of symbolic 
interaction. 
35. Blumer’s “formative interaction” brings to mind Durkheim’s notion of 
“social emergence.” See Blumer 1969, chap 3. 
36. See Blumer 1969, chaps. 1 and 2.  
37. For major statements on agency and structure, see Giddens 1979, 1984; 
Bourdieu 1977; Hays 1994; and Archer 1982.
38. See Dewey 1957, pt. 1, “The Place of Habit in Human Conduct.”
39. See Mills 1963b, pt. 4, esp. “Language, Logic, and Culture,” “Situated 
Actions and Vocabularies of Motive,” and “Methodological Consequences of 
the Sociology of Knowledge.”
Chapter 4
1. We find this view scattered throughout Dewey’s writings, but it appears 
most fully in his aesthetic theory set forth in Art as Experience (1958b).
2. For a comprehensive retrospective on the development of instrumental 
rationality from the perspective of the Frankfurt School, see Jay 2016. 
3. Plato’s scheme dividing the world of ideas or “perfect forms” from the 
imperfections of the real world of “things” can be thought of as the classic 
philosophical expression of this dichotomy.
4. This is elaborated in Dewey’s theory of logic. 
5. See, for example, Bernstein 1999, Galgan 1988, Rytina and Loomis 
1970, and Tilman 1984.
6. The term “public intellectual,” of which Dewey was perhaps the first best-
known example, was first introduced by Russell Jacoby (1987) and has been in 
circulation, especially in discussions of Mills and his contemporaries, ever since. 
Regarding the political controversy surrounding Dewey, while Dewey was ini-
tially a liberal reformer, in the aftermath of World War I and amid growing signs 
of worldwide economic and political crisis, his politics became more socialist. 
This corresponds to Richard Rorty’s observation in the introduction to Sydney 
Hook’s study of Dewey (his former professor) that Dewey and Hook were “anti-
Communist social democrats” (Hook 1995, xv). Indeed, the list of Dewey’s in-
volvements in the social and political causes of this period, including his defense 
of Leon Trotsky during the Moscow Trials, is quite extensive. See chapter 8 of 
Hook 1995 for an informative and sympathetic discussion of Dewey’s politics. 
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7. The concept of “praxis,” which originated with the Greeks, has appeared 
in the work of a host of philosophers, Marxist and non-Marxist alike. Given 
Dewey’s immersion in an Americanized Hegelian tradition during a time of 
rising popularity for socialism in the West, resemblances between this aspect 
of his philosophy and the Marxist notion of praxis are hardly surprising.
8. Hans Sluga (2014) draws a distinction between two types of political the-
ory, the “normative” and the “diagnostic,” generally approving of the modern 
trend he finds away from the former toward the latter. This quote indicates that 
Dewey, in basic agreement with Sluga, finds fault with normative theorizing 
while his promotion of experimental method and empirically based knowledge 
is more suggestive of Sluga’s conception of the diagnostic mode of thought. 
9. The scholar and teacher Ernest Becker once distinguished between “pas-
sive empirical” and “active ideational” modes of thought (personal lecture 
notes), a distinction that parallels Dewey’s conception of the difference be-
tween static concepts on the one hand and agentic and processual concepts on 
the other. 
10. These passages are difficult to interpret. While it is apparent what 
Dewey is driving at, his remarks about concept formation constitute one of his 
more puzzling arguments. It is not at all clear what his concept of the State, or 
any other entity, would actually look like. Here, Dewey’s thinking encounters a 
logical obstacle: Concepts by their very nature serve a stabilizing function, they 
fix in place what would otherwise remain a chaos of perceptions and represen-
tations. The essential function of concepts is to provide the mind with logical 
structure in order to capture and make sense of a complex and fluid reality. 
Here, Dewey seems unwilling to concede the difficulties involved in represent-
ing or theorizing “process,” a key principle of his philosophy. Moreover, in the 
absence of a tentative formal definition, it would be difficult to distinguish be-
tween what is a state and what is not a state, or how we might be able to decide 
the difference between a “good” state and a “bad” one. If in these quotes, on 
the other hand, Dewey is referring to the fact that concepts as practical tools of 
explaining and understanding the world are always subject to theoretical and 
empirical revision, than his statements seem more acceptable.
11. Explicitly defining thought in terms of human activity as opposed to 
contemplative and abstract reasoning, Dewey states, “Intelligence as distinct 
from the older conception of reason, is inherently involved in action.” Attack-
ing another conventional dualism, he adds, “Moreover, there is no opposi-
tion between it and emotion. There is such a thing as passionate intelligence” 
(1934, 79). 
12. In a rather uncharacteristic concession to the unpredictable results of 
human action, Dewey comments on the “‘accidental’ relation in institutional 
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development” involving “consequences that . . . were not foreseen or intended” 
(Dewey 1934, 75–76). This acknowledgment of the unintended/unanticipated 
consequences of action is a significant corrective to the impression Dewey 
tends to leave that rational, purposive conduct guarantees the achievement of 
desired ends. At the same time, one can argue that this familiar sociological 
concept is of a piece with notions of fallibility and theoretical revision. 
13. Hegel paved the way for this facet of Dewey’s thinking. Jay comments 
that Hegel “embraced a dynamic philosophy of relationality in which subjects 
and objects were mutually constituting” (2016, 63).
14. See “The Supremacy of Method” in Dewey 1960b. 
15. See reference to this distinction in note 9 above.
16. An interesting convergence between Dewey and Weber is observable 
in Mills’s work. While Dewey stressed problem solving, Weber claimed that 
every scientific field is defined by the problems it studies (Weber 1949, 68). 
Mills’s insistent focus on problems reflects both influences. 
17. See, especially, Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems (1954), Human Na-
ture and Conduct (1957), Freedom and Culture (1963), and Liberalism and Social 
Action (2000). 
18. Dewey was vague on the specifics of agency. His early writings seemed 
to favor the actions of individuals in guiding society toward a better future. In 
a later, seemingly less optimistic mood, he indicated support for collective, or-
ganized action. In his criticisms of Dewey, Mills carelessly misses this change 
of position, arguing that the logic of Dewey’s belief in the power of intelligence 
in shaping change is a mandate for an individualistic conception of agency as 
opposed to the actions of organizations or movements.
19. Despite the generic character of Dewey’s use of the word “change,” put 
in context it is apparent that the term refers to social change. Since for Dewey 
everything human was social in character, it follows that “society” was Dewey’s 
implicit reference point when talking about change. 
20. This set of concerns is most evident in White Collar (1956).
21. The relevant books are, in order of appearance, The New Men of Power 
(first published 1948), White Collar (first published 1951), and The Power Elite 
(first published 1956). See Geary 2009, 151. As Geary notes, since the first 
book was a study of labor leaders, it was not strictly speaking about the work-
ing class (2009, 249n25).
22. The emphasis on particularity as against generality is another strik-
ing instance of parallels between Dewey and Weber. The latter used the term 
“historical individual” (a particular cultural and social configuration—e.g., 
the modern money economy) to describe what he believed was the proper 
object of social science investigation (Weber 1949, 79). See Chapter 5. This 
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was Mills’s approach in his work on contemporary power relationships and the 
“new” middle-class society.
23. Mills developed his notion of cultural apparatus over a period of time in 
writings that were never published in book form. Late in his career Mills wid-
ened his identification of potential change agents to include not only traditional 
intellectuals but also “cultural workers.” Implementing this expanded category, 
he defined the cultural apparatus as “all those organizations and milieux in 
which artistic, intellectual and scientific work goes on” and “all the means by 
which such work is made available to small circles, wider publics, and to great 
masses” (from Mills 1958, 73, qtd. in Geary 2009, 190; see also “The Cultural 
Apparatus,” Mills 1963, 405–422). This turn to the realm of symbolic mean-
ings was a gesture in the direction of cultural politics, a move that connected 
Mills to the American New Left of the 1960s, the British cultural Marxists, and 
the Frankfurt School. One might say this concept was Mills at his dialectical 
best. On the one hand there were moments of optimism about the possibility 
of those in the cultural apparatus becoming agents of radical social change; 
on the other hand Mills pessimistically saw the cultural apparatus falling into 
the hands of the corporate economy and the nation-state, becoming a tool of 
manipulation and conformity in the form of mass culture and its correlative, 
mass apathy. This part of his theory has affinities with the later argument of 
Jürgen Habermas in his 1989 publication, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, in which the public disintegrates into a mass of private individu-
als beholden to consumer society and its corporate bidders. Later in this work, 
Mills struck a more optimistic tone, drawing on the pragmatist notion of the 
“constitutive power of language” as a basis for an “autonomous” cultural appa-
ratus (Geary 2009, 193) and the possible formation of new forms of conscious-
ness supporting liberatory change. This view invites comparison to Habermas’s 
work on communicative action (1984), which draws on pragmatist theory for 
the purpose of rehabilitating a liberatory concept of reason. See Jay 2016 and 
Antonio 1989.
24. My discussion of their differences is based on commentary on Mills’s 
political criticisms of Dewey in Tilman (1984, chap. 8; 2004, 212–217) and 
Geary (2009, chap. 2). 
25. Mills makes the mistake of taking Dewey’s biological model of action 
too literally and reductively. Dewey saw action and evolution partly in terms 
of interactions between humans and nature, partly in terms of interactions 
among humans themselves (i.e., social relations). Mills apparently failed to 
see how Dewey wove these dimensions together in a complex picture of social 
evolution. Generally, Mills fails to grasp the extent to which the biological 
imagery in Dewey’s writings serves to model society and social change on the 
idea of Darwinian adaptation. It is obvious that Dewey invokes Darwinism, 
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sometimes by analogy, sometimes metaphorically, to characterize the nature 
of the social process.
26. These Deweyan ideas, and what Dewey meant by them, have been the 
object of endless controversy. According to Joseph Featherstone, “The ambi-
guity in the term ‘adjustment’ lay in the fact that Dewey meant two nearly 
opposite things by it. He meant a passive adaptation to the social environment, 
and he meant mastery and control of it” (1972, 27). Both interpretations leave 
unanswered the political connotations of Dewey’s Darwinian language and 
how Dewey himself understood these terms theoretically and practically.
27. The debate here would seem to revolve around the distinction between 
“adjustment” and “transformation.” Both are vague and ambiguous terms 
requiring definition, context, and reference points. In fact, it is not entirely 
clear that these terms refer to mutually exclusive ideas. Such debate in certain 
respects alludes to the difference between “reform” and “revolution,” a much 
clearer distinction. (Neither Dewey nor Mills advocated the latter.)
28. According to Hook, Dewey at this time acknowledged the need for 
“reforming . . . the institutional scheme of things” (1995, 165), implying the 
kind of organized action in the interest of institutional and structural change 
advocated by social democrats and, apparently, Mills himself. 
29. This radical turn in Dewey’s politics was undoubtedly a response to 
the Great Depression. 
30. Tilman is probably right to characterize Mills’s objections to Dewey’s 
liberalism as historically misplaced insofar as they were more applicable to the 
liberalism of Mills’s own time. 
31. Given Dewey’s view of purposive action as entailing situationally based 
methods of experimental inquiry, one interpretation is that Dewey himself 
regarded humans as “craftsmen.” See the discussion in the section titled “Man 
as Craftsman” in Bernstein 1999, 213–219.
32. “Professional sociology” is in practice roughly but not entirely equiva-
lent to what I mean by “formal” or “formalistic” sociology.
33. This seems to be what Burawoy in part has in mind when he refers to 
a “sociology of publics” (2005b, 8, italics in original).
Chapter 5
1. It is seldom clear what the overused term “value-free sociology” actually 
means. For instance, in his criticism of this notion Alvin Gouldner (1962) 
mostly limited himself to Weber’s statements about fact-value separation in 
“Science as a Vocation” (1958c), his famous lecture warning against personal 
bias in the classroom. Gouldner’s narrow definition of the problem ignores 
Weber’s more elaborated discussion in “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and So-
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cial Policy” (1949), which outlines the multiple and complex ways that values 
enter into sociological inquiry. In his discussion of fact and value, even Put-
nam (2002, 63) ignores this essay and as a result overlooks Weber’s intricate 
dissection of the problem.
2. Gunnar Myrdal made a point of using the term “valuations” rather than 
“values,” stating that the “subjectivity” of the former term keeps actors in the 
picture and more accurately describes how values function in the social sci-
ences. As he indicated, people hold “values” (objects) but engage in “valuations” 
(a form of behavior). See Myrdal 1969 and commentary by his daughter in the 
introduction to a reissued publication of volume 1 of An American Dilemma 
(Myrdal 2009). 
3. This is true notwithstanding the frequent cultural and subcultural dif-
ferences between researchers and subjects.
4. Perhaps the best-known example of this in sociology is the strong con-
servative overtones of Talcott Parsons’s version of functionalism. He employs 
some of these same terms while claiming that society is a “normative order” 
and a “system seeking equilibrium,” a theory not so faintly attributing “nor-
malcy” and legitimacy to the prevailing value system and existing order. See 
Parsons 1951. Some have gone further, arguing that even philosophical and 
methodological positions in social science are ideological in character. It could 
be argued, for example, that as an approach to social scientific inquiry, positiv-
ism, by presupposing that the social world is governed by laws akin to those 
of nature, in effect underwrites a belief that existing social arrangements are 
“natural” and therefore “necessary” or “immutable.” Positivist sociology thus 
harbors a conservative message. See Shaw 1973.
5. Despite their embeddedness in language, values are always to some 
degree transparent and subject to scrutiny. Nonetheless, acknowledging that 
language itself is an inescapable source of valuation is a reminder that, as Witt-
genstein (2009) taught us, language is the arbiter of the limits of our knowl-
edge and understanding of the world. These limits, however, can be discerned 
and taken into account in our theories and practices.
6. For a fuller discussion of Putnam, see Bernstein 2010, chap. 7.
7. Weber’s well-known analytical constructs of economy, religion, bureau-
cracy, and authority types are examples of this method of abstractly “model-
ing” historical types of sociocultural phenomena on the basis of their salient 
characteristics. See Weber 1947 and other essays in this same book.
8. Certainly, making one’s own values explicit and open to inspection al-
lows for stronger claims to “objectivity.” Aside from this basic rationale for 
open expression of values, however, with the partial exception of Weber’s 
methodological prescriptions, none of the thinkers examined here offers use-
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ful guidance on the form this kind of self-reflexivity might take and how it 
can be achieved in practice. 
9. For further discussion of values in science, see Bell 2008, esp. chap. 2.
10. Among the many expressions of Dewey’s historicism, this quote from 
Experience and Nature is unequivocal: “Aside from mathematics, all knowledge 
is historic” (1958b, 163).
11. As indicated in previous chapters, the social problems orientation of 
the Chicago School as well as Dewey’s reformist-minded philosophy and poli-
tics were manifestations of this early twentieth-century environment of moral 
concern. It is also worth recalling that in its early years many entrants to the 
field of sociology were Protestants from professionally religious backgrounds. 
From its inception, the field was colored by moral and reformist impulses, and 
the joining of religious/moral interests to sociology, seen as a scientific instru-
ment of social amelioration, was a commonplace response to fears of social 
and moral decay.
12. Parallel to Durkheim’s thesis that morality changes with changing 
social conditions, Dewey’s historicism led him to a historically relative con-
ception of values. As an example, see chapter 3 of his Liberalism and Social 
Action (2000). Durkheim’s and Dewey’s conception of the social and histori-
cal relativity of morals brings to mind Weber’s notion that values function in 
historically specific ways and that empirical science therefore can analyze value 
positions in terms of their validity or viability for a given set of historical or 
social circumstances.
13. This is another of several Durkheimian themes in Dewey. Both think-
ers responded to the modern crisis of religion by turning to theories of morality 
and education, specifically their mutually interrelated functions in socialization 
of the individual and maintenance of the social bond. Dewey and Durkheim 
both believed that education was the primary means of secularizing morality. 
See Dewey 1934 and Durkheim 1956, 1961. See also Dill 2007. Given Durk-
heim’s interest in pragmatism (1983), similarities between his and Dewey’s 
concerns and ideas are worth further exploration. See Joas’s comparison and 
contrast of Durkheim and pragmatism (1993, chap. 2). See also Dewey 1957, 
pt. 4. In addition, see “The Durkheim and Dewey Page,” by Andrea Nagy, at 
studymore.org.uk/xnagy.htm. 
14. See Dewey 1966a, “Introduction.”
15. While perhaps not germane to his purposes, how Dewey actually 
defined “morality” remains an open question, although providing a formal 
definition would have been inconsistent with his philosophical principles. Ac-
cordingly, his notion of morality and ethics remained “situational.” See Brink-
mann 2013, 111–112. 
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16. See Pappas 1998 for a discussion of Dewey’s ethics. Moral concerns 
were so important to him that, according to Sydney Hook, “Dewey was led 
to his logical investigations as a result of his attempt to provide a scientific 
foundation for moral judgments” (1995, 88).
17. For an extensive analysis of the concept of objective value from a differ-
ent perspective, see Georg Simmel’s monumental 1990 study, The Philosophy 
of Money.
18. “Work in social science has always been accompanied by problems of 
evaluation” (Mills 1961, 76).
19. See Gerth and Mills 1964 on the role of values in the social psychology 
of the individual.
20. The literature covering this tradition is extensive. On the topic of im-
manent critique, see Antonio 1981 and Stahl 2014. On the Frankfurt School, 
see Jay 1973.
21. Referring to “the technical and economic conditions of machine pro-
duction” (Weber 1958a, 181) dominating modern life, the term “iron cage,” 
which appears on this same page, was coined by Talcott Parsons in his transla-
tion of Weber’s study of religion and capitalism. 
22. Sluga presents a probing analysis of the origins and development of 
diagnostic thinking, which he counterposes to the “normative tradition” in 
political theory. He sees the diagnostic mode of thought emerging with Marx 
and Nietzsche and appearing later in the work of thinkers like Weber, Carl 
Schmitt, the Frankfurt theorists, Hannah Arendt, and Foucault.
23. “Pathology” and other medical metaphors are scattered throughout 
Durkheim’s early work, which relies heavily on terminology and models from 
natural science. Social problems, from Durkheim’s perspective, are mani- 
festations of an “abnormality” in the “social body.” On anomie, see Durkheim 
1951. In a classic essay, “Social Structure and Anomie,” Robert K. Merton, who 
was later to become identified with the sociological mainstream, employs the 
anomie concept in a Marxist-sounding critical argument about the structural 
obstacles to upward mobility in American society. In a parallel with the practice 
of immanent critique, Merton points to the contradiction between the cultural 
goal of monetary success and a lack of economic opportunity. See Merton 1957, 
131–160. For an informative discussion of the medical model of diagnosis, see 
Sluga 2014, 33–40. 
24. There is, of course, a functionalist dimension to Marx’s theory of capi-
talism. He attempts to analyze how this system becomes dysfunctional as a 
system as part of his wider theory of social change in which a combination of 
structural breakdown in the economy and collective worker opposition to the 
ruling class leads to human emancipation. See Marx 1906 and 1959.
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25. Although Mills (1961) uses the term “institutional contradiction” on 
the first page of The Sociological Imagination (unfortunately without explain-
ing what this meant), the postwar critics generally did not avail themselves of 
the concept.
26. The social dislocation, impoverishment, and resulting discontent of 
working people in the “older” economy of the Midwest were major factors in 
the populist backlash against Washington politics and policies that elected 
Donald Trump to the presidency in the 2016 election. 
27. See Kadlec 2006 for documentation of neo-Marxist hostility toward 
pragmatism. As she indicates, Frankfurt School member Max Horkheimer, a 
severe critic of Dewey, in Eclipse of Reason identified pragmatism with “vulgar 
positivism” (Kadlec 2006, 253). It would seem that nothing could be further 
from the truth. See also Jay 1973 and Joas 1993, chap. 4.
28. In Bernstein’s words, Dewey “advocated a conception of philosophy in 
which it would become a form of social criticism” (1999, 201).
29. For representative criticisms of Frankfurt School critical theory, see 
Kadlec 2006 and Kellner 1983.
30. For more detailed treatments of pragmatism as critical theory, see An-
tonio 1989, Kadlec 2006, and Shalin 1992.
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